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Today, international credits are among the key ingredients of the growth 
strategies pursued by the developing countries and the investigation of the relationship 
between international credits and income distribution is of special importance when the 
effectiveness of such flows are evaluated. In this study, we examine the effect of 
international credits, including those disbursed by the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), on the income distribution in developing countries 
using data for years 1961-1996 for 63 countries, with maximum of 163 country-year 
observations and panel data estimation procedure. Our results briefly indicate that the 
WB loans do not appear to have reduced inequality in the countries in our sample. 
Comparing the performance of the WB group to that of the IMF, we find that credits 
originated from the IMF have a significant improving effect on the income distribution; 
which is stronger in the transition countries.  Our results also point out that the 
presence of high rates of inflation appears to aggravate inequality. Additionally, our 
findings support the empirical literature that there exists a positive relationship between 
the level of income and inequality in the early stages of development. Moreover, 
evidence from our regressions show that economic growth has not got a significant 
impact on income distribution. Finally, our results show that the inclusion of the 
governance variables leaves the former results intact, that is improvement in the 
governance measures has not sufficed to contribute to equality in distribution in the 
countries examined in this study.  
 
 





ULUSLARARASI KREDİLERİN GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELERİN GELİR 




Ekonomi Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 




Uluslararası krediler, gelişmekte olan ülkelerin büyüme stratejilerinin önemli bir 
parçasını oluşturmakta ve bu akımların etkinliğinin değerlendirilmesi söz konusu 
olduğunda bu kredilerin gelir dağılımıyla ilişkisinin incelenmesi özel bir önem 
taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmada 63 ülke ve  1961-1996 dönemi için oluşturulan veri setini ve 
panel veri yöntemini kullanarak Dünya Bankası ve Uluslararası Para Fonu tarafından 
verilen kredileri de içerecek şekilde, uluslararası  kredilerin gelişmekte olan ülkelerin 
gelir dağılımlarına etkisi ele aldık. Sonuçlarımız, örneklemimizdeki ülkeler için, Dünya 
Bankası tarafından verilen kredilerin gelir dağılımı eşitsizliğinde herhangi bir 
düzelmeye yol açmadığını göstermektedir. Öte yandan, Uluslararası  Para Fonu’nun 
kaynaklık ettiği kredilerinse gelir dağılımında anlamlı bir iyileşmeye yol açtığını 
saptadık ve bu iyileşmenin geçiş ülkelerinde daha güçlü olduğunu gözlemledik. 
Bunların yanında, sonuçlarımız enflasyonun gelir dağılımını bozucu etkisini ortaya 
koymaktadır. Sonuçlarımız, ekonomik gelişmenin ilk aşamalarında gelir eşitsizliğinin 
artma eğiliminde olduğu yönündeki literatürü destekler niteliktedir. Ek olarak, 
çalışmamız ekonomik büyümenin gelir dağılımında anlamlı bir düzelmeye yol açmadığı 
yönünde kanıtlar ortaya koymaktadır. Son olarak, yönetişim değişkenlerinin modellere 
eklenmesinin sonuçları değiştirmediği ve bu değişkenlerdeki iyileşmenin gelir 
dağılımını düzeltici bir etkisi bulunmadığını saptadık.   
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While reducing income inequality is one of the key challenges governments 
of the modern world face, it is extremely important for countries to design the 
appropriate strategies and policies that may help attain that goal. Today, 
international financial flows are the key elements of growth for developing countries 
and those countries have access to a broader range of international financial 
resources than ever before. Aid and other international loans are among the 
important channels through which developing countries finance their economic and 
social development strategies. First, these flows have a potential macroeconomic 
impact in the receiving country, which depends on those flows’ absolute level and 
relative level as a proportion of GDP and gross domestic investment; and on the 
characteristics of the country. There are many attempts in the literature to measure 
the macro-level impact of international loans. 
Research on the direct macroeconomic effects of financial loans and aid has 
generated a sizable literature. However, there are only a limited number of studies, 
with only a few notable exceptions, that investigate whether those flows improve 
income distribution. In one of the studies that enquire into this link, Cashin et al. 
(2001) claim that IMF programs and the adjustment loans involved with them have 
an impact on poverty and income distribution through different mechanisms such as 
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the real depreciation, fiscal consolidation, cuts in domestic absorption, expanded 
access to credit markets, the widening of the tax base to property and income taxes, 
the switching of expenditures to basic health and education and through their effects 
on growth and inflation. Moreover, using both the counterfactual methodology and 
before and after analysis, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) find a significantly 
negative effect of IMF lending on growth and distribution of income. 
Other line of studies on international loan and aid effectiveness aims to find 
empirical evidence on the issue whether financial aid works best in a good policy 
environment and whether financial assistance will lead to faster growth, poverty 
reduction and improvements in income distribution in countries that has sound 
economic management. In an early study, Johnson and Salop (1980) find that IMF 
programs have distributional consequences which depend on the structure of the 
economy, the specific terms of the stabilization program, the level of program 
implementation and the structure of poverty.  
Likewise, Garuda (2000) states that the economic and political environment 
of the country prior to participation has an important influence on the impact of IMF 
programs on income distribution. He reports that when the pre-program external 
balance is severe in the economy, a significant deterioration in income distribution 
and the incomes of the poor are observed in the program countries relative to their 
non-program counterparts. However, in cases where prior external imbalance is not 
as large, countries participating in IMF programs actually show relative 
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In view of the earlier studies there appears room for further explanation of 
the link between international credits and income distribution. This study aims to 
provide a panel data analysis which examines the link between international loans1 
and income distribution in the recipient countries. Using panel data for years 1961-
1996 for 63 countries, with maximum of 163 country-year observations and utilizing 
the constant coefficients model (the pooled regression model), this study will 
analyze the role of international credits in altering income distribution in association 
with governance in the recipient country. The major objective of this study is to find 
out whether the aid and loans by the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) improve, worsen or do not affect the income distribution in 
the recipient country. Besides, however, income distribution effects of other 
international credits are investigated in this study. Using panel analysis rather than 
adopting a cross-country framework like in Garuda (2000), our study aims to 
investigate the income distribution effects of international credit originating from the 
WB, in addition to the IMF loans which are more frequently visited in the literature. 
Hence, we investigate the possible effects of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans, the International Development 
Association (IDA) credits, IMF disbursements and total long term disbursements on 
the income distributions of receiving countries. In doing so, we consider the 
governance and the political environment of the country receiving the flows to check 
                                                 
1
 In our models we use different categories of financial flows that are in the form of aid and loans, 
namely; the ratio of IBRD loans and IDA credits to GDP, the ratio of long term disbursements plus 
IMF credits to GDP and the ratio of total long term disbursements to GDP (detailed definitions are 
provided in the appendix). 
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whether country specific governance factors have an influence on the distribution 
impact of international credits.  
Our findings indicate that an increase in the credits extended by the WB 
tends to deteriorate income distribution in the countries in our sample. Comparing 
the performance of the WB group to that of the IMF, we find that long term 
disbursements, plus IMF credits, have a significant equalizing effect on the income 
distribution, especially in transition economies. Opposite to what we have expected, 
we observe positive relationships between inequality and some governance 
measures, possibly meaning that improving these has not sufficed to contribute to 
equality in distribution in the countries examined in this study.  
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the literature survey 
and the studies on the interaction of various policy variables, aid, poverty reduction 
and income distribution. Chapter 3 presents the data used and the methodology 
utilized in the study. Chapter 4 presents the results of regression analysis on 










      CHAPTER 2 
 




Reducing poverty and eliminating the severe income inequalities in 
developing countries are critical challenges faced by economic institutions and 
governments of those countries. These are also among the main concerns of the 
international financial institutions that are designed to maintain stability of the world 
economic environment and to assist those in need.  
Although our study attempts to investigate the effect of international credits 
on income distribution, our literature survey mainly consists of studies that relate the 
flows generated by the international financial institutions, a considerable part of 
which is in the form of assistance and aids, with income distribution. The main 
reason for such an approach is the fact that majority of the international credits we 
consider in this study are generated by international financial institutions 
themselves. Also, there is no study that relates international credits in a broad sense 
with income distribution while a few studies have just focused on the relationship 
between aid and income distribution. Therefore, we base our literature survey 
mainly on the studies which examine the interrelationship between flows generated 
by international financial institutions, specifically aid, growth and income 
distribution, in addition, to some recent studies that inquire the effect of international 
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financial flows other than aid, especially loans by the IMF and the WB, on 
developing country distributions.      
Additionally we believe that an attempt to investigate the relationship 
between assistance and aid provided by the international financial institutions and 
income distribution has to involve literature surveys on economic growth, poverty, 
income distribution and the impacts of the assistance by the IMF and the WB. Being 
one of the earliest studies focusing on the impact of policies implemented and the 
actions taken by the international institutions on poverty alleviation and income 
distribution, Johnson and Salop (1980) find that IMF programs have distributional 
consequences which depend on the structure of the economy, the specific terms of 
the stabilization program, the level of program implementation and the structure of 
poverty. As mentioned above, a number of studies, however, have asserted the 
distribution worsening and growth reducing impacts of the IMF programs (See for 
example, Pastor (1987), Conway (1994), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), Vreeland 
(2002))2.  
The set of policies are important when the trends and allocation of global 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is considered. The flow of ODA to 
developing countries increased gradually during the 1970s and 1980s. However, 
after the end of the Cold War era (during the first half of the 1990s) a substantial 
                                                 
2
 Pastor (1987) finds that the implementation of a program reduces the labor share of income, relative 
to both the pre-program levels and a control group of Latin American countries that did not undergo 
IMF programs. Conway (1994) finds that the immediate impact of IMF programs on growth is 
negative. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) add that IMF programs lower annual economic growth by 
1.5% each year a country participates and they find no evidence of a positive impact in the long run. 
Vreeland (2002) also finds evidence of a negative distributional impact of IMF programs; 
redistributing income away from labor.  
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decline in global ODA was observed, then it reached its pre-1990s upward trend by 
the end of the decade. Approximately, three-fourths of ODA was supplied through 
bilateral programs during the last three decades and the proportion provided through 
multilateral organizations has increased since the 1980s. Finally, more than half of 
ODA goes to least developed and low-income countries and ODA is an important 
means to raise living standards of the poor living in these regions of the world. 
These facts are some of the reasons why the allocation and the efficient use of aid 
and the gains of the poor from these flows constitute one of the emphases of the 
studies mentioned above.  
The first part of this chapter (2.1) will cover the studies on the interaction of 
various policy variables, aid, poverty reduction and income distribution. Subsections 
are arranged in order to provide the analysis of papers concerning: economic growth 
and its determinants (2.1.1), with a special stress on aid as being one of the factors 
pertaining to growth; associations of poverty and income distribution with 
macroeconomic variables and aid (2.1.2).  
Second part (2.2) focuses on the effects of IMF and WB programs on the 
macroeconomic environment of the participant countries and consequences of these 
on the poverty levels and income distributions associating these with the political 
economy forces in those economies. Subsections cover: the dynamics of 
participation in and the effectiveness of such programs (2.2.1); the distributional 
effects of the IMF and WB oriented aid (2.2.2); and finally the possible links 
between aid provided and programs implemented by the WB and the IMF and, the 
political economy environment of the receiving country (2.2.3).    
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2.1 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICY VARIABLES, AID, POVERTY AND 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
 
This section gives a brief summary of the results of the studies on the 
interactions of various policy variables, aid, growth, poverty reduction and income 
distribution. First, we will discuss the determinants of growth and the linkages 
between aid and growth (2.1.1). Following that, we will address several works on 
poverty and income distribution with reference to key macroeconomic variables and 
aid (2.1.2).  
2.1.1 Macroeconomic Policies, Economic Growth and Aid 
 
One branch of the literature that is relevant for the relationship between 
macroeconomic policies and income distribution focuses on the link between 
economic growth and its determinants. Using a database developed by the World 
Bank Debt Reporting System on foreign aid, Burnside and Dollar (2001) examine 
the relationship among foreign aid, economic policies, and growth of per capita 
GDP. The authors find that fiscal surplus, inflation and trade openness are among 
the factors that have a great effect on growth based on panel growth regressions for 
56 developing countries and six four-year periods from 1973 to 1993. Authors first 
claim that in general, developing country growth rates depend on initial income, 
institutional variables and policy distortions3, aid, and aid interacted with distortions. 
                                                 
3
 Although the aid data employed by Burnside and Dollar cover a large number of countries, the 
institutional and policy variables are not available for many countries. They collect information for 
56 countries and get 272 observations. They use a measure of institutional quality that captures 
security of property rights and efficiency of government bureaucracy developed by Knack and Keefer 
(1995); ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable provided by Easterly and Levine (1996); 
assassination variable and interactive term between ethnic fractionalization and assassinations. 
Finally they use money supply over GDP in order to proxy for distortions in the financial system. 
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Then they construct an index of the three policy variables; fiscal surplus; inflation; 
and trade openness which they then interact with foreign aid and instrument for both 
aid and aid interacted with policies4. With regards to the relationship between 
growth and aid, they provide strong evidence that aid has a positive impact on 
growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies5. 
However, in the presence of poor policies, aid has no positive effect on growth. 
Furthermore, the examination of the determinants of policy indicates that there is no 
evidence that aid has systematically affected policies.  
However, reassessing the links between aid, policy, and growth using more 
data, Easterly et al. (2003) find that adding new data creates doubts about the 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) conclusion6. When they extend the sample forward to 
                                                                                                                                         
Besides these, they use several policy variables such as the dummy variable for openness provided by 
Sachs and Warner (1995). They use inflation as a measure of monetary policy (Fischer, 1993). They 
use the budget surplus relative to GDP and government consumption relative to GDP as fiscal policy 
variables, which are both introduced by Easterly and Rebelo (1993).  
4
 In order to deal with the endogeneity problems, Burnside and Dollar (2001) find some instruments 
for aid. Since aid/GDP is a function of variables such as population, infant mortality rate, and proxies 
for donors’ strategic interests and these variables are not included in the growth regression; authors 
include these as good instruments for aid and the interactive terms.  
5
 Burnside and Dollar (2001) estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency to 
reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors’ pursuit of their own strategic interests. They 
estimate separate aid equations for bilateral and multilateral aid and find that it is the former that is 
influenced by donor interest variables. Multilateral aid is found to be a function of income level, 
population, and policy. Additional finding that is provided by Burnside and Dollar is that bilateral aid 
has a strong positive impact on government consumption giving insight into why aid is not promoting 
growth as much as intended. Finally, they reallocate aid in a counterfactual way by reducing the 
effect of donor interests and channelling more aid as rewards to good policies. They find that such a 
reallocation would have a large, positive effect on developing countries’ growth rates. 
6
 There exists a significant literature criticizing Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar 
(2002). These critiques argue that the Burnside and Dollar work suffers from some important 
weaknesses such as incorrect functional-form specification which stems from the exclusion of the 
quadratic term, that aid-growth specifications should include (Lensink and White 2000, 2001, 
Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001 and Hansen and Tarp, 2001). Hansen and Tarp (2001) argue that 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) suffers from incorrect econometric specification and suggest that the 
impact of country-specific fixed effects should be removed via differencing. Finally, Lensink and 
White (2000) argue that growth elasticities of poverty reduction, which is assumed to be constant in 
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1997 from the Burnside and Dollar data end of 1993, they no longer find that aid 
promotes growth in good policy environments. Similarly, when they expand the 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) data by using the full set of data available over the 
original Burnside and Dollar (2000) period, they no longer find that aid promotes 
growth in good policy environments. Moreover, their findings regarding the fragility 
of the aid-policy-growth link is unaffected by excluding or including outliers7. 
2.1.2 Poverty and Income Distribution  
 
In this section, we summarize the literature on poverty and income 
distribution vis-à-vis their relationship with growth (2.1.2.1), several key 
macroeconomic variables (2.1.2.2) and aid (2.1.2.3).  
2.1.2.1 Poverty Reduction, Income Distribution and Economic Growth 
 
There are many studies that empirically address the question of how 
economic growth affects poverty and inequality, focusing especially on the middle 
and low-income countries. One of the earliest studies on the issue is Kuznets’ 
(1955). His famous hypothesis asserts that growth and inequality are related in an 
inverted U-shape; that is in a developing country experiencing the early stages of 
growth, most of the time income distribution gets worse and does not recover until 
                                                                                                                                         
Collier and Dollar (2002), vary across countries that is high-inequality countries will have lower 
elasticities. This weakens the poverty-reducing impact of higher growth. 
7
 In their paper Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott (2003) revisit the debate over the inter-relationships 
between aid, policy, growth and poverty reduction. They find that when they introduce country fixed 
effects, the core Burnside-Dollar finding that aid only works (in the sense of increasing per capita 
GDP growth) in a good policy environment, collapses.  Nevertheless, in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Burnside-Dollar thesis remains well-founded: aid raises growth only in the presence of a good policy 
environment. They add that in countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa, aid raises growth independent 
of policy.  
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the country reaches the middle income status8. However, later studies that use time-
series data reject this hypothesis and find that income distribution does not change 
significantly over time; so claiming that growth influences distribution is fallacious 
(Ravallion, 1995, Deininger and Squire, 1996, and Adams, 2002). 
Using a new database9, Adams (2002) elaborates on the findings of such 
studies asserting that income distribution10 does not change much over time, and 
concludes that economic growth11 does not affect inequality significantly. On the 
other hand, he infers that “since income inequality tends to remain stable over time, 
economic growth can be expected to reduce poverty, at least to some extent” 
depending on two factors: the rate of economic growth itself and the extent of 
inequality. Initial distribution matters because the absolute gains to the poor will 
depend on their initial shares of total income, as well as the extent of that growth 
and how distribution changes.  
                                                 
8
 According to Kuznets’ (1955) model, the agricultural and rural sectors are characterized with 
relatively low level of per capita income and low level of inequality. He posited that the initial phase 
of economic development process entails shrinking of these sectors through movement of resources 
from them to the industrial and urban sectors that both feature higher inequality and higher level of 
per capita income at the early stages of development. Meanwhile, the new workers who joined the 
industry and urban area would move up the income ladder vis-a-vis the existing richer workers there 
and, at the same time, scarcity of workers in the agriculture and rural area would drive up wages too, 
thereby reducing the inequality in the whole economy. This means that as the level of per capita 
income increases further, a negative relationship between income and inequality would be 
established. 
9
 The new data set, which concentrates on low-income countries, utilizes the results of household 
surveys as they represent the best source of poverty information in most developing countries, and 
includes complete growth, poverty and inequality for as many countries and time periods as possible. 
Adams (2002) got data from 50 low and lower middle-income countries, all of which at least had two 
nationally representative household surveys since 1980. Two surveys for one country define an 
interval and the data set includes a total of 101 intervals. The poverty and inequality data come from 
the World Bank, Global Poverty Monitoring database and the data on GDP growth come from the 
World Bank 2001 World Development Indicators database. 
10
 Three different poverty measures are used in this study: the headcount index, poverty gap index, 
and the squared poverty gap index. Gini coefficient is used for measuring the changes in inequality.  
11
 The study uses the approach of reporting results using two measures of growth which are the 
change in the level of mean expenditure (income) per person calculated from the household surveys 
and growth measured by changes in GDP per capita, in PPP units.  
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On the effect of inequality on growth, Ravallion (1996) claims that the 
higher the initial inequalities in physical and human assets the less economic 
growth, and the less likely the poor will participate in growth. He also points out 
another link concerning disparities between the investment opportunities of the poor 
and the rich. “Since credit constraints are likely to bite more for the poor,” he says, 
“high initial inequality implies that more people will be constrained from making 
productive investments; growth is lower and inequality persists”. These indicate the 
state-dependence of the paths out of poverty and that economies with high initial 
inequalities of human capital may get stuck in a macro-poverty trap of low and 
inequitable growth12. Likewise, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton 
(1997) claim that credit market imperfections, which  limit the ability of low income 
individuals to invest in human capital, leave productivity gains unexploited. 
Opposed to those views emphasizing negative aspects of inequality for growth, 
Barro (2000) suggests that due to the fact that political power follows from 
economic power, concentration of income may produce government policies 
favoring economic growth. 
2.1.2.2 Poverty Reduction, Income Distribution and Other Key Macroeconomic 
Variables 
 
                                                 
12
 Additionally, Ravallion (1996) briefly discusses the regional disparities in poverty measures that in 
almost every country there exist poor areas where poverty measures are well above the national mean 
and a persistence of poverty is observed. He argues that both current levels of poverty and rates of 
poverty reduction depend on various area characteristics such as poor infrastructure and geographic 
capital. He proposes that without extra resources or greater mobility the poor may be caught in a 
spatial poverty trap, which calls for anti-poverty policies that may have to break the local-level 
constraints on escaping poverty, by public investment or migration incentives. That is, prospects of 
escaping poverty may be highly dependent on individual, household and community characteristics. 
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Having overviewed the connection between inequality and growth, it is also 
important to find out whether there exist meaningful relationships between income 
distribution and other macroeconomic factors such as fiscal balance and balance of 
payment deteriorations, rising debt to GDP and debt servicing to GDP ratios and 
high inflation.  
Sarel (1997) develops an empirical framework with simple OLS regression 
procedure using a large cross-country database with two types of data: income 
distribution variables and macroeconomic and demographic variables13. He aims at 
identifying the macroeconomic variables that significantly affect trends of income 
distribution and at estimating the magnitude of these effects. He lists the variables 
that are associated with an improvement in income distribution as higher growth 
rate, higher income level, higher investment rate, real depreciation, and 
improvements in the terms of trade. The factors that have no significant effect are 
inflation (level, variability and rate of change), public consumption, external 
position (level and change), level of exchange rate, and the price ratio of investment 
to consumption goods14.  
2.1.2.3 Poverty Reduction and Aid 
 
Besides the factors mentioned above, the effect of aid on poverty has been 
investigated by various recent studies.  Burnside and Dollar (2000) report that the 
                                                 
13
 His sources are Deininger-Squire (1996) database for income distribution and Penn World Tables 
(PWT) version 5.6 for macroeconomic and demographic variables where he eliminates observations 
by a five-step selection process from 682 to 425. 
14
 Sarel (1997) calls for an expanded empirical study to include that there are additional factors that 
can affect trends in income distribution, such as the composition of social expenditure, including 
expenditure on education, health, and social insurance. 
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impact of aid on growth depends on the quality of economic policies and is subject 
to diminishing returns. However, the quantity of aid does not systematically affect 
the quality of policies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Similarly, Collier and Dollar 
(2002)15 find that the allocation of aid that has the maximum effect on poverty 
depends on the level of poverty and the quality of policies. That is, the optimal 
allocation of aid for a country depends on its level of poverty, the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to income, and the quality of its policies. Thus, holding the 
level of poverty constant, increasing aid with better policy environment (since the 
growth impact of aid is higher in a better policy environment) and holding policy 
constant, increasing aid with poverty (since the poverty impact of growth is higher) 
yields better ends than the actual allocation of aid. 
2.2 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK 
CREDITS  
 
This part concentrates on the effects of IMF and WB programs on countries. 
First, in section (2.2.1), we give the common characteristics of countries 
participating in such programs with substantial reference to Conway (1994) and the 
results of the studies on the effectiveness of the programs. Second, we will discuss 
the distributional effects of the IMF and WB aid in section (2.2.2).  Third in section 
(2.2.3), we will summarize some reports on the possible links between foreign aid 
and the political economy environment of the countries receiving aid.    
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 The study utilizes the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as the 
measure of policy environment. This measure has 20 different components covering macroeconomic, 
sectoral, social and public sector policies. Plus, Collier and Dollar (2002) estimate the aid-growth 
relationship over a large number of observations, 349 growth-aid-policy episodes of four years each.  
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2.2.1 Participation in and the Effectiveness of the IMF Adjustment 
Programs and WB Adjustment Lending 
 
Being one of the primary ways through which aid flows take place, IMF and 
WB supported adjustment programs have drawn substantial degree of interest 
among the researchers dealing with income distribution16. For developing countries, 
which suffering from macroeconomic imbalances, among the traditional channels 
for making outside resources available have been stand-by agreements and extended 
fund facility drawings17. While designed to have macroeconomic impact, these 
programs do affect the poor through some channels. Looking first at the direct 
effects of these programs, Conway (1994) examines the dynamics of IMF program 
participation and provides a detailed analysis of participation in IMF programs over 
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 For an excellent literature review on the subject see Vreeland (2002) and Garuda (2000). 
17
 In his book, “The Elusive Quest for Growth”, William Easterly gives an exhaustive explanation of 
why extensive development assistance over the course of decades failed to alleviate poverty in poor 
countries. As an economist at the World Bank, Easterly observed how resources and advice provided 
by the Bank failed to improve the lives of the poor in poor countries. He gives different explanations 
for the development failures among which IMF and World Bank efforts take place. (1) The Harrod-
Domar growth model according to which the aid necessary for a primarily set growth target is 
calculated. This aid was prospected to fill the gap between domestic investment and the total 
investment required to achieve the growth target. The Harrod-Domar growth model penalized 
countries that had high domestic saving rates; there was moral hazard since governments in poor 
countries maximize aid resources received by lowering their domestic savings effort, so as to create a 
larger financing gap that required more aid resources. (2) Robert Solow’s growth model, where 
technology, not the resources, are key to growth. However, infusions of aid intended to provide 
capital did not provide growth since the poor countries of the world were not in the domain of 
diminishing returns to capital, which is intended to be overcome by technology. Additionally, the 
poor countries did not bridge the technology gap. As a consequence, convergence of national 
incomes between poor and rich countries did not take place. (3) Education and accumulation of 
human capital failure of which is attributed to incentives by Easterly. That is, having the government 
force you to go to school does not change your incentives to invest in the future. Easterly claims that 
“creating people with high skill in countries where the only profitable activity is lobbying the 
government for favors is not a formula for success” and “creating skills where there is no technology 
to use them is not going to foster economic growth.” (4) Assistance and adjustment loans of the 
World Bank and debt forgiveness, which did not influence governments’ choice of policies. Repeated 
adjustment loans did not improve lives of the poor, because of corrupt and unethical governments.  
(5) Efforts of IMF concerning the alleviation of poverty in poor countries through adoption of sound 
macroeconomic policies did not work out perfectly due to problems of transparency in the operations 
of the governments and the effectiveness of public spending in helping the poor.   
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the period 1976-1986. The test of effectiveness of such a program requires a 
comparison methodology (counter-factual) in which the researcher should consider 
the outcome that would have occurred in the absence of the program.  
Conway (1994) extends the contributions of researchers18 that have worked 
on this issue in a number of directions. First, the decision to participate in an IMF 
program is modeled and examined using a discrete regression Probit procedure and a 
censored-regression Tobit procedure19. Conway found that participation is driven by 
a combination of factors such as: (1) Past performance (more rapid economic growth 
in the previous year reduced the expected time spent in an IMF program, so does a 
more negative current account in the previous year). (2) Present external influences 
(improvements in the terms of trade lowers participation at the margin, increases in 
the existing debt burden increase participation, a higher real interest rate is also 
associated with less frequent participation in IMF programs). (3) Sluggish 
adjustment of developing countries (the greater the percentage of IMF facility drawn 
down in the past year the greater the duration of an IMF program today; stabilization 
programs require more than the standard 12-month duration of stand-by agreement 
to reduce the need for assistance).  
Conway (1994) gives insights into the motivations for and the 
macroeconomic effects of participation in an IMF program. Using two-stage 
generalized least squares methodology, he finds that participation has 
contemporaneous effects such as a reduction in economic growth and domestic 
                                                 
18
 Killick (1984), Gylfason (1987), Edwards (1989), Khan (1990). 
19
 For a thorough criticism of alternative approaches to program evaluation (the outcome vs. 
counterfactual approach, the discrimination analysis (logit or probit) and the before–after method) see 
Evrensel (2002). 
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investment and an improvement in the current account. Conway (1994) 
distinguishes the contemporaneous effects from the lagged effects and concludes 
that past participation in an IMF program benefits more. He points that the lagged 
effects of increased participation on economic growth and domestic investment are 
positive, and in most estimates qualitatively greater than the contemporaneous 
effects. The improvement of current account is continued.  
On the other hand, Easterly20 (2001) tests the direct effect of IMF and WB 
adjustment lending on poverty reduction, and finds no systematic effect of 
adjustment lending on growth. But, he suggests that adjustment lending lowers the 
growth elasticity of poverty -the amount of change in poverty rates for a given 
amount of growth21. That is, economic expansions benefit the poor less under 
structural adjustment, but at the same time economic contractions hurt the poor less 
under structural adjustment.  
Easterly (2000) suggests some mechanisms leading to that result. First, he 
speculates that IMF and WB conditionality may be less austere when lending occurs 
during an economic contraction; while it may be severe during an expansion, 
requiring macro adjustment. In such a case the poor can be hurt, for instance because 
of a fiscal adjustment implemented through increasing regressive taxes like sales 
                                                 
20
 Easterly uses data from 1980-98 on all types of IMF lending and on WB adjustment lending, 
where IMF lending includes: Stand-bys, extended arrangements, structural adjustment facilities, 
enhanced structural adjustment facilities. WB adjustment, on the other hand includes: Structural 
adjustment loans, sectoral structural adjustment loans, structural adjustment credits. For data on 
poverty, he uses an updated version of Ravallion and Chen’s (1997) (reference list) database on 
poverty spells source of which is household surveys and which also reports Gini coefficients and the 
mean income.  
21
 The absolute value of the growth elasticity of poverty declines by about 2 points for every 
additional IMF or WB adjustment loan per year. 
 18 
taxes or decreasing progressive spending like transfers. Second, it may be IMF and 
WB conditionality that causes the expansion or contraction in aggregate output, but 
may not affect poor much if we see the poor as mainly deriving their income from 
informal sector and subsistence activities, which are not affected much by fiscal 
policy changes or adjustments in macro policies. 
An empirical analysis by Evrensel (2002) examines the effectiveness of 
Fund-supported stabilization programs and suggests that even though the Fund’s 
conditionality prescribes fiscal and monetary discipline in program countries, the 
IMF cannot impose its conditionality even during program years22. Moreover, 
Evrensel (2002) claims that, when successive inter-program periods are considered, 
program countries enter a new program in a worse macroeconomic condition than 
they entered the previous program.  
In the study, the basis of program evaluation is what the Fund expects 
program countries to do and whether these targets are achieved, that is Fund-
supported programs are evaluated based on the outcome vs. purpose approach using 
the before-after method23. For instance, the Fund expects program countries to 
reduce their domestic credit creation, budget deficit, domestic borrowing, inflation 
rate, current account and capital account deficit. Evrensel (2002) investigates 
whether the program countries experience significant improvement in these 
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 The study uses a broader data set than previous program evaluations. Among 181 IMF-member 
countries 91 countries received at least one of the four structural adjustment programs; namely 
standby, EFF, SAF, and ESAF during the sample period (1971–97) of the study. 
23
 In this paper, Fund-supported programs are evaluated based on the outcome vs. purpose approach 
using the before–after method. Different from the previous before- after evaluations which consider 
one-year lags before and after a program, this study uses lags of up to three years so as to observe 
changes in the evaluation variables from three years before the start of a program to three years after 
the end of a program. In addition to the results of the before–after analysis, the temporal inter-
program analysis is used to illustrate the possibility of moral hazard associated with Fund programs. 
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variables under an IMF program and reports that as countries approach a 
stabilization program, current account deficit, and reserves deteriorate accompanied 
by a slower real growth.  
However, during the program period significant improvements are observed 
in the current account and reserves24 together with smaller domestic borrowing and 
larger foreign debt. When the post-program years are examined, in the year 
following the end of the program there are significant improvements in financial 
account and overall balance of payments. However, in three years time money 
supply increases significantly. Evrensel (2002) stresses that most of the program 
countries suffer the problem of sustainability and point out to the fact that the 
improvements in balance of payments and reserves achieved during an IMF program 
disappear in the post-program years. 
Devarajan et al. (2001) also evaluate adjustment lending by the outcome vs. 
purpose method and conclude that the countries in Africa receiving large amounts of 
aid, including conditional loans, usually end up with different policies and outcomes 
than they are advised to reach and that aid is not a primary determinant of policy.  
Moreover using both the counterfactual methodology, which is based on the 
observations on how intervention changed the outcome compared to what would 
have happened without the intervention, and before and after analysis, Przeworski 
and Vreeland (2000) find a significantly negative effect of IMF lending on growth 
and distribution. 
                                                 
24
 However, the definition of reserves makes a difference. When reserves are defined net of IMF-
credit, Evrensel (2002) finds no significant improvement in reserves due to a Fund program. 
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Different from the studies mentioned above, which treat adjustment loans as 
independent events and do not use the information contained in the frequent 
repetition of adjustment loans to the same economy, Easterly (2005) claims that the 
repetition of adjustment loans changes the nature of the selection bias. He mentions 
that one explanation for why adjustment loans are repeated is as follows: “the 
adjustment is a multistage process that requires multiple loans to be completed… 
and we would expect to see gradual improvement in performance with each 
successive adjustment loans, or at least an improvement after a certain threshold in 
adjustment lending was passed”.  
Easterly (2005) also mentions that when evaluating structural adjustment 
programs with repetition, selection bias can still take place if adjustment loans are 
repeatedly initiated in countries that fail to correct the macroeconomic problems and 
poor growth under earlier adjustment loans, mainly because governments fail to 
follow through with the conditions of earlier loans. However, he then asks why the 
IMF and WB keep giving new adjustment lending resources to countries with poor 
track record of compliance with the conditions and concludes that “the interpretation 
is not particularly favorable to the effectiveness of adjustment lending as a way to 
induce adjustment with growth”.  
Observing the patterns in the 20 top receivers of repeated adjustment lending 
over 1980-99, Easterly (2005) finds that none of those top 20 recipients were able to 
achieve reasonable growth and contain all policy distortions and about half of the 
adjustment loan recipients show severe macroeconomic distortions regardless of 
cumulative adjustment loans. He uses probit regressions for an extreme 
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macroeconomic imbalance indicator and reports that its components fail to show 
robust effects of adjustment lending or time spent under IMF programs25. Also, by 
using instrumental variables regression estimation for investigating the causal effect 
of repeated adjustment lending on policies; Easterly (2005) reports that the results 
show no positive effect on policies or growth. He finds that there is no evidence that 
per capita growth improved with increased intensity of structural adjustment 
lending. 
Nevertheless, the success of such reforms may exhibit variability depending 
on factors such as political economy forces within the aid receiving country. 
Additional to this, a few donor-effort variables are also suggested as being highly 
correlated with the probability of success. Dollar and Svensson (2000) test the 
hypothesis that success or failure of reform depends on political economy factors 
within the country that attempts to reform through the use of several variables that 
capture elements of domestic political economy: ethnic fractionalization, whether 
leaders are democratically elected, and length of tenure (time in power)26. They find 
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 First, the results of probit regressions of the macroeconomic distortion dummy on cumulative 
adjustment loans in a pooled cross-section time series sample suggest a small but statistically 
significant reduction in the probability of macroeconomic distortions with each additional adjustment 
loan or each additional year under an IMF program. However, when a time trend is introduced, this 
effect disappears meaning that there is a time trend towards reduced probability of macroeconomic 
distortions which is unrelated to adjustment lending. An additional adjustment loan or an additional 
year under an IMF program does not reduce the probability of macroeconomic distortions once this 
time trend is controlled. Therefore, Easterly (2005) concludes that countries have adjusted over time, 
but this is not related to the number of adjustment loans from the Bank and Fund, and to cumulative 
time spent under IMF programs. 
26
 In order to assess these hypothesis, authors exploit data from the World Bank’s Operation 
Evaluation Department (OED) covering more than 200 loans designed to support specific reform 
programs. The OED measure is an acceptable proxy for reform since it is highly correlated with 
improvements in observed economic indicators such as the rate of inflation and the extent of budget 
surplus. The database includes not only data on reform outcome, but also detailed information on 
variables under the WB’s control such as the resources devoted to analytical work prior to reform, 
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considerable support for this hypothesis, that is, a small number of political 
economy variables can predict the outcome of an adjustment loan successfully 75% 
of the time. However, they find no evidence that any of the variables under the 
donor’s control (allocation of preparation and supervision resources or number of 
conditions) effect the probability of success of an adjustment loan. Factors under the 
control of the donor community influence the success of adjustment programs, only 
after controlling for domestic political economy factors. 
2.2.2 Distributional Effects of the IMF and the WB Credits  
  
As summarized, research on the direct macroeconomic effects of adjustment 
programs implemented under the assistance of the IMF and the WB has generated a 
sizable literature. In addition, however, it is important to draw attention to the 
distributional and poverty-reducing effect of such programs. Particularly, Cashin et 
al., (2001)27 do this with reference to the studies by Garuda (2000), Easterly (2000), 
                                                                                                                                         
number of conditions, and the sequencing of conditions. In the study, 182 adjustment loans are 
included to the dataset.  
27
  This study uses the UNPD’s Human Development Index (HDI), which is a composite indicator of 
well-being. This measure takes the arithmetic average of a country’s achievements in three basic 
dimensions of human development: longevity, educational attainment, and living standards. It was 
available for 100 countries over the period 1975-98 at the time of the study. Although the measure 
does not capture the income inequality directly, it is very much correlated with UNDP’s Human 
Poverty Index (HPI). The study finds an association between improvement in HDI and the sound 
macroeconomic policies such as lower inflation, lower variability of inflation, lower external debt, 
better rule of law, lower black market premium, a lower frequency of financial crises. Pointing that 
these associations are debatable, Cashin et al. (2001) attempt to estimate the relationship between 
economic policies and improvements in the HDI, for a given rate of growth of GDP per capita 
isolating the direct effects of each of the policies on well-being. Using cross-country regression 
approach, they have not found significant and robust evidence that any of the variables are 
individually associated with pro-poor or anti-poor economic growth.  
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Demery and Squire (1996)28. They claim that Fund programs have an impact on 
poverty and income distribution through different mechanisms such as real 
depreciation -the price of non traded goods decreases relative to traded goods- 
(positively if the traded goods sector is more labor intensive so that the return to 
labor increases), fiscal consolidation, cuts in domestic absorption, “expanded access 
to credit markets, the widening of the tax base to property and income taxes, the 
switching of expenditures to basic health and education” (p. 10) and through their 
effects on growth and inflation.  
In particular, Garuda (2000)29 reports that the economic and political 
environment of the country prior to participation may determine the impact of such 
programs on income distribution. He finds evidence of a significant deterioration in 
income distribution and the incomes of the poor in Fund program countries relative 
to their non-program counterparts, when the pre-program external balance is severe. 
In cases where prior external imbalance is not as large, countries participating in 
Fund programs actually show relative improvements in distributional indicators30.  
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 In their study, Demery and Squire (1996) find that those countries which implemented effective 
World Bank and IMF reform programs generated declines in overall poverty; those that implemented 
ineffective reform programs generated increases in overall poverty.   
29
 His study exploits a cross-country database on income inequality developed by Klaus Deininger 
and Lyn Squire. The paper measures the effects of 58 IMF programs in 39 countries from 1975 to 
1991 on Gini coefficients and income of the poorest quintile. Plus, in order to capture the combined 
impact of Fund programs on distribution and growth, a third measure is constructed: average income 
of the poorest quintile. Income data used Penn World Tables 5.6 for per capita income estimates. 
30
 Garuda (2000) measures the effects of 58 IMF programs during 1975-91 on Gini coefficients and 
income of the poorest quintile, tracing these variables over two to five years following the program 
initiation. He uses propensity scores similar to that of Conway (1994), which are described as the 
implied probabilities measuring the probability that a country would ask for Fund assistance in a 
given year based on its economic circumstances. Then he makes an assessment of the effect of IMF 
programs on outcome measures within bands of propensity scores. As most of the studies taking the 
IMF program performance as its problem, the basic technique employed in this study is a comparison 
of a sample of country-years in which a country entered a Fund program to another in which a 
country did not. It addresses the problem of identifying the counterfactual by using a statistical 
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2.2.3  IMF and World Bank Aid and the Business Environment of the 
Receiving Country 
 
It is widely accepted that aid is not generally channeled for productive uses 
or poverty alleviation. In association with corruption, foreign aid may foster poor 
governance and reduce growth. Mauro (1995) finds that higher levels of corruption 
are associated with low economic growth, making foreign aid susceptible if any link 
between aid and corruption is proven to exist. Tavares (2003), on the other hand, 
finds that foreign aid decreases corruption. Two possible explanations of such 
relationship are provided by Tavares. “First, foreign aid may be associated with 
rules and conditions that limit the discretion of the recipient country’s officials, thus 
decreasing corruption –a conditionality effect. Second, if foreign aid alleviates 
public revenue shortages and facilitates increased salaries for public employees it 
may diminish the supply of corruption by public officials –a liquidity effect” (p. 
104). 
Alesina and Weder (2002) examine whether less corrupt governments are 
rewarded with increases in bilateral aid, and they find that it is actually the more 
corrupt countries that receive more aid. One possibility that arises is that aid is 
channeled to uses that promote corruption. Corrupt countries are poor performers 
                                                                                                                                         
technique known as propensity score estimation to reduce the selection bias inherent in comparing 
program and non-program countries. This technique controls for differences in countries’ initial 
economic circumstances. In particular, countries seeking the Fund assistance typically face a more 
unstable pre-program economic climate than those who do not. In the lowest group of propensity 
scores, countries initiating Fund programs show average improvements in all three distributional 
outcomes relative to non-program control sample. Ones in the middle group show less pronounced 
differences, though they are generally positive. However, in the highest propensity band Fund 
program countries actually show statistically significant relative worsening of income share and 
increases in Gini coefficients relative to the control samples. Garuda adds that the most plausible 
mechanism by which Fund causes the above changes is the currency devaluation.  
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and they find themselves relying more on foreign resources. The governments of 
those countries do not seem to be disturbed by this situation on account of the future 
flows of aid. On the other hand, within-country forces make them consider the 
poverty and income distribution; therefore governments become uncomfortable with 
the poor economic performance.  
A similar explanation is provided by Evrensel (2002). Associating the Fund-
supported programs with moral hazard, she proposes that the governments of 
program countries may adopt unsustainable macroeconomic policies due to the 
availability of future the Fund credit. For instance, if a country has had Fund support 
before, the cost of macroeconomic policies that lead to the depletion of international 
reserves may be lower to the country and the availability of continual adjustment 
programs may imply moral hazard by motivating governments to follow riskier 
macroeconomic policies under the fact that stabilization programs on average do not 
change the macroeconomic fundamentals of program countries. When subsequent 
stabilization programs are compared, the second inter-program period is associated 
with significantly smaller reserves, higher domestic credit creation, inflation rate, 
budget deficit, domestic borrowing, domestic and foreign debt than the first inter-







    CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
 
The literature offers interesting studies regarding the effectiveness of Fund-
supported structural adjustment programs and the aid, assistance and adjustment 
loans of the World Bank. However, the relationship between such efforts and 
income distribution in the recipient country has not been explored exhaustively. This 
study employs a greater number of observations than used in the study of Garuda 
(2000), and investigates the possible effects of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans; the International Development 
Association (IDA) credits and IMF disbursements on the income distributions of 
receiving countries.  
Previous studies provide empirical evidence that aid is one of the major 
catalysts of growth, which is strongly associated with improvements in income 
distribution (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Income distribution is not only affected by 
growth but it is also improved by real depreciation and improvements in the terms of 
trade (Sarel, 1997), which are common consequences of structural adjustment 
programs. Therefore, these two studies indicate that the channels through which 
international credits improve income distribution are several and are proven to 
function depending on the quality of economic policies implemented and the 
effective use of such flows in the recipient country. Nevertheless, neither of these 
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two studies have directly investigated the direct effect of international credits on 
income distribution. 
Using panel data this study will analyze the role of aid and loans by the WB 
and the IMF in effecting income distribution in association with governance in the 
recipient country. The major objective of this study is to find out whether the WB 
and IMF loans improve, worsen or do not affect the income distribution in the 
recipient countries.  
This chapter discusses the earlier model by Garuda (2000) that deals with the 
link between Fund-supported programs and income distribution (3.1). Then, the 
chapter follows with the description of the variables and data used in the study and 
ends with the econometric methodology used for estimations (3.2). 
3.1 REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY OF EARLIER STUDIES 
 
It is stimulating to investigate the nature of the relationship between income 
distribution and international credits, especially the ones by the IMF and the WB, 
since the direct link between these two is not a subject in the economic literature that 
is visited much. In this section, we will briefly point out the guiding lines presented 
by the two studies that have parallel aims with our study.  
An important cross-country analysis on the relationship between income 
distribution and aid is provided by Garuda (2000). He was motivated by the 
methodology used by Conway (1994), who calculated propensity scores (the 
probability that a country would request IMF assistance in a given year based on its 
economic circumstances) in order to verify that IMF program participation of 
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countries can be predicted by the background economic variables which are lagged 
values of some economic indicators.  In order to estimate the effect of IMF 
programs after controlling a country’s pre-program economic environment, Garuda 
(2000) estimates propensity scores and subclassifies observations into groups 
defined by ranges of propensity scores. After the generation of the propensity scores 
Garuda (2000) separates the observations into treatment and control groups within 
each group of propensity scores. Then he performs a mean comparison of changes in 
outcomes within each range of propensity scores. He then considers differences in 
the effects of Fund programs over two-to-five year periods after program initiation 
within each group.  
When compared with Garuda (2000), our analysis uses panel analysis rather 
than adopting a cross-country framework. Additionally, our study employs a greater 
number of observations than used in the study of Garuda (2000). That is, instead of 
generating propensity scores for countries receiving IMF assistance, we follow a 
pooled panel analysis. In addition, we do not limit ourselves with the effects of IMF 
program participation alone but consider a wider concept of flows, which includes 
the WB assistance and the Fund programs together to investigate the possible 
effects of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
loans, the International Development Association (IDA) credits, and IMF 
disbursements. Through this approach we intend to grasp a broader view of the 
effects of world-wide aid and assistance on income distributions.  
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Moreover, as in Evrensel (2002) our analysis considers the total impact of 
the aid and loans for five year periods31. Testing for the impact of such flows on 
income distributions. We take the total and average of aid and loans for five years 
and conduct the tests with these variables (instead of using yearly variables) under 
the assumption that the effect of these flows may not be realized during the year it 
is received, but it may take some time to observe these effects. That is, instead of 
taking the effect of the initiation of a program on each of the program years and on 
the post-program years and discussing what happened for example in the second 
year after the program; we consider the cumulative effect of the aid and loans that 
flow during five year periods and discuss the overall effect of these on the income 
distribution considering the effects of the five year averages of the control variables. 
We take five-year periods prior to each available income distribution data and 
examine the whole affect by calculating the five-year averages, and totals, of flows. 
This allows us to capture both the lagged and the combined effects of sustained aid 
flows and disbursements.  
3.2 METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY 
 
In order to exploit the available data efficiently and to analyze the effects of 
aid flows and disbursements in both a time-series and cross-section context, a panel 
data set is used in this study. In a panel data a set of individuals is repeatedly 
                                                 
31
 In her paper, Evrensel (2002) evaluates the Fund-supported programs based on the purpose vs. the 
outcome approach using the before-after method. She uses lags of up to three years to observe the 
changes in the evaluation variables from three years before the start of a program to three years after 
the end of a program. By this method, she aims to demonstrate how evaluation variables gradually 
change toward a program and after a program.  
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sampled at different points in time, that is it provides multiple observations on each 
individual in the sample. Panel data sets for economic research have quite a lot of 
advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data sets. First, panel data sets let the 
researcher to utilize a larger number of data points when compared to cross-sectional 
or time-series data sets. This situation is likely to produce more reliable parameter 
estimates and results in higher degrees of freedom and reduced collinearity among 
explanatory variables, which in turn improves the efficiency of econometric 
estimates (Hsiao, 1986, p.2). When the explanatory variables vary in two dimensions 
they are less likely to be highly correlated (Matyas and Sevestre, 1992, p.22). 
Second, panel data “allows a researcher to analyze a number of important 
economic questions that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time-series 
data sets” (Hsiao, 1986, p.2). In addition to being a method that allows constructing 
and testing more complicated behavioral models than purely cross-sectional or time-
series data, “the use of panel data also provides a means of resolving or reducing the 
magnitude of a key econometric problem that often arises in empirical studies, 
namely, the often-heard assertion that the real reason one finds (or does not find) 
certain effects is because of omitted (mismeasured, not observed) variables that are 
correlated with explanatory variables” (Hsiao, 1986, p.3). Panel data provides a way 
to control for the effects of missing and unobserved variables by utilizing 
information on both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities 
being investigated. 
The basic panel data regression model is given in Greene (1993) as 
yit =αi +β xit +εit       i = 1, …, N; t = 1, … , T 
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with i denoting households, individuals, firms, countries, etc., and t denoting time. 
The i subscript, therefore denotes the cross-section dimension whereas t denotes the 
time-series dimension. There are K regressors in xit, not including the constant term. 
The individual effect is αi, which is taken to be constant over time t and specific to 
the individual cross-sectional unit i. In this form, this model is a classical regression 
model. If the αi’s are assumed to be the same across all units, then ordinary least 
squares provides consistent and efficient estimates of α
 
and β. 
There are two fundamental structures used to generalize this model, namely 
fixed effects and random effects methods. As explained in Greene (1993) the fixed 
effects approach takes αi to be a group specific constant term in the regression 
model. On the other hand, the random effects approach specifies αi as a group 
specific disturbance similar to εit except that for each group, there is a single draw 
that enters the regression identically in each period. To decide on whether or not to 
use the random effects model, Hausman Test is applied, resulting in the rejection of 
the random effects model. 
The fixed effects methodology asks for two conditions to be present for the 
use of fixed effects model for the estimation of a panel data set. The first condition 
requires the characterization of the unobservable factors that differentiate cross-
section units as parametric shifts of the regression function so that a separate 
intercept is required for each individual in the sample. In our analysis this condition 
is likely to hold given the country-specific nature of the cross-section units under 
investigation. However, the second condition requires that a relatively large 
proportion of the population is represented in the sample. This condition does not 
 32 
hold in our analysis given the relatively low number of observations and cross-
sections used in the regressions and thus the fixed effects model is not preferred. 
Hence we restrict the constant to be the same across all cross-sections and the type 
of panel model we utilized is the constant coefficients model (the pooled regression 
model). 
While using this method we specify the model as follows:  
yit = α + βxit + uit       i = 1, …, N; t = 1, … , T    
In this model we simply stack the observations of each country over time on 
top of one another. This is the standard pooled model where intercepts and slope 
coefficients are homogeneous across all N cross-sections and through all T time 
periods. Finally, in OLS methodology each observation is given equal weight 
(Sussex University Lecture Notes, 2004). 
As mentioned above, OLS is applied to this model. Although, a straight 
application of OLS causes a loss of efficiency with respect to the temporal 
dimension (which captures the ‘within’ variation in the data) and space dimension 
(which captures the ‘between’ variation in the data), and although the pooled OLS 
estimator does not efficiently exploit both ‘between’ and ‘within’ dimensions of the 
data, this methodology is the most suitable for our aim of investigating the effect of 
time-invariant governance variables where fixed effects methodology does not serve 
as the best choice for such an estimation. 
We estimated covariances that are robust to general heteroskedasticity, 
following White (1980) who has derived a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
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matrix estimator which provides correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form.  
3.3 THE DATA AND THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ESTIMATIONS  
 
This section gives information about the data and presents the hypotheses 
behind the choice of variables employed in the models that will be introduced in the 
following section. It also explains the various calculations and modifications made 
on the raw data to make it suitable for the regression analysis. Table A.1 gives the 
sources and definitions of the variables used in the study. 
In our analysis we use data for years 1961-1996 for 63 countries, with 
maximum of 163 country-year observations. Panel data estimation procedure is 
employed in the estimation of the regression equations. The panel used in our 
analysis is unbalanced because of unavailable data and missing observations for 
different nations for different time periods. Since our study deals with developing 
countries that receive international credits, some of the data is not available for small 
countries.  
The data is obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
Online and World Bank Governance Indicators. The income distribution data 
included in the data base is a slightly updated version of the full version of the 
database described in Deininger and Squire (1996).   
The key variables included in the study are Gini coefficient as an indicator of 
income distribution, international credits, GDP growth, inflation, level of income 
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and the governance variables. Sections (3.3.1) to (3.3.6) will provide explanations 
for the use of each of these variables32.  
3.3.1 Income Distribution 
 
Income distribution is the dependent variable in the model, on which the 
effects of various variables are investigated. We use Gini coefficient as an indicator 
of income inequality and it ranges between 0 and 1; higher values show worse 
income distributions. The data source classifies the data according to quality and we 
only use the ones that are included in the high quality data set, which are labeled as 
“accept”33. 
3.3.2 International Credits 
 
In our model we use different categories of financial flows that are in the 
form of international credits, namely; the ratio of IBRD loans and IDA credits to 
GDP, the ratio of long term disbursements plus IMF credits to GDP and the ratio of 
total long term disbursements to GDP. The effects of these variables on income 
distribution constitute the main interest of the study. Our hypothesis is that when a 
country receives more flows, the income distributions become better. Moreover, 
                                                 
32
 Explanations and abbreviations of the variables used in the models are given in the appendix (Table 
A.1).  
33
 Deininger and Squire (1996) classify the observations according to their quality as (i) accept: 
included  in their high quality data set, (ii) nn: biased on a survey of less than national coverage, (iii) 
cs: estimate that was not included due to availability of an estimate from a consistent source, (iv) ps: 
estimate that was not included as there is no clear reference to the primary source, (v) est: estimate 
based on national accounts or surveys of less than full national coverage, (vi) wg: estimate excluded 
because it was based on the income earning population only or derived from non-representative tax 
records. Deininger and Squire (1996) note that only the “accept”s should be selected in order to reach 
a high-quality database. 
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better the governance in the country that receives international credits; more 
powerful the impact of those flows. IBRD loans and IDA credits are extended by the 
World Bank Group. IBRD lends its loans at market rates and the credits from IDA 
are at concessional rates. 
 Long term disbursements plus IMF credits includes disbursements on long-
term debt and IMF purchases. Disbursements are drawings on loan commitments 
during the year specified and long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an 
original or extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed to nonresidents 
and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. IMF purchases, on the other 
hand, are defined as the total drawings on the General Resources Account of the 
IMF during the year specified, excluding drawings in the reserve tranche. In order to 
maintain comparability between data on transactions with the IMF and data on long-
term debt, World Bank Global Development Finance database includes the 
converted value of use of IMF credit outstanding at the end of year (stock) to dollars 
at the SDR exchange rate in effect at the end of year. Additionally, purchases are 
converted at the average SDR exchange rate for the year in which transactions take 
place. Third variable is disbursements on long-term debt alone. 
All the above variables used in our model are percentages of GDP of the year 
the flow is received.  
3.3.3 Economic Growth 
 
The literature on the link between growth and income distribution does not 
give hints of a strong relationship between the two variables. Studies using time-
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series data find that income distribution does not change significantly over time. 
They conclude that the earlier findings claiming that growth influences distribution 
are unsound (Ravallion, 1995 and Deininger and Squire, 1996, 1998, Adams, 2002). 
The study of Adams (2002) details this fact and reaches a similar conclusion. 
He points the fact that income inequality tends to remain stable over time, therefore 
economic growth can be expected to reduce poverty depending both on the rate of 
economic growth itself and the extent of inequality. However, he finds that income 
distribution does not change much over time and economic growth does not affect 
inequality significantly. All these studies oppose to the findings of the highly 
acclaimed hypothesis of Kuznets’ (1955) and results of Sarel (1997) that associates 
improvement in income distribution with higher growth rate and higher income 
level.  
We include economic growth, along with income level, as a variable in the 
model firstly to test whether the model will carry out evidence strong enough to 
reject the Kuznets’ hypothesis and support the later studies.  
Our second justification is the strong link between aid and growth. Burnside 
and Dollar (2001) claim that along with initial income, institutional variables and 
policy distortions; developing country growth rates depend on aid and aid interacted 
with distortions. They provide strong evidence that aid has a positive impact on 
growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. They 
also assert that this significant impact disappears under poor policy environment. 
Since our aim is to test the impact of international credits, an important portion of 
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which is aid, on income distributions, it is wise to control for one of the most 
important channels this impact may come through.  
We use the World Bank and OECD National Accounts data files where 
growth is given by the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based 
on constant local currencies where the aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. 
dollars.  
3.3.4 Initial Income per capita and Average Income per capita 
 
As mentioned above, Sarel (1997) claims that, besides a higher growth rate, 
higher income level can be listed as a determinant of improving income 
distribution. Therefore, in our framework it is reasonable to include the GDP per 
capita at the beginning of the five-year period and the average of GDP per capita of 
the five year period as proxies for level of income. Besides these, testing of 
Kuznets’ Hypothesis provides a strong motive for the inclusion these variables. 
3.3.5 Other Macroeconomic Variables 
 
The results of the framework developed by Sarel (1997) identify higher 
investment rate and real depreciation as the macroeconomic variables that 
significantly affect trends of income distribution. However, these two variables 
appear to be insignificant in our analysis. Moreover, they drop the number of 
observations and the cross sections used sharply. Therefore, these variables are 
excluded from our models. Likewise, we considered some of the population trend, 
human and physical capital variables to our analysis, such as fertility rate, 
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population growth, rural population. Preliminary results showed that population 
growth and fertility rate appeared to be significant as determinants of distribution in 
regressions without credit flows and other macroeconomic variables34. However 
when these are used as control variables and included in the regressions with credit 
flows and other macroeconomic variables, significance of these variables fell 
substantially. Therefore, these variables are not included in our models35.  
When inflation is considered, Evrensel (2002) provides evidence on the 
relationship between inflation and aid; associating IMF’s stabilization programs 
with significantly higher inflation rates. We used the inflation data provided by 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and applied the following normalization: 
Infnorm = [(Inf)/100]/{1+[(Inf)/100]} 
where Inf is the raw inflation data we obtained from IFS and Infnorm is the 
normalized value that lies between 0 and 1.  
                                                 
34Fertility rate data is taken from World Bank and it comprises of World Bank staff estimates from 
various sources including census reports, the United Nations Statistics Division's Population and 
Vital Statistics Report, country statistical offices, and Demographic and Health Surveys from national 
sources and Macro International. Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be 
born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in 
accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. Population growth data is calculated directly 
from the World Bank data. Rural population is the share of the total population living in areas defined 
as rural in each country. 
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 Similarly, we considered testing for the effects of the share of agricultural sector in the total labor 
force on income distribution following Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) who stress the necessity 
of the inclusion of economic dualism. They also show that the share of skilled workers in the labor 
force proxied by secondary school enrollment ratio and the availability of land resources proxied by 
arable land per capita have significant income equalizing effects. Therefore, we also considered gross 
primary and secondary school enrollment ratios, which are the ratios of total enrollment, regardless of 
age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. 
Only secondary school enrollment ratio appeared to be significant as a determinant of distribution in 
regressions without aid and other macroeconomic variables. However due to the fact that this variable 
drops degrees of freedom when incorporated in the regressions with aid and other macroeconomic 
variables, we did not include it in our models.   
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3.3.6 Governance Variables 
 
Our model uses indicators of six dimensions of governance: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law and control of corruption. The estimates for all these six governance variables 
have been collected by Kaufmann et al. (2003) covering 199 countries based on an 
analysis of wide ranging data sources comprised of both polls and surveys.  
Political stability (polins) is a combination of several indicators that measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or 
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including terrorism. 
Voice and accountability (voaccount) mixes several indicators measuring different 
features of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. Government 
effectiveness (goveff) gives insights to the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the 
civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies into a single grouping. Regulatory quality (regqual) is an 
indicator of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies like price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision; it also includes perceptions of the burdens imposed by 
excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. Rule 
of Law (rule) is a measurement of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of the society. Finally, control of corruption (contcorr) comprises 
of the perceptions of corruption, which is defined as the exercise of public power for 
private gain. 
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The values of all these variables are converted into a range 0 to 1 where 
greater values indicate better governance. The normalization is done in the following 
way: 
g = (Gov – MinGov)       and           Govnorm = g/Maxg 
where Gov stands for any of the foregoing six governance variables and 
MinGov is the minimum value of the governance variable among all countries, and 
Maxg is the maximum value of the difference between Gov  and MinGov. 
 These variables are used both separately and interactively with international 
credit variables in the regressions to see whether the governance in the country that 
receives those flows has a significant influence on the effect of flows on income 
distribution; that is whether international credits and international credits interacted 
with governance has differing impacts on distributions. The interaction terms are 
constructed to check whether international credit flows interacted with governance 
indicators is a significant determinant of income distributions of the countries 
involved and whether its effect differs from that of credits alone. In the course of 
this analysis, it will thus be possible to make insightful comments on the role of the 
political environment of the recipient countries while determining the impact of the 
international credits on income distributions. 






    CHAPTER 4 
 
4. Models and the Regression Analysis 
 
 
In this chapter we introduce the models we used for the regression analysis 
and present the results we reached by the use of the methodology explained in the 
previous chapter. First, we started by forming a basic equation in which income 
distribution is regressed on international credits and international credits interacted 
with governance variables. Then, we expand this basic model with several 
explanatory variables discussed in the previous chapter in order to test the effects of 
such variables on income distribution and the effect of international credit flows in a 
broader sense36. However, this analysis reflected existence of strong 
multicollinearity between international credits and international credits interacted 
with governance variables and between some of the macroeconomic control 
variables. Due to this problem, we estimate many different specifications, which we 
report stepwise below.  
 
(1) five-year totals (t) and, alternatively averages (a), of the ratio of 
the three international credit variables to GDP (intcrx,y), where x 
represents the type of credits and y represents 5-year total (y=t) or 
5-year average (y=a). Types of international credits are: the ratio 
                                                 
36
 As an example to this formulation, the results for ibrdidagdp5, disincimfgdp5, disgdp5 and their 
interaction with polins are given in the appendix (Table A.4-A.9).  
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of IBRD loans and IDA credits to GDP (ibrdidagdp5, x=1), the 
ratio of long term disbursements plus IMF purchases to GDP 
(disincimfgdp5, x=2) and the ratio of total long term 
disbursements to GDP (disgdp5, x=3). For all the three variables, 
y=t and y=a are defined as the five-year totals and averages, 
respectively, 
 
(2) the governance variables (Govz), namely  political stability 
(polins, z=1), voice and accountability (voaccount, z=2), 
government effectiveness (goveff, z=3), regulatory quality 




(3) the macroeconomic control variables, namely, inflation (inf5), 
initial GDP per capita (ln (igdppc5)), GDP growth (gdpgr5) and 
average GDP per capita (ln(agdppc5)).  
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 The total number of equations are 7 (equations) * 3 (types of international credits) * 2 (y’s) = 42 
for the first cluster and 7*3*2*6 (for six different governance measures) = 252 equations for each of 
clusters 2 and 3, totaling to 546 equations all together. 
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I. Models with intcr:  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it …………………...................................................(4.1.x.y) 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (inf5)it….........................................................(4.2.x.y)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it, + β2 [ln (igdppc5)]it………….….…………….....(4.3.x.y)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (gdpgr5)it……….………....…....…………...(4.4.x.y)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 [ln (agdppc5)]it…….......................................(4.5.x.y)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (inf5)it + β3 [ln (igdppc5)]it                                                
+ β4 (gdpgr5)it ………………………………………………………………..(4.6.x.y) 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (inf5)it + β3 [ln (igdppc5)]it + β4 (gdpgr5)it 
+ β5 [ln (agdppc5)]it..……………………………………...…….....................(4.7.x.y) 
 
II. Models with intcr + Gov: 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (Govz)it………………….............................(4.8.x.y.z) 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (Govz)it + β3 (inf5)it ….................................(4.9.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (Govz)it + β3 [ln (igdppc5)]it….…………..(4.10.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it  + β2 (Govz)it + β3 (gdpgr5)it ..………...............(4.11.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (Govz)it + β3 [ln (agdppc5)]it......................(4.12.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (Govz)it + β3 (inf5)it + β4 [ln (igdppc5)]it  
+ β5 (gdpgr5)it …………...……………………………...………………...(4.13.x.y.z) 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y)it + β2 (Govz)it + β3 (inf5)it + β4 [ln (igdppc5)]it  




III. Models with intcr*Gov: 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it …………………..................................(4.15.x.y.z) 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it + β2 (inf5)it …........................................(4.16.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it + β2 [ln (igdppc5)]it……….............…..(4.17.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it + β2 (gdpgr5)it …………………..….....(4.18.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it + β2 [ln (agdppc5)]it…...........................(4.19.x.y.z)  
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it + β2 (inf5)it + β3 [ln (igdppc5)]it  
+ β4 (gdpgr5)it ……………………………………...…………………..…(4.20.x.y.z) 
ydistrit = β0 + β1 (intcrx,y * Govz)it + β2 (inf5)it + β3 [ln (igdppc5)]it  
+ β4 (gdpgr5)it + β5 [ln (agdppc5)]it..……....................................................(4.21.x.y.z) 
 
We aim to investigate the effect of international credits and international 
credits interacted with governance on income distribution. The reason why we 
utilize these three clusters of models is the multicollinearity between international 
credits and international credits interacted with governance. Due to this problem, we 
consider these two variables separately in the regressions. In the first cluster we do 
not include governance and concentrate on the effect of international credits alone 
(tables 4.1 through 4.3 and tables A.10 through A.27). In the second cluster, we add 
governance to the models as a separate variable (Table 4.4 and tables A.28 through 
A.62). In the third cluster, we include international credits interacted with 
governance to check whether governance is influential in altering the effect of such 
flows (tables A.63 through A.98).  
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We start by the discussion of the results of the regressions from the first 
cluster. Although the explanatory power of the regressions is low, judging by the 
low values of the adjusted R-squares; results presented in this study give a lot of 
important insights on the income distribution and the WB and IMF assistance nexus. 
Table 4.1 presents the estimations of the first set of models through (4.1.1.t) to 
(4.7.1.t) and through (4.1.1.a) to (4.7.1.a). The fundamental equations (4.1.1.t) and 
(4.1.1.a) relate international credits and income distribution; while the other 
equations combine international credits with inflation, initial income, GDP growth 
and average GDP per capita. What we expect is that when a country receives more 
flows, the income distributions become better. 
Table 4.1 shows that the signs of both tibrdidagdp5 and aibrdidagdp5 are 
positive meaning that an increase in the credits extended by the World Bank Group 
is found to deteriorate income distribution. For instance, for the coefficient 0.81 in 
equation (4.7.1.a), 1 per cent increase in Gini can be observed as a result of 1.23 
increase in aibrdidagdp5. Coefficients of this flow type are significantly different 
from zero at the 1 per cent level in equations (4.3.1), (4.5.1), (4.6.1), (4.7.1) for both 
totals and averages. These results indicate that World Bank credits do not appear to 
have reduced inequality in the countries in our sample. When these results are 
compared with that of long term disbursements plus IMF credits and long-term 
disbursements38, we observe that the latter two have positive but insignificant (at 1 
per cent level) coefficients in all regressions. The lack of robustness of these results 
may suggest that the effects of these two variables may be indirect.     
                                                 
38
 Results are given in Tables A.10 and A.11. 
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Table 4.1: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.1.t) (4.2.1.t) (4.3.1.t) (4.4.1.t) (4.5.1.t) (4.6.1.t) (4.7.1.t) (4.1.1.a) (4.2.1.a) (4.3.1.a) (4.4.1.a) (4.5.1.a) (4.6.1.a) (4.7.1.a) 
constant 41.67*** 39.45*** 9.17** 43.31*** 9.08** 10.57* 6.39 41.71*** 39.52*** 9.25** 43.39*** 8.79** 10.59* 5.93 
 
(1.07) (1.31) (4.06) (1.80) (4.39) (5.45) (5.75) (0.35) (1.32) (4.09) (1.80) (4.38) (5.57) (5.70) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.07** 0.06 0.15*** 0.05 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
   






(0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.25) (0.24) 
inf5  15.13***    11.02** 10.69**  14.95***    11.09** 10.85** 
 




  (4.30) (4.36) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.61***   4.03*** 33.86*   4.59***   4.02*** 34.06* 
  




 (0.74) (20.33) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  0.16 1.22    -0.34  0.16 1.24 





  (0.25)  (0.30) (0.81) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.56***  -29.69     4.59***  -29.86 
        
  (0.66)   (20.45)   
  
    (0.65)   (20.37) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.09 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.28 0.02 0.26 0.24 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 161 137 157 159 158 135 137 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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As it can be seen from Table 4.1, the coefficients of inf5 are statistically 
significant and positive in all equations where inflation is included; indicating that the 
presence of high rates of inflation appears to aggravate the inequality.    
The first observation from the examination of models with variables of level of 
income, namely ln (igdppc5) and ln (agdppc5), is that the use of these two variables 
together in a regression increases the potential of multicollinearity. Both ln (igdppc5) 
and ln (agdppc5) have positive signs and are significantly different from zero at 1 per 
cent level when they are considered separately. However, the increased potential of 
multicollineraity most probably accounts for the loss of significance and negative sign 
of ln (agdppc5) in equations (4.7.1) and (4.7.2) for both total and average flows.  
We tested for the Kuznets’ hypothesis (i.e. the inverted U-shape relationship) 
that there exists a positive relationship between the level of economic development and 
inequality in the early stage of development, while there is a negative relationship in 
later stages. According to this hypothesis, per capita income in logarithms and its square 
should have positive and negative statistically significant coefficients, respectively, in 
an equality equation. The second part of the hypothesis is not supported by our data, 
hence we do not include square of per capita income in the reported estimates. Instead 
we only consider the initial level of per capita income and average level of per capita 
income.  
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Results for all three international credit variables (in addition to Table 4.1, 
Tables A.10 and A.11) show that per capita income has statistically significant positive 
coefficients in the regressions where only one of the income variables is included to 
eliminate the potential of multicollinearity. This positive association between inequality 
and per capita income does not contradict Kuznets’ relationship keeping in mind that 
almost all of the countries in our sample were at an early stage of development during 
the years our data covers39. Hence our results are in conformity with Kuznets with 
regards to his diagnosis for the early stages of development.  
Finally, evidence from Table 4.1 shows that economic growth has not got a 
significant impact on income distribution. As mentioned in the literature survey, Sarel 
(1997) includes higher growth rate as a variable that is associated with an improvement 
in income distribution. Our results show no sign of such relationship. Even when the 
results for the other two types of flows are considered, growth does not appear to have a 
significant coefficient in any of the equations.  
In Table 4.2 we report the estimations for disincimfgdp5 with a transition 
economy (TE) dummy40, since we anticipate that the transition economies may reflect 
different results than the rest due to their large extent of reforms during the 1990s. The 
results with disgdp5 are similar to that of disincimfgdp5 and results with ibrdidagdp5 do 
not reveal significant results so we do not include them in the text (See Tables A.12 
                                                 
39
 From Table A.3 in Appendix, we see that the highest income per capita among countries in the sample 
is 5017.45 $ for Hungary in 1989.  
40
 Hungary is the only country that we have an observation for the transition dummy.   
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through 15). As it can be seen from the table, results for the equations (4.6.2.t), (4.7.2.t), 
(4.6.2.a) and (4.7.2.a) are not reported because the regressors appear to be very highly 
collinear in these models.  
We performed Wald Tests (See Table 4.3) based on an F-distribution for the 
significance of the coefficient sums of the interactive variables and the average effects. 
Results of the Wald Tests reveal that all of the null hypotheses are rejected at 1 per cent 
significance level and that there are interesting points that distinguish economies in 
transition from the other countries in our sample. First of all, our results for transition 
economies strongly suggest that higher disbursement plus IMF purchases to GDP exert 
significant income equalizing effect41. Moreover, this effect is much stronger than the 
inequalizing effect of ibrdidagdp5 we have observed for countries in general.  
For instance, calculated for the coefficient of adisincimfgdp5 + 
adisincimfgdp5*TE (-1.81) in (4.3.2.a), a relatively slight 0.6 increase in adisincimfgdp 
results in 1 per cent decrease in Gini coefficient. Especially when we consider the high 
disbursements plus IMF credits to GDP ratios in most of the transition countries, such 
as 10.88 in Croatia, 2.77 in Czech Republic, 10.88 in Estonia, 9.59 in Hungary, 5.97 in 
Kazakhstan, 2.87 in Poland and 5.46 in Slovak Republic in 2002, we can speculate that 
disbursements and IMF credits have an important distribution amending impact in these 
countries. Noting that transition countries were rather closed countries with low degrees 
of openness and relatively balanced trade before their association with IMF, our result is 
                                                 
41
 The same conclusion prevails for disgdp5 (See Tables A.14 and A.15). 
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Table 4.2: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (disincimfgdp5)   
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.2.t) (4.2.2.t) (4.3.2.t) (4.4.2.t) (4.5.2.t) (4.1.2.a) (4.2.2.a) (4.3.2.a) (4.4.2.a) (4.5.2.a) 
constant 41.34*** 39.50*** 12.00*** 44.23*** 12.85*** 41.43*** 39.60*** 12.36*** 44.35*** 12.87*** 
 
(1.12) (1.38) (4.55) (1.58) (4.69) (1.11) (1.39) (4.60) (1.55) (4.71) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.11** 0.08** 0.00 0.07 0.01      
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
adisincimfgdp5 
     0.51*** 0.41** -0.01 0.33 0.04 
 
     (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
inf5 
 14.40***     14.26***    
 
 (4.40) 
   
 (4.40) 
   
ln (igdppc5) 









   -0.53**     -0.54***  
 
   
(0.21) 




    4.48***     4.47*** 
 
    
(0.72) 
    
(0.72) 
tdisincimfgdp5 
* TE -0.86*** -1.09*** -0.34*** -1.04*** -0.38***      
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 








   (0.41) (0.22) (0.63) (0.50) (0.65) 
inf5 * TE 










ln (igdppc5) * 
TE 










gdpgr5 * TE 
   2.38***     2.27***  
 






ln (agdppc5) * 
TE 
    -1.98***     -1.90*** 
  
        
(0.29)   
  
    (0.30) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.08 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.14 0.33 0.12 0.31 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 161 138 158 160 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors   
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in line with Garuda’s (2000) finding that in cases where prior external imbalance is not 
severe, countries participating in IMF programs actually show relative improvements in 
distributional indicators.  
Besides this important result, our findings indicate that all other variables (including 
gdpgr5 which did not have a significant effect in Table 4.1) have significant inequality 
producing effects in the economies of transition. As most of the transition economies 
have high growth rates especially in the 1990s, we may suggest that fast growers 
probably grow at the cost of worsening income distributions.   
Table 4.3: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummy 
(disincimfgdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Stat Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Stat 
(4.1.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -0.75*** 69.22 (4.1.2.a) 
adisincimfgdp5 + 
adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -3.81*** 69.28 
 
   
 
   
tdisincimfgdp5 + 
tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -1.00*** 299.21 
adisincimfgdp5 + 
adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -5.02*** 301.25 (4.2.2.t) 
inf5 + inf5*TE=0 84.96*** 281.69 
(4.2.2.a) 
inf5 + inf5*TE=0 84.72*** 283.19 
 
   
 
   
tdisincimfgdp5 + 
tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -0.34*** 8.51 
adisincimfgdp5 + 
adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -1.81*** 8.57 (4.3.2.t) ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*TE=0 2.52*** 14.81 
(4.3.2.a) ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*TE=0 2.53*** 14.17 
 
   
 
   
tdisincimfgdp5 + 
tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -0.98*** 67.38 
adisincimfgdp5 + 
adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -4.88*** 70.96 (4.4.2.t) 
gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.85*** 68.80 
(4.4.2.a) gdpgr5 + 
gdpgr5*TE=0 1.73*** 69.33 
 
   
 
   
tdisincimfgdp5 + 
tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -0.38*** 9.69 
adisincimfgdp5 + 
adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -2.04*** 9.88 (4.5.2.t) 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*TE=0 2.50*** 12.83 
(4.5.2.a) 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*TE=0 2.57*** 12.93 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.    
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.    
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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When we compare results of disincimfgdp5 and disgdp5 with the results of 
ibrdidagdp5 for transition economies, we see that results for the latter are ambiguous 
with respect to the significance and the direction of the effect of international credits 
(See Tables A.14 and A.15). Both negative and positive signs for the coefficients of 
ibrdidagdp5 are observed and in two of the five equations, the coefficients with positive 
sign lack significance. Hence, we can conclude that there is no robust effect of World 
Bank credits on income distributions of transition economies.  
In addition to transition economies dummy, we estimate our equations with two 
other region dummies: sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America (LA) countries 
(see Table A.2). Results for these dummies are reported through Table A.16 to Table 
A.27. It is observed that in both regions aid provided plus loans disbursed by the World 
Bank have a significant worsening effect on income distribution. Moreover, this effect 
is significantly much higher in Latin American countries when the magnitude of the 
effect in Latin America is compared with the average of the countries in the sample (see 
statistically significant coefficients for ibrdidagdp5*LA in Table A.16). For both 
average and total, coefficients of ibrdidagdp5 + ibrdidagdp5*LA and ibrdidagdp5 + 
ibrdidagdp5*SSA are positive and significant at 1 per cent level in all equations. 
However, it is not the case for disincimfgdp5 and disgdp5. In sub-Saharan Africa, there 
is no meaningful relationship between disbursements and disbursements plus IMF 
credits and income distribution due to non-rejection of the null hypotheses disincimfgdp 
+ disincimfgdp5*SSA=0 and disgdp5 + disgdp5*SSA=0 in all equations (except from 
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the models with inf5 where they are statistically different from zero at 5 per cent level). 
Similarly, results with LA dummy present that the null hypotheses disincimfgdp + 
disincimfgdp5*LA=0 and disgdp5 + disgdp5*LA=0 are rejected only in the first two 
equations. The overall evidence therefore suggests that in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa regions, a robustly significant positive association between inequality 
and World Bank credits is observed; while IMF credits with disbursements neither 
improves nor deteriorates distributions significantly.  
Models in the second cluster have governance variables in addition to the ones we have 
discussed above. OLS estimations are utilized to investigate the effects of the indices of 
political stability, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. These results for the example cases of 
ibrdidagdp5 and polins are reported in Table 4.442. Inclusion of the governance 
variables does not change the aforementioned results much. As in the results for models 
without governance, flows originated from the World Bank are positively associated 
with inequality in all equations and the coefficient of ibrdidagdp5 is significant almost 
in all instances, not for only equations with polins but for models with other five 
governance variables (tables A.28 through 32). Again, the positive (except from a few 
cases) but insignificant coefficients for disincimfgdp5 characterize lack of a meaningful 
relationship between IMF credits plus disbursements and distribution (see tables A.33 
through A.38). Same result follows for disgdp5 (Table A.39 – A.44). As it can be seen 
                                                 
42
 Results for other governance variables and international credit types are in the appendix, through Table 
A.29 to Table A.45.  
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from Table 4.4, the coefficients of the inflation rate are statistically significant in all 
cases. These findings suggest that, in line with the results from the first set, inflation 
appears to have contributed much to the observed income distribution patterns in the 
countries in our sample. Therefore, our results establish a strong distributional effect of 
inflation, that high inflation increases income inequality.  
The evidence from the table shows that along with inflation, the level of per 
capita income again emerges as an important factor that determines distribution of 
income. In all cases (where the two income level variables are integrated in the models 
separately) results support a significant influence of level of income, that is higher 
levels of per capita income are associated with worse distributions.  
An overall examination of tables for intcr and Gov pairs (Table 4.4 and Tables 
A.28-44) reveals that the coefficients for governance variables do not show the expected 
robust results. Opposite to what we have expected, we observe positive, and in most 
regressions statistically significant, relationships between inequality and political 
stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality. These regressions show that 
the betterment of these governance measures does not contribute to equality in 
distribution. Although there are a few significant negative coefficients for government 
effectiveness and rule of law and a few significant positive coefficients for control of 
corruption, results for these governance variables provide no robust and meaningful link 
between these and distribution.  
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Table 4.4: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 + polins (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.8.1.t.1) (4.9.1.t.1) (4.10.1.t.1) (4.11.1.t.1) (4.12.1.t.1) (4.13.1.t.1) (4.14.1.t.1) (4.8.2.a.1) (4.9.1.a.1) (4.10.1.a.1) (4.11.1.a.1) (4.12.1.a.1) (4.13.1.a.1) (4.14.1.a.1) 
constant 36.20*** 33.43*** 9.21** 37.92*** 9.04** 10.74** 6.92 36.36*** 33.59*** 9.28** 38.09*** 8.74** 10.73* 6.40 
 
(2.21) (2.37) (4.09) (2.46) (4.37) (5.44) (5.88) (2.21) (2.37) (4.12) (2.46) (4.35) (5.57) (5.82) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.07* 0.05 0.15*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.15***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) (0.26) (0.25) 
polins 10.25*** 11.69*** -1.58 10.47** -1.31 0.62 2.16 10.03*** 11.51*** -1.69 10.29** -1.59 0.45 1.85 
 
(3.89) (4.16) (3.92) (4.12) (3.83) (4.54) (4.27) (3.89) (4.17) (3.90) (4.12) (3.81) (4.54) (4.25) 
inf5  15.26***    11.07*** 10.85**  15.09***    11.13*** 10.99** 
 




  (4.28) (4.35) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.72***   3.97*** 34.41*   4.72***   3.97*** 34.53* 
  




 (0.80) (20.35) 
gdpgr5    -0.38  0.15 1.23    -0.38  0.16 1.24 





  (0.26)  (0.31) (0.82) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.67***  -30.47     4.72***  -30.52 
     
 (0.65)  (20.41)  
 
  (0.64)  (20.32) 
adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.04 0.12 0.26 0.05 0.26 0.23 0.25 
# of cross sec.s used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel (unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 139 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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As we have done for the first set of models, we report results of the 
regressions with dummies and the Wald Tests for the models in the second set 
(through Table A.45 to Table A.56)43. Inclusion of a governance variable does not 
change the results regarding the effect of ibrdidagdp5 in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa; higher ibrdidagdp5 ratios are robustly associated with higher Gini 
coefficients. An interesting yet weakly significant result for Latin America region is 
that disbursements plus IMF credits and disbursements alone have negative signs in 
regressions, meaning that these flows appear to have ameliorated distributions in 
Latin American countries. This result highlights the distinction between the effects of 
different flows types in this particular region much strongly than the results we 
reached for the first set of models in a way that the ambiguity and insignificance of 
the effect of disbursements and IMF credits is replaced by an income equalizing one. 
Although they are not as robust and significant as they are in the case of economies 
of transition, results for Latin America countries give signs on the effectiveness of 
IMF credits and disbursements in this region.    
The coefficients of political stability variable show no significance in 
regressions with LA and SSA dummies, and show positive and negative signs (both 
significant) in different regressions with TE dummy, which appears as anomaly. The 
potential of multicollinearity between better governance and higher ratios of 
international credits to GDP may account for the unexpected signs and significance 
of these variables. In order to test for the possible equalizing effects of governance 
on income distribution and in an attempt to eliminate the anomalies that may be 
                                                 
43
 In order to save space only the results of regressions with  political stability variable are reported. 
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generated due to multcollinearity between intcr and Gov variables, we now turn to 
the observation of the interaction of international credits with governance variables.     
In Tables through A.57 to A.74 we report the results for the equations with 
the interactive variable (intcr*Gov). The first observation form the results is that 
interacting international credits with governance does not change the results much 
from the results with intcr alone and with (intcr + Gov). Still, the sign for 
ibrdidagdp5*Gov is positive in all instances; that is the procurement of good 
governance in the recipient countries does not change the hazardous nature of the 
effect of flows originated from the World Bank on income distributions. In addition, 
we have a few significant positive coefficients for disincimfgdp5*Gov and 
disgdp5*Gov as in the case of (intcr + Gov). The ambiguity of the effect of these two 
flow types on the whole sample countries still prevails. Although they are not 
significant in any case, we observe some negative coefficients for the interactions of 
disincimfgdp5 and disgdp5 with goveff, rule and contcorr. Finally, we note that we 
have an increased number of significant coefficients than we do in the first two sets 
of regressions, especially in the regressions with ibrdidagdp5.  
Results of (intcr*Gov) with dummy variables and their Wald Tests are 
reported in Tables through A.81 to A.84. We note that when these results are 
compared with the ones for (intcr + Gov), two differences worth to mention. 
Firstly, the weak finding that disbursements and disbursements plus IMF 
credits appear to have been distribution improving in Latin America countries is no 
longer the case, because interaction with polins in the regressions for disincimfgdp5 
and disgdp5 with LA dummy (Tables through A.89 to A.92) changes the sign of 
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negative coefficients in (4.8), (4.9) and (4.11), and reduces the significance of 
previously significant negative coefficients in (4.10) and (4.12).  
Secondly, in Table A.46 we have observed negative signs for tibrdidagdp5 + 
tibrdidagdp5*TE and aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*TE in regressions (4.9.1.t.1) and 
(4.9.1.a.1), respectively. In regressions with (ibrdidagdp5*polins) (Table A.82) this 
kind of anomaly is observed in regressions for ibrdidagdp5 + ibrdidagdp5*TE alone 
(4.15.1.t.1 and 4.15.1.a.1) and ibrdidagdp5 + ibrdidagdp5*TE with gdpgr5 (4.18.1.t.1 
and 4.18.1.a.1).  
It is possible to conclude this section by noting that our analysis indicates that 
there exists a significant inequality aggravating effect of the credits extended by the 
World Bank in general, while total long-term disbursements and disbursements plus 
IMF credit significantly improve income distribution in the economies of transition. 
Furthermore, our results show that governance does not appear to have a significant 















In this study, we examine the effect of the international credits, including 
those disbursed by the WB and IMF, on the income distribution in developing 
countries. Using data for years 1961-1996 for 63 countries, with maximum of 163 
country-year observations and panel data estimation procedure, our empirical 
analysis involves investigating the effects of such international financial flows on 
income distribution and these effects’ possible association with governance in the 
recipient country.  
The findings indicate that an increase in the credits extended by the WB 
group is found to deteriorate income distribution; that is, the WB loans do not 
appear to have reduced inequality in the countries in our sample. Comparing the 
performance of the WB group to that of the IMF, we find that long term 
disbursements plus IMF credits, and long-term disbursements alone, have a 
significant improving effect on the income distribution in the transition economies.  
Our results also point out that the coefficients of inflation are statistically significant 
and positive in all equations where inflation is used, indicating that the presence of 
high rates of inflation appears to aggravate inequality. Additionally, our findings 
support the empirical literature that there exists a positive relationship between the 
level of income and inequality in the early stages of development, the first part of 
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the Kuznets’ hypothesis. Finally, evidence from our regressions show that economic 
growth has not got a significant impact on income distribution.  
Moreover, in the estimations using transition economies dummy, we observe 
that higher disbursement plus IMF credits exert significant income equalizing effect, 
which is much stronger than the inequalizing effect of IBRD loans and IDA credits 
on income distributions of the countries in the sample. Besides this important result, 
our findings indicate that initial and average GDP per capita, GDP growth and 
inflation all have significant inequality producing effects in the economies of 
transition.  
The overall evidence from the regressions with sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
American country dummies suggests that in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
regions, a robustly significant positive association between inequality and World 
Bank loans is observed; while IMF disbursements neither improves nor deteriorates 
distributions significantly.  
Inclusion of the governance variables leaves the former results inact, the 
positive association of the flows originated from the WB with inequality in all 
equations, and lack of a meaningful relationship of both disbursements plus IMF 
credits and total long-term disbursements with income distribution. Opposite to what 
we have expected, we observe positive relationships between inequality and political 
stability, voice and accountability and regulatory quality; meaning that betterment of 
these governance measures has not sufficed to contribute to equality in distribution in 
the countries examined in this study.  
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Finally, regression of the models in the second cluster with an LA dummy 
shows an interesting yet weakly significant result for this region. We find that 
disbursements plus IMF credits and disbursements alone have negative signs in 
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Table A.1: Data Sources and Descriptions   
Variable 
Name of the 




The income distribution data included in 
our data set is a slightly updated version 
of the full version of the data-base 
described Deininger and Squire (1996). 
Only the accepts are selected in order to 
reach a high-quality database. 





Inflation (consumer prices annual %) as 
measured by the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in 
the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a fixed basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly. The 





and data files.  
gdpgr5 GDP Growth  
Average of 5 
years 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
(annual %) at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
igdppc5 ln of Initial 
Income per 
capita at the 
Beginning of the 
5 Year Period  
GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 
U.S. dollars (GDP per capita, PPP 
constant 1995 international $). 




agdppc5 ln of Average 
Income per 
capita for 5 Year 
period, (GDP 
per capita, PPP 
constant 1995 
international $) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 
U.S. dollars. 





voaccount Voice and 
Accountability 
Mixture of several indicators measuring 
different features of the political process, 
civil liberties and political rights. 
polins Political 
Stability 
Combination of several indicators that 
measure perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown by possibly 




The quality of public service provision, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to policies 
into a single grouping. 
requal Regulatory 
Quality 
Indicator of the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies like price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
the perceptions of the burdens imposed 
by excessive regulation in areas such as 
foreign trade and business development. 
rule Rule of Law Measurement of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of the society. 
contcorr Control of 
Corruption 
The perceptions of corruption, which is 
defined as the exercise of public power 
for private gain. 
Research Project by 
Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay and 
Massimo Mastruzzi, 





ibrdidagdp5 IBRD loans and 
IDA credits to 
GDP  
IBRD loans and IDA credits (PPG DOD, 
current US$): IBRD loans and IDA 
credits are extended by the World Bank 
Group. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
lends at market rates. Credits from the 
International Development Association 
(IDA) are at concessional rates. Data are 
in current U.S. dollars. 




disincimfgdp5 Long Term 
Disbursements 
plus IMF loans 
Disbursements are drawings on loan 
commitments during the year specified. 
This item includes disbursements on 
long-term debt and IMF purchases. Long-
term external debt is defined as debt that 
has an original or extended maturity of 
more than one year and that is owed to 
nonresidents and repayable in foreign 
currency, goods, or services. IMF 
purchases are total drawings on the 
General Resources Account of the IMF 
during the year specified, excluding 
drawings in the reserve tranche. To 
maintain comparability between data on 
transactions with the IMF and data on 
long-term debt, use of IMF credit 
outstanding at the end of year (stock) is 
converted to dollars at the SDR exchange 
rate in effect at the end of year. Purchases 
are converted at the average SDR 
exchange rate for the year in which 
transactions take place. 




disgdp5 Total Long 
Term 
Disbursements 
Disbursements on long-term debt are 
drawings on loan commitments during 
the year specified. Long-term external 
debt is defined as debt that has an 
original or extended maturity of more 
than one year and that is owed to 
nonresidents and repayable in foreign 
















Table A.2: Classification of Economies by Region, 1999 (Source: World Bank) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Asia  Europe and Central Asia 
Middle East and North 
Africa Latin America 
Botswana Bangladesh Hungary Algeria Bolivia 
Burkina Faso China Turkey Egypt, Arab Rep. Brazil 
Cameroon India  Iran, Islamic Rep. Chile 
Central African 
Republic Indonesia  Jordan Colombia 
Cote d'Ivoire Lao PDR  Morocco Costa Rica 
Ethiopia Malaysia  Tunisia Dominican Rep. 
Gambia, The Nepal   Ecuador 
Ghana Pakistan   El Salvador 
Guinea Philippines   Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau Sri Lanka   Guyana 
Kenya Thailand   Honduras 
Lesotho Tonga   Mexico 
Madagascar    Nicaragua 
Malawi    Panama 
Mali    Peru 
Mauritania    Venezuela, RB 
Mauritius      
Niger     
Nigeria     
Rwanda     
Senegal     
Tanznia     
Uganda      
Zambia     



























Table A.3 Gini and Income Distribution of the Countries Included in Our Sample (Sources are as indicated in Table A.1) 
Country 

















Algeria 1988 38.73 1647.95 Ghana 1991 33.97 352.20 Mexico 1989 54.98 3091.33 
Bangladesh 1981 39.00 251.57 Ghana 1992 33.91 356.55 Mexico 1992 50.31 3317.05 
Bangladesh 1983 36.00 254.55 Guatemala 1979 49.72 1578.59 Morocco 1984 39.19 1127.32 
Bangladesh 1986 37.00 266.69 Guatemala 1987 58.26 1312.08 Morocco 1991 39.20 1373.35 
Bangladesh 1989 28.85 268.95 Guatemala 1989 59.06 1349.23 Nepal 1984 30.06 162.54 
Bangladesh 1992 28.27 291.45 Guinea 1995 40.40 560.18 Nicaragua 1993 50.32 407.71 
Bolivia 1990 42.04 835.77 
Guinea-
Bissau 1991 56.12 216.86 Niger 1992 36.10 213.40 
Botswana 1986 54.21 2170.23 Guyana 1993 40.22 739.29 Nigeria 1986 37.02 229.16 
Brazil 1979 59.44 3991.21 Honduras 1986 54.94 665.94 Nigeria 1992 41.15 263.11 
Brazil 1980 57.78 4256.56 Honduras 1989 54.00 703.58 Nigeria 1993 37.47 261.18 
Brazil 1981 55.42 3979.76 Honduras 1990 54.00 683.58 Pakistan 1979 32.32 297.10 
Brazil 1982 54.19 3916.56 Honduras 1991 50.00 684.98 Pakistan 1985 32.44 385.22 
Brazil 1983 57.00 3703.58 Honduras 1992 52.63 702.23 Pakistan 1986 32.15 395.73 
Brazil 1985 61.76 4041.17 Honduras 1993 54.00 724.39 Pakistan 1987 32.13 410.31 
Brazil 1986 54.52 4280.47 Hungary 1987 24.15 4945.03 Pakistan 1988 31.43 430.11 
Brazil 1987 56.18 4352.51 Hungary 1989 23.34 5017.45 Pakistan 1991 31.15 459.08 
Brazil 1989 59.60 4334.44 Hungary 1991 32.24 4287.64 Panama 1979 48.76 2743.02 
Burkina 
Faso 1995 39.00 246.61 India 1986 32.22 273.22 Panama 1980 47.47 2709.16 
Cameroon 1983 49.00 892.34 India 1987 31.82 278.89 Panama 1989 56.47 2381.93 
Central 
African 
Republic 1992 55.00 323.89 India 1988 31.15 300.04 Peru 1981 49.33 2685.53 
Chile 1980 53.21 2665.03 India 1989 30.46 312.87 Peru 1986 42.76 2498.54 
Chile 1989 57.88 3220.63 India 1990 29.69 324.43 Peru 1994 44.87 2115.12 
Chile 1994 56.49 4212.58 India 1991 32.53 320.94 Philippines 1985 46.08 974.31 
China 1986 33.30 277.71 India 1992 32.02 331.62 Philippines 1988 45.73 1044.57 
China 1987 34.30 305.00 Indonesia 1980 35.61 503.01 Philippines 1991 45.00 1060.33 
China 1988 34.90 334.04 Indonesia 1981 33.73 533.21 Rwanda 1983 28.90 333.05 
China 1989 36.00 342.45 Indonesia 1984 32.40 592.25 Senegal 1991 54.12 549.20 
China 1990 34.60 350.28 Indonesia 1987 32.01 647.74 Sri Lanka 1979 43.50 436.15 
China 1991 36.20 377.32 Indonesia 1990 33.09 776.67 Sri Lanka 1980 42.00 455.07 
China 1992 37.80 425.66 Indonesia 1993 31.69 926.13 Sri Lanka 1981 45.30 474.61 
Colombia 1988 51.20 2049.07 
Iran, 
Islamic 
Rep. 1984 42.90 1509.53 Sri Lanka 1987 46.70 569.06 
Colombia 1991 51.32 2166.71 Jamaica 1988 43.16 1856.74 Sri Lanka 1990 30.10 615.87 
Costa Rica 1961 50.00 1841.78 Jamaica 1989 43.53 1971.56 Tanzania 1993 38.10 178.78 
Costa Rica 1979 45.00 3168.55 Jamaica 1990 41.79 2082.55 Thailand 1981 43.10 1158.14 
Costa Rica 1981 47.49 2938.51 Jamaica 1991 41.11 2086.02 Thailand 1986 47.40 1381.12 
Costa Rica 1982 42.00 2646.80 Jamaica 1992 38.48 2105.68 Thailand 1988 47.40 1658.20 
Costa Rica 1983 47.00 2645.04 Jamaica 1993 37.92 2131.28 Thailand 1990 48.80 1997.12 
Costa Rica 1986 42.00 2782.73 Jordan 1980 40.80 1797.89 Thailand 1992 51.50 2277.93 
Costa Rica 1989 46.07 2923.03 Jordan 1987 36.10 1955.48 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 1981 41.72 4710.37 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 1985 41.21 977.00 Jordan 1991 40.66 1371.09 Tunisia 1980 43.00 1640.85 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 1986 38.62 972.80 Kenya 1992 54.39 340.88 Tunisia 1985 43.00 1771.73 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 1987 40.01 935.18 Lao PDR 1992 30.40 330.73 Tunisia 1990 40.24 1823.32 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 1988 36.89 912.71 Lesotho 1987 56.02 402.96 Turkey 1987 44.09 2458.65 
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Cote 
d'Ivoire 1995 38.00 792.52 Madagascar 1993 43.44 247.94 Uganda 1989 33.00 231.19 
Dominican 
Republic 1984 43.29 1402.02 Malawi 1993 62.00 152.82 Uganda 1992 40.78 240.04 
Dominican 
Republic 1989 50.46 1567.75 Malaysia 1979 51.00 2188.85 
Venezuela, 
RB 1979 39.42 4304.76 
Dominican 
Republic 1992 49.00 1532.15 Malaysia 1984 48.00 2689.26 
Venezuela, 
RB 1981 42.82 3865.80 
Ecuador 1994 43.00 1776.32 Malaysia 1989 48.35 2933.20 
Venezuela, 
RB 1987 45.17 3529.44 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 1991 32.00 959.85 Mali 1994 54.00 247.18 
Venezuela, 
RB 1989 44.08 3240.78 
El Salvador 1977 48.40 1899.12 Mauritania 1988 42.53 429.13 
Venezuela, 
RB 1990 53.84 3349.69 
Ethiopia 1996 44.20 110.08 Mauritania 1995 37.80 464.44 Zambia 1991 43.51 465.54 
Gambia, 
The 1992 39.00 364.06 Mauritius 1986 39.63 2202.74 Zambia 1996 52.40 409.42 
Ghana 1988 35.90 331.40 Mauritius 1991 36.69 2949.74 Zimbabwe 1990 56.83 654.13 


































Table A.4: Pooled OLS Results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) (tibrdidagdp5 & polins): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.1.t.1) (4.2.1.t.1) (4.3.1.t.1) (4.4.1.t.1) (4.5.1.t.1) (4.6.1.t.1) (4.7.1.t.1) (4.8.1.t.1) (4.9.1.t.1) (4.10.1.t.1) (4.11.1.t.1) (4.12.1.t.1) (4.13.1.t.1) (4.14.1.t.1) (4.15.1.t.1) (4.16.1.t.1) 
constant 41.79*** 39.68*** 8.56* 43.54*** 8.52* 14.19** 41.08*** 14.90** 4.66 8.81 6.69 12.71** 16.24*** 14.65** 0.70                     9.22 
 
(1.06) (1.22) (4.46) (1.81) (4.78) (5.52) (2.19) (5.75) (5.71) (5.50) (5.67) (6.13) (6.07) (6.12) (5.73) (6.34) 
tibrdidagdp5 -0.19 -0.35** 0.19 -0.21 0.19 0.02 -0.36** 0.03 0.24* 0.20 0.23* 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.19 0.00 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18) 
tibrdidagdp5 
* polins 0.46** 0.71*** -0.08 0.46* -0.07 0.20 0.72*** 0.19 -0.13 -0.08 -0.13 0.18 0.24*** 0.18 -0.03 0.26 
 
(0.22) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.25) (0.30) 
inf5  16.20***    10.97*** 14.82*** 11.81***    11.47*** 11.26 11.93***  11.26** 
 
 (4.15)    (3.98) (4.70) (3.86) 
 
  (4.38) (4.27) (4.33) 
 
(4.42) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.69***   3.64***   5.05*** 1.98  3.76*** 4.57  42.67** 35.67* 
  





gdpgr5    -0.36   -0.25  0.28  0.11 0.13  0.02 1.55** 1.25 
   
 (0.24) 
  
(0.28)  (0.25)  (0.22) (0.30) 
 
(0.26) (0.75) (0.81) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.64***   3.48***  2.63 4.81***  -1.24 3.49*** -37.55* -31.89 
        




(7.19) (0.84) (20.62) (20.59) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.12 0.27 0.04 0.25 0.24 0.12 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 56 61 60 61 56 55 56 60 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 135 137 135 157 155 157 135 133 135 155 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.5: Pooled OLS Results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) (aibrdidagdp5 & polins): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.1.a.1) (4.2.1.a.1) (4.3.1.a.1) (4.4.1.a.1) (4.5..1.a.1) (4.6.1.a.1) (4.7.1.a.1) (4.8.1.a.1) (4.9.1.a.1) (4.10.1.a.1) (4.11.1.a.1) (4.12.1.a.1) (4.13.1.a.1) (4.14.1.a.1) (4.15.1.a.1) (4.16.1.a.1) 
constant 41.84*** 39.76*** 8.68** 43.64*** 8.26* 14.43** 41.21*** 14.59** 4.69 8.54 6.37 12.94** 15.92*** 14.25** 0.38 8.80 
 
(1.07) (1.23) (4.49) (1.82) (4.75) (5.58) (2.21) (5.71) (5.82) (5.49) (5.66) (6.26) (6.04) (6.08) (5.68) (6.27) 
aibrdidagdp5 -0.95 -1.74** 0.94 -1.05 0.96 0.07 -1.82** 0.14 1.18* 1.01 1.19* 0.16 -0.01 0.17 0.95 0.03 
 
(0.66) (0.77) (0.68) (0.74) (0.65) (0.85) (0.78) (0.85) (0.70) (0.71) (0.69) (0.86) (0.87) (0.85) (0.71) (0.89) 
aibrdidagdp5 
* polins 2.31** 3.56*** -0.36 2.34** -0.31 1.05 3.62*** 0.94 -0.63 -0.41 -0.66 0.94 1.21 0.91 -0.15 1.29 
 
(1.07) (1.27) (1.20) (1.17) (1.12) (1.42) (1.28) (1.40) (1.20) (1.21) (1.18) (1.41) (1.42) (1.39) (1.22) (1.46) 
inf5  16.07***    11.07*** 14.62*** 11.92***    11.55*** 11.41*** 12.07***  11.42** 
 
 (4.15)    (3.98) (4.70) (3.86) 
 
  (4.39) (4.26) (4.33) 
 
(4.41) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.67***   3.60***   5.04*** 1.83  3.72*** 4.38  42.75** 35.81* 
  





gdpgr5    -0.37   -0.26  0.28  0.12 0.12  0.03 1.56** 1.26 
   
 (0.24) 
  
(0.28)  (0.25)  (0.22) (0.30) 
 
(0.26) (0.74) (0.80) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.66***   3.50***  2.81 4.84***  -1.02 3.53*** -37.60* -31.99 
     




(7.21) (0.84) (20.57) (20.51) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.04 0.26 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 56 61 60 61 56 55 56 60 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 159 136 156 158 157 136 136 134 156 155 157 134 133 135 155 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.6: Pooled OLS Results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) (tdisincimfgdp5 & polins): 
Variable/ 
Model (4.1.2.t.1) (4.2.2.t.1) (4.3.2.t.1) (4.4.2.t.1) (4.5.2.t.1) (4.6.2.t.1) (4.7.2.t.1) (4.8.2.t.1) (4.9.2.2.t.1) (4.10.2.t.1) (4.11.2.t.1) (4.12.2.t.1) (4.13.2.t.1) (4.14.2.t.1) (4.15.2.t.1) (4.16.2.t.1) 
constant 41.37*** 39.52*** 16.47*** 43.09*** 17.09*** 21.95*** 41.06*** 22.77*** 16.87*** 18.29*** 18.47*** 23.15*** 23.83*** 24.29*** 13.08* 20.70*** 
 
(1.13) (1.39) (5.12) (1.89) (5.33) (5.95) (2.36) (5.98) (6.14) (5.63) (5.86) (6.57) (6.20) (6.26) (6.97) (7.49) 
tdisincimfgdp5 -0.09 -0.17 0.07 -0.13 0.08 -0.05 -0.20 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
tdisincimfgdp5 * 
polins 0.30* 0.40** -0.08 0.34* -0.09 0.11 0.43** 0.11 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.19 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
inf5  15.40***    11.48*** 13.92*** 12.25***    10.77** 9.89** 10.96**  9.87** 
 
 (4.25)    (3.92) (4.86) (3.84) 
 
  (4.53) (4.56) (4.56) 
 
(4.72) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.84***   2.79***   3.81*** 9.75  2.74*** 10.93  39.31* 27.80 
  





gdpgr5    -0.35   -0.26  -0.04  -0.18 -0.14  -0.23 1.10 0.66 
   
 (0.24) 
  
(0.28)  (0.27)  (0.24) (0.32) 
 
(0.29) (0.84) (0.88) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.72***   2.61***  -6.09 3.64***  -8.27 2.59*** -35.34 -24.97 
     




(7.78) (0.91) (21.91) (21.70) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 56 61 60 61 56 55 56 60 55 
∑ panel obs 162 139 159 161 158 137 139 135 159 155 157 137 133 135 155 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.7: Pooled OLS Results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) (adisincimfgdp5 & polins): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.2.a.1) (4.2.2.a.1) (4.3.2.a.1) (4.4.2.a.1) (4.5.2.a.1) (4.6.2.a.1) (4.7.2.a.1) (4.8.2.a.1) (4.9.2.a.1) (4.10.2.a.1) (4.11.2.a.1) (4.12.2.a.1) (4.13.2.a.1) (4.14.2.a.1) (4.15.2.a.1) (4.16.2..1) 
constant 41.47*** 39.66*** 16.96*** 43.25*** 17.18*** 22.67*** 41.30*** 22.89*** 17.48*** 18.36*** 18.53*** 24.03*** 23.94*** 24.39*** 13.13** 20.79*** 
 
(1.13) (1.41) (5.17) (1.89) (5.34) (6.01) (2.38) (5.98) (6.22) (5.64) (5.87) (6.66) (6.20) (6.26) (6.99) (7.49) 
adisincimfgdp5 -0.43 -0.85 0.32 -0.67 0.39 -0.30 -1.03* -0.22 0.27 0.09 0.28 -0.43 -0.55 -0.38 0.01 -0.57 
 
(0.57) (0.53) (0.64) (0.66) (0.64) (0.55) (0.62) (0.55) (0.76) (0.74) (0.74) (0.67) (0.64) (0.65) (0.71) (0.64) 
adisincimfgdp5 * 
polins 1.47* 1.96** -0.36 1.70* -0.43 0.64 2.14** 0.59 -0.31 -0.08 -0.29 0.77 0.93 0.75 0.02 0.97 
 
(0.84) (0.80) (0.96) (0.92) (0.96) (0.86) (0.89) (0.86) (1.08) (1.04) (1.06) (0.97) (0.93) (0.95) (1.00) (0.91) 
inf5  15.24***    11.49*** 13.66*** 12.35***    10.70** 10.01** 11.08**  9.97** 
 
 (4.25)    (3.94) (4.88) (3.85) 
 
  (4.57) (4.58) (4.59) 
 
(4.74) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.77***   2.69***   3.73*** 9.62  2.62*** 10.69  39.21* 27.56 
  





gdpgr5    -0.36   -0.28  -0.05  -0.18 -0.16  -0.22 1.10 0.66 
   
 (0.24) 
  
(0.28)  (0.27)  (0.24) (0.32) 
 
(0.29) (0.83) (0.88) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.69***   2.58***  -5.99 3.61***  -8.07 2.56*** -35.26 -24.76 
     




(7.78) (0.91) (21.92) (21.68) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 56 61 60 61 56 55 56 60 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 161 138 158 160 159 136 138 136 158 156 158 136 134 136 156 134 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.8: Pooled OLS Results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) (tdisgdp5 & polins): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.3.t.1) (4.2.3.t.1) (4.3.3.t.1) (4.4.3.t.1) (4.5.3.t.1) (4.6.3.t.1) (4.7.3.t.1) (4.8.3.t.1) (4.9.3.t.1) (4.10.3.t.1) (4.11.3.t.1) (4.12.3.t.1) (4.13.3.t.1) (4.14.3.t.1) (4.15.3.t.1) (4.16.3.t.1) 
constant 41.35*** 39.41*** 16.69*** 43.04*** 17.36*** 22.13*** 40.94*** 23.02*** 17.29*** 18.57*** 18.87*** 23.40*** 23.97*** 24.55*** 13.27* 20.79*** 
 
(1.12) (1.42) (5.15) (1.82) (5.35) (5.98) (2.36) (5.98) (6.10) (5.61) (5.83) (6.51) (6.17) (6.21) (6.99) (7.47) 
tdisgdp5 -0.09 -0.17 0.05 -0.13 0.06 -0.08 -0.21 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.04 -0.16 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) 
tdisgdp5 * 
polins 0.32* 0.42** -0.06 0.36* -0.07 0.15 0.46** 0.15 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.24 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) 
inf5  15.64***    11.49*** 14.10*** 12.30***    10.66** 9.65** 10.88**  9.55** 
 
 (4.30)    (3.98) (4.95) (3.90) 
   





  3.83***   2.78***   3.78*** 10.26  2.73*** 11.45  40.49* 28.80 
  
 (0.82)   (0.94) 
 





gdpgr5    -0.36   -0.26  -0.06  -0.20 -0.16  -0.24 1.12 0.67 







(0.24) (0.31)  (0.28) (0.84) (0.88) 
ln 
(agdppc5) 
    3.70***   2.59***  -6.62 3.61***  -8.79 2.57*** -36.51 -25.95 







(7.76) (0.92) (22.17) (21.94) 
adjusted 
R-squared 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.16 
# of cross 
sections 





ns: 162 139 159 161 158 137 135 135 159 155 157 137 133 135 155 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.9: Pooled OLS Results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) (adisgdp5 & polins): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.3.a.1) (4.2.3.a.1) (4.3.3.a.1) (4.4.3.a.1) (4.5.3.a.1) (4.6.3.a.1) (4.7.3.a.1) (4.8.3.a.1) (4.9.3.a.1) (4.10.3.a.1) (4.11.3.a.1) (4.12.3.a.1) (4.13.3.a.1) (4.14.3.a.1) (4.15.3.a.1) (4.16.3.a.1) 
constant 41.46*** 39.57*** 17.20*** 43.21*** 17.47*** 22.86*** 41.20*** 23.16*** 17.91*** 18.66*** 18.95*** 24.29*** 24.10*** 24.67*** 13.33* 20.90*** 
 
(1.12) (1.44) (5.19) (1.82) (5.36) (6.03) (2.38) (5.98) (6.17) (5.61) (5.83) (6.59) (6.17) (6.21) (7.01) (7.47) 
adisgdp5 -0.44 -0.88 0.21 -0.67 0.29 -0.43 -1.07 -0.33 0.15 -0.04 0.17 -0.57 -0.71 -0.51 -0.18 -0.76 
 
(0.62) (0.57) (0.69) (0.71) (0.68) (0.58) (0.67) (0.58) (0.80) (0.78) (0.78) (0.71) (0.68) (0.69) (0.73) (0.66) 
adisgdp5 * 
polins 1.54* 2.08* -0.23 1.79* -0.31 0.82 2.28** 0.76 -0.15 0.08 -0.15 0.97 1.14 0.93 0.22 1.21 
 
(0.90) (0.86) (1.01) (0.99) (1.02) (0.90) (0.95) (0.90) (1.14) (1.10) (1.12) (1.02) (0.97) (0.99) (1.04) (0.94) 
inf5  15.47***    11.50*** 13.81*** 12.42***    10.59** 9.80** 11.01**  9.66** 
 
 (4.31)    (4.01) (4.97) (3.92) 
 
  (4.67) (4.69) (4.68) 
 
(4.81) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.76***   2.68***   3.70*** 10.13  2.61*** 11.21  40.38* 28.54 
  





gdpgr5    -0.37   -0.28  -0.07  -0.19 -0.17  -0.23 1.12 0.67 
   
 (0.24) 
  
(0.28)  (0.27)  (0.24) (0.31) 
 
(0.28) (0.84) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.68*   2.55***  -6.52 3.58***  -8.59 2.54*** -36.42 -25.72 
     




(7.76) (0.92) (22.19) (21.94) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 56 61 60 61 56 55 56 60 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 161 138 158 160 159 136 138 136 158 156 158 136 134 136 156 134 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.10: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.1.2.t) (4.2.2.t) (4.3.2.t) (4.4.2.t) (4.5.2.t) (4.6.2.t) (4.7.2.t) (4.1.2.a) (4.2.2.a) (4.3.2.a) (4.4.2.a) (4.5.2.a) (4.6.2.a) (4.7.2.a) 
constant 41.09*** 39.11*** 17.17*** 42.46*** 17.91*** 21.52*** 18.70*** 41.16*** 39.18*** 17.57*** 42.56*** 17.96*** 22.11*** 18.73*** 
 
(1.11) (1.38) (5.02) (1.74) (5.15) (5.95) (6.73) (1.11) (1.38) (5.07) (1.72) (5.17) (6.02) (6.74) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.10** 0.08** 0.02 0.09* 0.02 0.01 0.00        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
   
    




   (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) 
inf5  15.38***    10.66** 9.86**  15.25***    10.61** 9.98** 
 




  (4.58) (4.69) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.74***   2.94*** 25.58   3.69***   2.86*** 25.33 
  




 (0.91) (21.94) 
gdpgr5    -0.29  -0.11 0.64    -0.30  -0.11 0.64 





  (0.23)  (0.29) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.60***  -22.49     3.59***  -22.26 
        
  0.81   (21.91)   
  
    (0.81)   (21.87) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.11: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables/ 
Model (4.1.3.t) (4.2.3.t) (4.3.3.t) (4.4.3.t) (4.5.3.t) (4.6.3.t) (4.7.3.t) (4.1.3.a) (4.2.3.a) (4.3.3.a) (4.4.3.a) (4.5.3.a) (4.6.3.a) (4.7.3.a) 
constant 41.03*** 38.92*** 17.14*** 42.40*** 17.91*** 21.54**** 18.64*** 41.11*** 39.00*** 17.55*** 42.51*** 17.97*** 22.15*** 18.70*** 
 
(1.10) (1.41) (5.11) (1.67) (5.24) (6.01) (6.85) (1.09) (1.41) (5.16) (1.65) (5.26) (6.09) (6.87) 
tdisgdp5 0.11** 0.10** 0.01 0.10** 0.02 0.00 -0.01        
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
   




   (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 
inf5  15.78***    10.60** 9.65**  15.65***    10.57** 9.82** 
 




  (4.65) (4.76) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.77***   2.96*** 26.01   3.71***   2.87*** 25.66 
  




 (0.93) (22.18) 
gdpgr5    -0.30  -0.12 0.64    -0.31  -0.12 0.64 





  (0.23)  (0.29) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.63***  -22.87     3.61***  -22.56 
        
  (0.83)   (22.09)   
  
    (0.83)   (22.07) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.12: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5)   
Variables 
/Model (4.1.1.t) (4.2.1.t) (4.3.1.t) (4.4.1.t) (4.5.1.t) (4.1.1.a) (4.2.1.a) (4.3.1.a) (4.4.1.a) (4.5.1.a) 
constant 42.07*** 40.15*** 5.27 44.88*** 5.20 42.12*** 40.23*** 5.36 44.99*** 4.93 
 
(1.06) (1.30) (3.62) (1.68) (3.95) (1.07) (1.30) (3.65) (1.68) (3.94) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.06 0.05 0.13*** 0.03 0.14***      
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
     
aibrdidagdp5      0.30 0.25 0.67*** 0.15 0.72*** 
 
 
   
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) 
inf5  14.26***     14.06***    
 
 (4.47) 
   
 (4.47) 
   
ln (igdppc5)   5.31***     5.29***   
 
  (0.53) 
    
(0.54) 
  
gdpgr5    -0.54**     -0.55**  
    
(0.23) 
    
(0.23) 
 
ln (agdppc5)     5.24***     5.27*** 
     
(0.56) 
    
(0.56) 
tibrdidagdp5 
* TE -3.07*** 6.36*** 0.35 -3.86*** 0.28      
 
(1.17) (1.66) (0.87) (1.40) (0.94) 
    
 
aibrdidagdp5 




   (5.92) (8.34) (4.35) (7.01) (4.67) 










* TE   -2.83***     -2.85***   








gdpgr5 * TE    1.93*     1.87*  







* TE     -2.75***     -2.76*** 
          
(0.47)   
  
    (0.48) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.05 0.13 0.41 0.07 0.31 0.05 0.12 0.40 0.07 0.40 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 159 136 156 160 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   






Table A.13: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummy (ibrdidagdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.1.t) 
tibrdidagdp5 + 
tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 -3.01*** 6.57 0.01 (4.1.1.a) 
aibrdidagdp5 + 
aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 -15.25*** 6.59 0.01 
           
(4.2.1.t) 
tibrdidagdp5 + 
tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 6.42*** 14.99 0.00 (4.2.1.a) 
aibrdidagdp5 + 
aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 32.19*** 15.01 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 -412.79*** 68.55 0.00  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 -414.72*** 68.60 0.00 
           
(4.3.1.t) 
tibrdidagdp5 + 
tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 0.48 0.30 0.58 (4.3.1.a) 
aibrdidagdp5 + 
aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 2.63 0.37 0.55 
 
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*TE=0 2.47*** 15.98 0.00  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*TE=0 2.44*** 15.33 0.00 
           
(4.4.1.t) 
tibrdidagdp5 + 
tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 -3.83*** 7.35 0.01 (4.4.1.a) 
aibrdidagdp5 + 
aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 -19.26*** 7.46 0.01 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.38 1.95 0.16  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.32 1.79 0.18 
           
(4.5.1.t) 
tibrdidagdp5 + 
tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 0.42 0.20 0.66 (4.5.1.a) 
aibrdidagdp5 + 
aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 2.32 0.25 0.62 
  
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*TE=0 2.50*** 13.60 0.00   
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*TE=0 2.51*** 13.66 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.           
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Table A.14: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (disgdp5)   
Variables 
/Model (4.1.3.t) (4.2.3.t) (4.3.3.t) (4.4.3.t) (4.5.3.t) (4.1.3.a) (4.2.3.a) (4.3.3.a) (4.4.3.a) (4.5.3.a) 
constant 41.24*** 39.27*** 11.89** 44.04*** 12.77*** 41.34*** 39.39*** 12.25*** 44.17*** 12.79*** 
 
(1.11) (1.42) (4.64) (1.51) (4.78) (1.09) (1.41) (4.69) (1.48) (4.80) 
tdisgdp5 0.12*** 0.10** -0.01 0.09* -0.01      
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
adisgdp5      0.59*** 0.50** -0.05 0.42* -0.01 
      
(0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
inf5  14.83***     14.69***    
  
(4.45) 
   
 (4.45) 
   
ln (igdppc5)   4.69***     4.64***   







gdpgr5    -0.53**     -0.54***  
    
(0.21) 
   
 (0.20) 
 
ln (agdppc5)     4.52***     4.51*** 
     
(0.73) 
    
(0.74) 
tdisgdp5 * 
TE -0.90*** -1.18*** -0.31*** -1.11*** -0.35***      
 
(0.09) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
    
 
adisgdp5 * 
TE      -4.51*** -5.90*** -1.60*** -5.52*** -1.85*** 
   
   (0.44) (0.20) (0.60) (0.56) (0.61) 










* TE   -2.23***     -2.20***   








gdpgr5 * TE    2.50***     2.44***  







* TE     -2.10***     -2.05*** 
          
(0.25)   
  
    (0.25) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.09 0.14 0.33 0.12 0.31 0.01 0.10 0.33 0.12 0.31 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 161 138 158 160 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   





Table A.15: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummy (disgdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -0.77*** 63.27 0.00 (4.1.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -3.92*** 64.41 0.00 
           
(4.2.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -1.08*** 348.08 0.00 (4.2.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -5.40*** 352.48 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 93.66*** 842.55 0.00  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 93.41*** 850.36 0.00 
           
(4.3.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -0.32*** 7.86 0.01 (4.3.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -1.65*** 7.88 0.01 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.45*** 14.29 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.44*** 13.63 0.00 
           
(4.4.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -1.02*** 61.77 0.00 (4.4.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -5.10*** 64.84 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.97*** 70.99 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.89*** 73.11 0.00 
           
(4.5.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -0.35*** 9.10 0.00 (4.5.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -1.86*** 9.26 0.00 
  
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*TE=0 2.42*** 12.31 0.00   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 2.46*** 12.35 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.           
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Table A.16: Regression Results with Latin America Countries (LA) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5)     
Variables/Model (4.1.1.t) (4.2.1.t) (4.3.1.t) (4.4.1.t) (4.5.1.t) (4.6.1.t) (4.7.1.t) (4.1.1.a) (4.2.1.a) (4.3.1.a) (4.4.1.a) (4.5.1.a) (4.6.1.a) (4.7.1.a) 
constant 40.72*** 38.39*** 13.97*** 41.81*** 14.57*** 18.28*** 15.36** 40.75*** 38.38*** 14.05*** 41.88*** 14.32*** 18.29*** 14.80** 
 
(1.11) (1.32) (5.19) (1.83) (5.37) (6.11) (6.66) (1.12) (1.33) (5.22) (1.85) (5.37) (6.23) (6.62) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.05 0.05 0.14*** 0.05 0.14*** 0.13** 0.15***        
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
aibrdidagdp5        0.25 0.27 0.69*** 0.26 0.73*** 0.67** 0.78*** 
 
      
 
(0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.27) (0.26) 
inf5  13.11*    15.44** 15.34**  13.11*    15.47** 15.43** 
 
 (7.62) 




   
(6.53) (7.00) 











gdpgr5    -0.37  0.14 1.12    -0.38  0.14 1.16 
    
(0.24)  (0.35) (0.85) 




ln (agdppc5)     3.55***  -24.86**     3.58***  -25.31 








tibrdidagdp5 * LA 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.15* 0.20** 0.15* 0.19** 0.19        
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
       





   
(0.32) (0.33) (0.46) (0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42) 








  (8.70) (9.66) 
ln (igdppc5) * LA   0.45   0.84 -27.32   0.44   0.84 -28.71 







 (0.58) (30.94) 
gdpgr5 * LA    1.33***  0.13 -0.97    1.31***  0.11 -1.04 







(0.31)  (0.55) (1.03) 
ln (agdppc5) * LA     0.54*  28.61     0.54*  30.02 
          
(0.32) 
  
(30.88)   
  
    (0.32)   (31.12) 
adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.12 0.22 0.33 0.16 0.34 0.35 0.37 
# of cross secs used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel observations: 160 137 157 160 158 135 133 159 136 156 159 158 134 133 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.    
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.    
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.       
 87 
 
Table A.17: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummy (ibrdidagdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.42*** 31.41 0.00 (4.1.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 2.05*** 31.87 0.00 
          
(4.2.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.46*** 53.95 0.00 (4.2.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 2.33*** 53.91 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 14.83*** 7.59 0.01  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 14.69*** 7.51 0.01 
          
(4.3.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.29*** 13.56 0.00 (4.3.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.45*** 13.23 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 4.17*** 40.13 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 4.15*** 39.43 0.00 
          
(4.4.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.25*** 8.63 0.00 (4.4.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.23*** 8.26 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.96*** 7.41 0.01  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.94*** 6.98 0.01 
          
(4.5.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.29*** 14.23 0.00 (4.5.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.43*** 14.52 0.00 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 4.09*** 36.70 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 4.11*** 37.24 0.00 
          
(4.6.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.32*** 22.99 0.00 (4.6.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.60*** 21.87 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.30 0.17 0.69  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 3.40*** 18.22 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.42*** 18.87 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.50 0.19 0.66 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.26 0.37 0.55  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.25 0.34 0.56 
          
(4.7.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.34*** 21.26 0.00 (4.7.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.73*** 20.75 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.85 0.19 0.66  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 3.19 0.23 0.63 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 0.04 0.00 1.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 -0.86 0.00 0.97 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.16 0.05 0.82  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.12 0.03 0.86 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.76 0.02 0.88   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 4.71 0.04 0.85 
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Table A.18: Regression Results with Latin American Countries (LA) Dummy (disincimfgdp5)     
Variables/Model (4.1.2.t) (4.2.2.t) (4.3.2.t) (4.4.2.t) (4.5.2.t) (4.6.2.t) (4.7.2.t) (4.1.2.a) (4.2.2.a) (4.3.2.a) (4.4.2.a) (4.5.2.a) (4.6.2.a) (4.7.2.a) 
constant 41.33*** 39.75*** 24.00*** 42.36*** 25.00*** 31.89*** 31.05*** 41.53*** 39.96*** 24.39*** 42.59*** 25.05*** 32.44*** 31.01*** 
 
(1.12) (1.42) (6.18) (1.76) (6.20) (6.70) (7.56) (1.12) (1.44) (6.20) (1.76) (6.19) (6.75) (7.55) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.09        
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
       
adisincimfgdp5        0.09 -0.03 0.37 0.20 0.46 0.37 0.51 
 
       (0.23) (0.23) (0.32) (0.25) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) 
inf5  12.19*    18.05** 18.53**  11.84    18.01** 18.76*** 
 
 (7.15) 




   
(7.05) (7.22) 











gdpgr5    -0.43*  -0.14 0.23    -0.45*  -0.15 0.24 








ln (agdppc5)     2.17**  -8.22     2.14**  -8.05 








tdisincimfgdp5 * LA 0.23*** 0.23*** -0.12 0.06 -0.14* -0.12 -0.14*        
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
    
   




   
  
(0.29) (0.32) (0.38) (0.29) (0.37) (0.38) (0.41) 








  (9.76) (10.27) 
ln (igdppc5) * LA   1.07***   1.48** 5.14   1.10***   1.51** 6.85 
   
(0.36) 
 




 (0.64) (34.70) 
gdpgr5 * LA    1.56***  0.49 0.46    1.58***  0.49 0.49 







(0.29)  (0.55) (1.24) 
ln (agdppc5) * LA     1.18***  -3.52     1.22***  -5.16 
          
(0.34) 
  
(35.00)   
  
    (0.34)   (35.04) 
adjusted R-squared 
0.08 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.27 0.27 
# of cross sections used 
62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel (unbalanced) 





Table A.19: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummy (disincimfgdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 0.25*** 14.42 0.00 (4.1.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 1.14*** 13.07 0.00 
          
(4.2.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 0.22*** 11.75 0.00 (4.2.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 0.99*** 11.46 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 14.01*** 7.06 0.01  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 14.51*** 7.73 0.01 
          
(4.3.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.05 1.24 0.27 (4.3.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.28 1.87 0.17 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.46*** 17.19 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.43*** 16.78 0.00 
          
(4.4.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 0.10* 2.95 0.09 (4.4.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 0.42 2.47 0.12 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.12*** 11.50 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.13*** 11.41 0.00 
          
(4.5.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.06 1.60 0.21 (4.5.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.30 2.27 0.13 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.35*** 15.97 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.36*** 16.07 0.00 
          
(4.6.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.05 0.94 0.34 (4.6.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.27 1.52 0.22 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -0.71 0.01 0.91  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -0.97 0.02 0.89 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.31** 5.75 0.02  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.27** 5.49 0.02 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.35 0.62 0.43  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.34 0.63 0.43 
          
(4.7.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.05 0.96 0.33 (4.7.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.30 1.53 0.22 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.42 0.04 0.84  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.75 0.06 0.81 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 14.07 0.20 0.65  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 15.57 0.25 0.62 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.69 0.50 0.48  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.73 0.56 0.45 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -11.74 0.14 0.71   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -13.21 0.18 0.67 
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Table A.20: Regression Results with Latin American Countries (LA) Dummy (disgdp5)     
Variables/Model (4.1.3.t) (4.2.3.t) (4.3.3.t) (4.4.3.t) (4.5.3.t) (4.6.3.t) (4.7.3.t) (4.1.3.a) (4.2.3.a) (4.3.3.a) (4.4.3.a) (4.5.3.a) (4.6.3.a) (4.7.3.a) 
constant 41.47*** 39.93*** 23.99*** 42.46*** 25.08*** 32.23*** 31.71*** 41.67*** 40.15*** 24.41*** 42.68*** 25.17*** 32.80*** 31.78*** 
 
(1.10) (1.47) (6.31) (1.70) (6.32) (6.82) (7.70) (1.10) (1.49) (6.32) (1.70) (6.32) (6.86) (7.70) 
tdisgdp5 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.11        
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
       
adisgdp5        0.06 -0.09 0.35 0.22 0.45 0.43 0.60 
 
       (0.25) (0.26) (0.37) (0.28) (0.35) (0.40) (0.43) 
inf5  12.05*    18.67** 19.40**  11.67    18.68** 19.80** 
 
 (7.13) 




   
(7.46) (7.72) 











gdpgr5    -0.45**  -0.15 0.16    -0.47**  -0.16 0.17 








ln (agdppc5)     2.19**  -6.74     2.15**  -6.32 








tdisgdp5 * LA 0.24*** 0.24*** -0.12 0.05 -0.14 -0.13 -0.17        
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
    
   




   
  
(0.31) (0.33) (0.42) (0.32) (0.40) (0.46) (0.49) 








  (10.10) (10.63) 
ln (igdppc5) * LA   1.03***   1.50** 6.57   1.07***   1.54** 8.48 
   
(0.36) 
 




 (0.67) (34.45) 
gdpgr5 * LA    1.57***  0.50 0.52    1.60***  0.50 0.56 







(0.29)  (0.54) (1.22) 
ln (agdppc5) * LA     1.15***  -4.93     1.19***  -6.76 
          
(0.35) 
  
(34.76)   
  
    (0.34)   (34.78) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.27 0.27 
# of cross sections 
used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.21: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummy (disgdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 0.26*** 13.74 0.00 (4.1.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 1.16*** 12.52 0.00 
          
(4.2.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 0.22*** 11.35 0.00 (4.2.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 0.98*** 11.14 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 14.23*** 7.23 0.01  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 14.65*** 7.82 0.01 
          
(4.3.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.05 1.21 0.27 (4.3.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.28 1.84 0.18 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.46*** 16.49 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.42*** 16.05 0.00 
          
(4.4.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 0.10* 2.80 0.10 (4.4.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 0.41 2.33 0.13 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.12*** 11.58 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.13*** 11.56 0.00 
          
(4.5.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.06 1.59 0.21 (4.5.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.31 2.26 0.13 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.33*** 15.22 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.34*** 15.25 0.00 
          
(4.6.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.05 1.15 0.29 (4.6.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.30 1.74 0.19 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -0.81 0.01 0.90  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.08 0.03 0.87 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.28** 5.46 0.02  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.23** 5.20 0.02 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.35 0.64 0.43  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.35 0.66 0.42 
          
(4.7.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.06 1.18 0.28 (4.7.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.33 1.76 0.19 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.55 0.05 0.83  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.89 0.07 0.80 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 13.92 0.20 0.65  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 15.34 0.25 0.62 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.69 0.50 0.48  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.73 0.57 0.45 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -11.67 0.14 0.71   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -13.08 0.18 0.67 
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Table A.22: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5)     
Variables 
/Model (4.1.1.t) (4.2.1.t) (4.3.1.t) (4.4.1.t) (4.5.1.t) (4.6.1.t) (4.7.1.t) (4.1.1.a) (4.2.1.a) (4.3.1.a) (4.4.1.a) (4.5.1.a) (4.6.1.a) (4.7.1.a) 
constant 41.74*** 38.88*** 8.13* 43.38*** 8.73** 10.65* 8.94 41.77*** 38.95*** 8.26* 43.45*** 8.52* 10.83* 8.48 
 
(1.12) (1.36) (4.16) (1.86) (4.41) (5.83) (5.88) (1.13) (1.37) (4.21) (1.87) (4.40) (6.02) (5.84) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.08        
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
aibrdidagdp5        0.31 0.32 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.39 0.41 
 
       (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.37) (0.34) 
inf5  21.58***    16.01*** 14.17**  21.44***    15.99*** 14.23** 
 
 (4.48) 




   
(5.66) (5.46) 











gdpgr5    -0.32  0.27 1.40    -0.32  0.26 1.42 








ln (agdppc5)     4.80***  -38.26     4.82***  -38.46 









SSA 0.01 0.10 0.20** 0.03 0.21*** 0.15 0.23***        
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
    
   
aibrdidagdp5 * 




     (0.25) (0.32) (0.42) (0.28) (0.38) (0.50) (0.38) 








 (8.39) (8.41) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
SSA   -0.49   0.12 -2.01   -0.52   0.10 -0.17 
   
(0.45) 
 
 (0.80) (40.18) 
  
(0.46)   (0.81) (39.86) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    -0.11  0.10 0.60    -0.13  0.09 0.65 




   
(0.43)  (0.60) (1.44) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
SSA     -0.75**  1.13     -0.77**  -0.75 
          
(0.34) 
  
(40.85)   
  
    (0.34)   (40.53) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.14 0.29 0.01 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.01 0.14 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.26 0.30 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 135 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
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Table A.23: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummy (ibrdidagdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.07* 3.06 0.08 (4.1.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.35* 3.14 0.08 
          
(4.2.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.16*** 11.25 0.00 (4.2.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.81*** 11.62 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -12.79* 3.63 0.06  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -12.79** 3.82 0.05 
          
(4.3.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.22*** 16.74 0.00 (4.3.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.13*** 17.54 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.44*** 28.72 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.40*** 27.57 0.00 
          
(4.4.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.06 1.43 0.23 (4.4.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.31 1.48 0.23 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.43 1.01 0.32  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.45 1.08 0.30 
          
(4.5.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.25*** 36.65 0.00 (4.5.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.27*** 38.51 0.00 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.05*** 28.91 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.06*** 29.11 0.00 
          
(4.6.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.22*** 10.75 0.00 (4.6.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.11*** 11.49 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -8.76 1.75 0.19  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -8.37 1.75 0.19 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.06*** 12.39 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.02*** 11.66 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.36 0.72 0.40  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.35 0.69 0.41 
          
(4.7.1.t) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.31*** 55.93 0.00 (4.7.1.a) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.56*** 59.92 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -12.94* 3.58 0.06  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -12.30* 3.58 0.06 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 40.09 1.43 0.23  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 42.18 1.62 0.21 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 2.01* 2.69 0.10  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 2.07* 2.88 0.09 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -37.12 1.20 0.27   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -39.21 1.37 0.24 
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Table A.24: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (disincimfgdp5)     
Variables 
/Model (4.1.2.t) (4.2.2.t) (4.3.2.t) (4.4.2.t) (4.5.2.t) (4.6.2.t) (4.7.2.t) (4.1.2.a) (4.2.2.a) (4.3.2.a) (4.4.2.a) (4.5.2.a) (4.6.2.a) (4.7.2.a) 
constant 41.05*** 38.99*** 12.65** 42.49*** 12.67** 19.99*** 18.51** 41.13*** 39.06*** 13.17** 42.61*** 12.78** 21.04*** 18.68** 
 
(1.11) (1.41) (5.10) (1.78) (5.43) (6.85) (7.35) (1.10) (1.42) (5.15) (1.77) (5.43) (7.02) (7.35) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.11** 0.06 -0.05 0.11** -0.06 -0.02 -0.02        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
adisincimfgdp5        0.53*** 0.31 -0.24 0.53** -0.23 -0.06 -0.05 
 
       (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) 
inf5  20.53***    13.95** 12.84**  20.42***    13.97** 12.99** 
 
 (4.33) 




   
(5.65) (5.83) 











gdpgr5    -0.37  -0.06 0.87    -0.38  -0.08 0.88 








ln (agdppc5)     4.44***  -30.43     4.41***  -30.36 









* SSA -0.02 0.11 0.12 -0.07 0.14 0.13 0.11        
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
    
   
adisincimfgdp5 




   
  
(0.27) (0.38) (0.59) (0.30) (0.57) (0.81) (0.81) 








  (9.75) (9.20) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
SSA   0.21   0.03 -53.43   0.17   -0.08 -52.93 
   
(0.48) 
 




 (1.00) (48.60) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    0.29  0.46 -1.34    0.28  0.53 -1.28 







(0.37)  (0.69) (1.80) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
SSA     0.16  54.26     0.14  53.69 
          
(0.48)   (49.83)   
  
    (0.47)   (49.53) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.25: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummy (disincimfgdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.09 2.28 0.13 (4.1.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.42 2.22 0.14 
          
(4.2.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.17** 4.85 0.03 (4.2.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.85** 4.83 0.03 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -5.14 0.63 0.43  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -5.42 0.71 0.40 
          
(4.3.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.06 0.30 0.58 (4.3.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.35 0.40 0.53 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.68*** 21.81 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.56*** 20.52 0.00 
          
(4.4.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.04 0.47 0.49 (4.4.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.21 0.44 0.51 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.08 0.05 0.83  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.10 0.07 0.80 
          
(4.5.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.08 0.59 0.44 (4.5.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.45 0.71 0.40 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.60*** 19.52 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.55*** 19.20 0.00 
          
(4.6.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.11 0.52 0.47 (4.6.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.68 0.73 0.39 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -2.39 0.09 0.76  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -2.81 0.13 0.72 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.10** 4.33 0.04  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 2.84* 3.54 0.06 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.39 0.51 0.48  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.44 0.65 0.42 
          
(4.7.2.t) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.09 0.37 0.54 (4.7.2.a) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.56 0.50 0.48 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.13 0.00 0.99  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.30 0.00 0.97 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -20.03 0.22 0.64  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -19.65 0.21 0.64 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.46 0.09 0.77  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.40 0.07 0.80 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 23.83 0.30 0.58   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 23.33 0.29 0.59 
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Table A.26: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (disgdp5)     
Variables 
/Model (4.1.3.t) (4.2.3.t) (4.3.3.t) (4.4.3.t) (4.5.3.t) (4.6.3.t) (4.7.3.t) (4.1.3.a) (4.2.3.a) (4.3.3.a) (4.4.3.a) (4.5.3.a) (4.6.3.a) (4.7.3.a) 
constant 41.02*** 38.92*** 12.59** 42.51*** 12.61** 19.37*** 18.18** 41.11*** 38.99*** 13.13** 42.63*** 12.74** 20.41*** 18.41** 
 
(1.10) (1.44) (5.15) (1.73) (5.47) (6.87) (7.53) (1.08) (1.45) (5.20) (1.72) (5.47) (7.03) (7.53) 
tdisgdp5 0.12*** 0.07 -0.05 0.12** -0.05 -0.02 -0.02        
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
adisgdp5        0.58*** 0.35* -0.23 0.60*** -0.23 -0.05 -0.05 
 
       (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) 
inf5  20.59***    13.99** 12.84**  20.49***    14.02** 13.00** 
 
 (4.40) 




   
(5.63) (5.82) 











gdpgr5    -0.39  -0.05 0.89    -0.40  -0.06 0.89 








ln (agdppc5)     4.44***  -30.79     4.40***  -30.62 









SSA -0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.14 0.07 0.08        
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.20) (0.21) 
    
   
adisgdp5 * 




   
  
(0.33) (0.44) (0.72) (0.36) (0.71) (0.98) (1.06) 








  (11.12) (10.63) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
SSA   0.27   0.37 -58.11   0.23   0.25 -58.78 
   
(0.49) 
 




 (1.06) (50.77) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    0.31  0.24 -1.63    0.30  0.31 -1.61 







(0.37)  (0.71) (1.75) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
SSA     0.21  59.19     0.20  59.79 
          
(0.49) 
  
(51.60)   
  
    (0.49)   (51.46) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.27: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummy (disgdp5) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.10 1.99 0.16 (4.1.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.48 1.94 0.17 
          
(4.2.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.18** 3.90 0.05 (4.2.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.90** 3.87 0.05 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -2.20 0.09 0.76  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -2.48 0.12 0.73 
          
(4.3.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.06 0.16 0.69 (4.3.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.34 0.23 0.63 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.74*** 21.08 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.61*** 19.79 0.00 
          
(4.4.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.05 0.38 0.54 (4.4.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.23 0.35 0.55 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.08 0.04 0.83  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.10 0.07 0.80 
          
(4.5.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.08 0.38 0.54 (4.5.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.47 0.47 0.50 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.65*** 18.97 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.60*** 18.60 0.00 
          
(4.6.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.05 0.08 0.78 (4.6.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.41 0.18 0.68 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.71 0.01 0.94  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.76 0.01 0.94 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.51** 5.01 0.03  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.23** 4.19 0.04 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.20 0.12 0.73  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.25 0.19 0.67 
          
(4.7.3.t) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.07 0.10 0.75 (4.7.3.a) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.45 0.18 0.67 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 1.69 0.03 0.85  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 1.91 0.04 0.83 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -24.32 0.29 0.59  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -25.21 0.31 0.58 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.74 0.24 0.63  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.72 0.22 0.64 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 28.40 0.38 0.54   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 29.17 0.41 0.52 
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Table A.28: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 + voaccount (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.1.t.2) (4.9.1.t.2) (4.10.1.t.2) (4.11.1.t.2) (4.12.1.t.2) (4.13.1.t.2) (4.14.1.t.2) (4.8.1.a.2) (4.9.1.a.2) (4.10.1.a.2) (4.11.1.a.2) (4.12.1.a.2) (4.13.1.a.2) (4.14.1.a.2) 
constant 34.20*** 33.73*** 9.31** 35.18*** 9.38** 10.69** 6.63 34.16*** 33.67*** 9.46** 35.15*** 8.98** 10.78* 6.16 
 
(1.58) (1.94) (3.91) (2.31) (4.28) (5.37) (5.82) (1.57) (1.94) (3.93) (2.31) (4.24) (5.50) (5.76) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.07* 0.07* 0.15*** 0.07 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
voaccount 14.72*** 11.25*** 0.51 14.15*** 0.89 0.48 2.62 14.96*** 11.55*** 0.66 14.43*** 0.56 0.61 2.38 
 
(3.51) (3.94) (3.73) (3.65) (3.63) (3.99) (3.63) (3.54) (3.98) (3.79) (3.67) (3.59) (4.06) (3.58) 
inf5  13.92***    11.02** 10.54**  13.68***    11.09** 10.71** 
 




  (4.32) (4.38) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.55***   3.98*** 37.01*   4.52***   3.95*** 36.91* 
  




 (0.73) (20.12) 
gdpgr5    -0.14  0.16 1.32    -0.15  0.16 1.33 





  (0.23)  (0.31) (0.80) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.46***  -33.09     4.52***  -32.93 
        
  (0.67)   (20.24)   
  
    (0.66)   (20.17) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.11 0.12 0.27 0.10 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.23 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 139 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
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Table A.29: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 + goveff (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.1.t.3) (4.9.1.t.3) (4.10.1.t.3) (4.11.1.t.3) (4.12.1.t.3) (4.13.1.t.3) (4.14.1.t.3) (4.8.1.a.3) (4.9.1.a.3) (4.10.1.a.3) (4.11.1.a.3) (4.12.1.a.3) (4.13.1.a.3) (4.14.1.a.3) 
constant 37.40*** 34.59*** 10.64** 38.21*** 10.68** 10.72* 6.75 37.38*** 34.56*** 10.64** 38.20*** 10.37** 10.67* 6.29 
 
(3.30) (3.47) (4.78) (3.41) (4.91) (5.58) (5.88) (3.29) (3.46) (4.79) (3.40) (4.89) (5.68) (5.82) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.08** 0.08* 0.14*** 0.07 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
goveff 9.12 10.34 -6.21 11.95 -7.99 -6.00 -5.45 9.25 10.55 -5.93 12.17 -7.90 -5.65 -5.34 
 
(6.71) (7.06) (6.94) (7.51) (6.87) (7.95) (7.40) (6.69) (7.03) (6.92) (7.51) (6.84) (7.98) (7.37) 
inf5  15.36***    10.92*** 10.69***  15.21***    11.01** 10.85** 
 




  (4.23) (4.29) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.81***   4.35*** 32.47   4.79***   4.33*** 32.71 
  




 (0.75) (19.81) 
gdpgr5    -0.44*  0.24 1.25    -0.45*  0.24 1.26 





  (0.26)  (0.33) (0.80) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.86***  -28.03     4.89***  -28.23 
        
  (0.64)   (19.87)   
  
    (0.64)   (19.80) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.24 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 139 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
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Table A.30: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 + requal (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.1.t.4) (4.9.1.t.4) (4.10.1.t.4) (4.11.1.t.4) (4.12.1.t.4) (4.13.1.t.4) (4.14.1.t.4) (4.8.1.a.4) (4.9.1.a.4) (4.10.1.a.4) (4.11.1.a.4) (4.12.1.a.4) (4.13.1.a.4) (4.14.1.a.4) 
constant 19.05*** 21.12*** 7.54 20.79*** 7.68 9.73* 3.25 19.35*** 21.38*** 7.68 21.08*** 7.49 9.86* 2.92 
 
(4.24) (4.60) (4.63) (4.38) (4.79) (5.56) (5.62) (4.23) (4.60) (4.65) (4.38) (4.77) (5.65) (5.57) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.10** 0.09** 0.14*** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) 80.25) (0.25) 
requal 35.81*** 29.50*** 8.79 35.25*** 9.32 8.81 16.37** 35.40*** 29.15*** 8.71 34.88*** 8.83 8.69 15.93* 
 
(6.89) (7.56) (7.64) (6.99) (7.57) (8.51) (8.29) (6.88) (7.55) (7.64) (6.99) (7.56) (8.55) (8.30) 
inf5  11.97**    10.49** 9.35*  11.90**    10.55** 9.54* 
 




  (4.64) (4.86) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.05***   3.42*** 43.23**   4.04***   3.40*** 43.15** 
  




 (0.82) (20.81) 
gdpgr5    -0.28  0.09 1.45*    -0.29  0.09 1.46* 





  (0.22)  (0.33) (0.81) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.93***  -40.11*     3.99***  -39.97* 
        
  (0.74)   (21.07)   
  
    (0.74)   (21.01) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 139 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
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Table A.31: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 + rule (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.1.t.5) (4.9.1.t.5) (4.10.1.t.5) (4.11.1.t.5) (4.12.1.t.5) (4.13.1.t.5) (4.14.1.t.5) (4.8.1.a.5) (4.9.1.a.5) (4.10.1.a.5) (4.11.1.a.5) (4.12.1.a.5) (4.13.1.a.5) (4.14.1.a.5) 
constant 38.67*** 36.68*** 9.74** 40.22*** 9.32** 10.12* 6.42 38.57*** 36.59*** 9.72** 40.14*** 9.02** 10.05* 5.96 
 
(2.46) (2.71) (4.17) (2.70) (4.42) (5.50) (5.87) (2.45) (2.70) (4.18) (2.69) (4.41) (5.63) (5.82) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.08** 0.07* 0.14*** 0.06 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
rule 6.95 6.16 -7.17 7.67 -7.83 -5.59 -4.22 7.28 6.51 -6.95 8.08 -7.88 -5.35 -4.18 
 
(5.22) (5.47) (5.46) (5.63) (5.39) (5.67) (5.31) (5.19) (5.45) (5.49) (5.63) (5.37) (5.73) (5.30) 
inf5  15.58***    10.57** 10.47**  15.43***    10.68** 10.63** 
 




  (4.26) (4.34) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.97***   4.40*** 31.35   4.95***   4.38*** 31.58 
  




 (0.76) (19.83) 
gdpgr5    -0.38  0.24 1.19    -0.39  0.24 1.21 





  (0.25)  (0.32) (0.79) 
ln (agdppc5)     5.00***  -26.93     5.04***  -27.12 
        
  (0.66)   (19.93)   
  
    (0.66)   (19.85) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.27 0.24 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 139 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
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Table A.32: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 + contcorr (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.8.1.t.6) (4.9.1.t.6) (4.10.1.t.6) (4.11.1.t.6) (4.12.1.t.6) (4.13.1.t.6) (4.14.1.t.6) (4.8.1.a.6) (4.9.1.a.6) (4.10.1.a.6) (4.11.1.a.6) (4.12.1.a.6) (4.13.1.a.6) (4.14.1.a.6) 
constant 36.66*** 35.96*** 9.02** 38.41*** 8.79** 9.86* 5.95 36.72*** 35.99*** 9.09** 38.47*** 8.48* 9.84* 5.48 
 
(2.07) (2.30) (4.02) (2.48) (4.34) (5.46) (5.90) (2.06) (2.30) (4.05) (2.48) (4.33) (5.60) (5.84) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.09** 0.08* 0.14*** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16***        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
 




   (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
contcorr 14.13*** 9.90* -3.73 14.12** -3.95 -4.42 -4.13 14.12*** 9.99* -3.58 14.18** -4.09 -4.27 -4.16 
 
(5.31) (5.69) (6.06) (5.71) (5.92) (6.21) (5.89) (5.30) (5.68) (6.06) (5.71) (5.89) (6.23) (5.89) 
inf5  14.92***    10.92** 10.69**  14.76***    11.01** 10.85** 
 




  (4.30) (4.34) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.82***   4.3*** 32.48   4.80***   4.32*** 32.68 
  




 (0.77) (19.96) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  0.19 1.20    -0.36  0.20 1.22 





  (0.24)  (0.31) (0.80) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.80***  -28.05     4.84***  -28.20 
        
  (0.67)   (20.04)   
  
    (0.67)   (19.97) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.05 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.05 0.26 0.24 0.25 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 139 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
 
 103 
Table A.33: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 + polins (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.2.t.1) (4.9.2.t.1) (4.10.2.t.1) (4.11.2.t.1) (4.12.2.t.1) (4.13.2.t.1) (4.14.2.t.1) (4.8.2.a.1) (4.9.2.a.1) (4.10.2.a.1) (4.11.2.a.1) (4.12.2.a.1) (4.13.2.a.1) (4.14.2.a.1) 
constant 36.42*** 33.61*** 17.06*** 38.01*** 17.79*** 22.04*** 18.78*** 36.59*** 33.79*** 17.46*** 38.20*** 17.83*** 22.66*** 18.76*** 
 
(2.21) (2.36) (5.10) (2.36) (5.21) (5.85) (6.49) (2.20) (2.36) (5.15) (2.35) (5.23) (5.92) (6.49) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.07* 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.02        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) 
polins 9.51** 11.70*** 1.19 9.88** 1.66 6.25 7.27 9.30** 11.51*** 1.19 9.68** 1.62 6.33 7.19 
 
(4.00) (4.23) (4.17) (4.33) (4.13) (4.69) (4.49) (4.01) (4.24) (4.18) (4.34) (4.14) (4.70) (4.50) 
inf5  15.38***    11.16** 10.21**  15.21***    11.08** 10.30** 
 




  (4.50) (4.67) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.67***   2.43** 29.14   3.61***   2.34** 28.97 
  
 (0.82)   (0.95) (21.96) 
  
(0.82)   (0.96) (21.90) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  -0.15 0.71    -0.36  -0.16 0.72 





  (0.24)  (0.30) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.50***  -26.61     3.48***  -26.45 
        
  (0.83)   (21.87)   
  
    (0.84)   (21.82) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.17 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.34: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 + voaccount (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.8.2.t.2) (4.9.2.t.2) (4.10.2.t.2) (4.11.2.t.2) (4.12.2.t.2) (4.13.2.t.2) (4.14.2.t.2) (4.8.2.a.2) (4.9.2.a.2) (4.10.2.a.2) (4.11.2.a.2) (4.12.2.a.2) (4.13.2.a.2) (4.14.2.a.2) 
constant 34.94*** 34.78*** 17.77*** 36.07*** 18.90*** 21.88*** 18.60*** 34.95*** 34.78*** 18.33*** 36.11*** 18.94*** 22.63*** 18.61*** 
 
(1.67) (1.99) (5.08) (2.29) (5.22) (6.00) (6.68) (1.66) (1.98) (5.13) (2.27) (5.23) (6.09) (6.69) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.07* 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) 
voaccount 13.17*** 9.38** 2.92 12.47*** 4.49 2.40 5.23 13.46*** 9.67** 3.44 12.76*** 4.47 2.98 5.19 
 
(3.59) (3.96) (3.85) (3.77) (3.84) (4.20) (4.05) (3.63) (4.02) (3.92) (3.81) (3.84) (4.29) (4.05) 
inf5  14.31***    10.69** 9.50**  14.07***    10.61** 9.61** 
 




  (4.57) (4.77) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.44***   2.71*** 32.39   3.32***   2.57*** 32.16 
  
 (0.87)   (0.95) (21.77) 
  
(0.88)   (0.96) (21.75) 
gdpgr5    -0.16  -0.11 0.85    -0.17  -0.12 0.85 





  (0.22)  (0.30) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.13***  -29.74     3.12***  -29.52 
        
  (0.88)   (21.76)   
  
    (0.88)   (21.73) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.35: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 + goveff (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.8.2.t.3) (4.9.2.t.3) (4.10.2.t.3) (4.11.2.t.3) (4.12.2.t.3) (4.13.2.t.3) (4.14.2.t.3) (4.8.2.a.3) (4.9.2.a.3) (4.10.2.a.3) (4.11.2.a.3) (4.12.2.a.3) (4.13.2.a.3) (4.14.2.a.3) 
constant 39.79*** 37.17*** 19.22*** 40.30*** 19.67*** 21.62*** 19.01*** 39.83*** 37.22*** 19.53*** 40.35*** 19.71*** 22.14*** 19.05*** 
 
(3.11) (3.40) (5.44) (3.16) (5.41) (6.01) (6.85) (3.09) (3.39) (5.47) (3.15) (5.42) (6.07) (6.85) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.10** 0.08** 0.01 0.08* 0.02 0.01 0.01        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) 
goveff 3.04 4.57 -11.81 5.93 -12.90* -7.92 -7.02 3.10 4.63 -11.56 6.09 -12.88* -7.42 -7.09 
 
(6.73) (7.15) (7.24) (7.73) (7.21) (8.27) (8.04) (6.72) (7.14) (7.22) (7.73) (7.21) (8.29) (8.02) 
inf5  15.46***    10.58** 9.98**     4.17*** 10.54*** 10.10** 
 
 (4.39)    (4.44) (4.60) 
   
 (0.77) (4.48) (4.60) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.21***   3.36*** 23.70  15.32***    3.26*** 23.42 
  
 (0.75)   (0.86) (21.07) 
 
(4.39)    (0.87) (21.04) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  0.01 0.68   4.15***   -0.01 0.68 





 (0.76)   (0.32) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.18***  -20.26    -0.37   -20.00 
        
  (0.77)   (20.89)   
  
  (0.26)     (20.85) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.36: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 + requal (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.8.2.t.4) (4.9.2.t.4) (4.10.2.t.4) (4.11.2.t.4) (4.12.2.t.4) (4.13.2.t.4) (4.14.2.t.4) (4.8.2.a.4) (4.9.2.a.4) (4.10.2.a.4) (4.11.2.a.4) (4.12.2.a.4) (4.13.2.a.4) (4.12.2.4.4) 
constant 22.63*** 24.32*** 15.01*** 24.26*** 15.72*** 19.37*** 13.36** 22.93*** 24.65*** 15.38*** 24.57*** 15.76*** 19.95*** 13.32* 
 
(4.48) (4.69) (5.63) (4.53) (5.66) (6.22) (6.73) (4.49) (4.70) (5.68) (4.54) (5.69) (6.28) (6.78) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.26) 
requal 31.40*** 25.91*** 11.13 31.61*** 12.46 14.90* 22.32** 31.06*** 25.53*** 11.33 31.29*** 12.38 15.23* 22.24** 
 
(7.54) (8.02) (7.98) (7.92) (8.00) (8.87) (9.02) (7.58) (8.09) (7.99) (7.97) (8.03) (8.97) (9.11) 
inf5  12.40***    9.65* 7.44  12.25***    9.52* 7.49 
 




  (5.05) (5.39) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.06***   2.02** 40.23*   2.99***   1.91** 40.22* 
  
 (0.85)   (0.91) (21.75) 
  
(0.85)   (0.92) (21.82) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  -0.22 0.97    -0.35  -0.23 0.98 





  (0.22)  (0.32) (0.85) 
ln (agdppc5)     2.81***  -38.35*     2.81***  -38.34* 
        
  (0.87)   (21.83)   
  
    (0.87)   (21.89) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.37: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 + rule (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.8.2.t.5) (4.9.2.t.5) (4.10.2.t.5) (4.11.2.t.5) (4.12.2.t.5) (4.13.2.t.5) (4.14.2.t.5) (4.8.2.a.5) (4.9.2.a.5) (4.10.2.a.5) (4.11.2.a.5) (4.12.2.a.5) (4.13.2.a.5) (4.14.2.a.5) 
constant 40.10*** 38.30*** 17.48*** 41.29*** 17.80*** 20.91*** 18.66*** 40.08*** 38.29*** 17.78*** 41.30*** 17.85*** 21.44*** 18.69*** 
 
(2.30) (2.59) (4.98) (2.42) (5.07) (5.94) (6.83) (2.28) (2.58) (5.02) (2.40) (5.08) (6.03) (6.84) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.10** 0.08** 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) 
rule 2.61 2.07 -10.27* 3.64 -9.96* -6.73 -4.99 2.85 2.30 -9.98* 3.99 -9.97* -6.28 -5.07 
 
(5.38) (5.57) (5.67) (6.00) (5.64) (6.13) (5.76) (5.39) (5.57) (5.71) (6.03) (5.65) (6.21) (5.76) 
inf5  15.51***    10.25** 9.73**  15.38***    10.25** 9.85** 
 




  (4.53) (4.67) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.30***   3.37*** 22.46   4.24***   3.26*** 22.13 
  
 (0.77)   (0.89) (20.98) 
  
(0.78)   (0.91) (20.94) 
gdpgr5    -0.33  0.00 0.61    -0.34  -0.01 0.61 





  (0.25)  (0.32) (0.85) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.21***  -19.08     4.19***  -18.77 
        
  (0.80)   (20.84)   
  
    (0.80)   (20.80) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.38: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5 + contcorr (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.8.2.t.6) (4.9.2.t.6) (4.10.2.t.6) (4.11.2.t.6) (4.12.2.t.6) (4.13.2.t.6) (4.14.2.t.6) (4.8.2.a.6) (4.9.2.a.6) (4.10.2.a.6) (4.11.2.a.6) (4.12.2.a.6) (4.13.2.a.6) (4.14.2.a.6) 
constant 38.52*** 37.81*** 16.69*** 40.08*** 17.30*** 20.44*** 18.11*** 38.59*** 37.88*** 17.07*** 40.16*** 17.35*** 21.03*** 18.14*** 
 
(1.99) (2.23) (4.92) (2.26) (5.06) (5.88) (6.84) (1.98) (2.22) (4.96) (2.24) (5.08) (5.97) (6.85) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.09** 0.07* 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) 
contcorr 8.52 4.50 -7.09 9.08 -5.89 -6.25 -4.83 8.54 4.53 -6.83 9.15 -5.88 -5.90 -4.89 
 
(5.62) (5.93) (6.39) (6.17) (6.23) (6.69) (6.33) (5.62) (5.93) (6.39) (6.18) (6.23) (6.70) (6.33) 
inf5  15.23***    10.66** 9.94**  15.08***    10.62** 10.07** 
 




  (4.55) (4.66) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.15***   3.35*** 23.87   4.08***   3.25*** 23.59 
  
 (0.80)   (0.90) (21.32) 
  
(0.80)   (0.91) (21.29) 
gdpgr5    -0.35  -0.05 0.62    -0.36  -0.06 0.62 





  (0.24)  (0.30) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.97***  -20.48     3.96***  -20.22 
        
  (0.82)   (21.17)   
  
    (0.83)   (21.13) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.39: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 + polins (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.8.3.t.1) (4.9.3.t.1) (4.10.3.t.1) (4.11.3.t.1) (4.12.3.t.1) (4.13.3.t.1) (4.14.3.t.1) (4.8.3.a.1) (4.9.3.a.1) (4.10.3.a.1) (4.11.3.a.1) (4.12.3.a.1) (4.13.3.a.1) (4.14.3.a.1) 
constant 36.43*** 33.54*** 17.01*** 38.00*** 17.77*** 22.00*** 18.59*** 36.62*** 33.73*** 17.42*** 38.20*** 17.83*** 22.64*** 18.61*** 
 
(2.20) (2.37) (5.19) (2.34) (5.30) (5.91) (6.57) (2.20) (2.37) (5.24) (2.32) (5.32) (5.98) (6.59) 
tdisgdp5 0.08* 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.03        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.21) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 
polins 9.41** 11.54*** 1.27 9.72** 1.75 6.27 7.34 9.20** 11.36*** 1.28 9.52** 1.71 6.35 7.27 
 
(4.00) (4.23) (4.16) (4.32) (4.13) (4.66) (4.45) (4.01) (4.25) (4.17) (4.33) (4.13) (4.67) (4.46) 
inf5  15.60***    11.08** 9.96**  15.43***    11.02** 10.09** 
 




  (4.58) (4.73) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.69***   2.44** 29.82   3.63***   2.35** 29.56 
  




 (0.98) (22.11) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  -0.16 0.73    -0.37  -0.16 0.73 





  (0.24)  (0.29) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.52***  -27.24     3.50***  -27.00 
        
  (0.85)   (22.03)   
  
    (0.85)   (21.99) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections 
used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.40: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 + voaccount (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.3.t.2) (4.9.3.t.2) (4.10.3.t.2) (4.11.3.t.2) (4.12.3.t.2) (4.13.3.t.2) (4.14.3.t.2) (4.8.3.a.2) (4.9.3.a.2) (4.10.3.a.2) (4.11.3.a.2) (4.12.3.a.2) (4.13.3.a.2) (4.14.3.a.2) 
constant 34.87*** 34.66*** 17.76*** 36.01*** 18.93*** 21.91*** 18.50*** 34.88*** 34.68*** 18.33*** 36.07*** 18.98*** 22.68*** 18.54*** 
 
(1.68) (2.00) (5.18) (2.28) (5.32) (6.07) (6.78) (1.67) (1.99) (5.23) (2.25) (5.33) (6.16) (6.80) 
tdisgdp5 0.08** 0.07* 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
   




   (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 
voaccount 13.16*** 9.28** 2.96 12.41*** 4.55 2.41 5.26 13.44*** 9.56** 3.49 12.68*** 4.54 3.00 5.24 
 
(3.58) (3.97) (3.86) (3.77) (3.85) (4.20) (4.05) (3.61) (4.02) (3.93) (3.80) (3.84) (4.28) (4.05) 
inf5  14.63***    10.65** 9.29*  14.38***    10.59** 9.43* 
 




  (4.64) (4.82) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.45***   2.72*** 32.90   3.33***   2.57*** 32.61 
  




 (0.99) (21.97) 
gdpgr5    -0.17  -0.12 0.86    -0.18  -0.13 0.86 





  (0.22)  (0.29) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.14***  -30.21     3.12***  -29.94 
        
  (0.90)   (21.93)   
  
    (0.90)   (21.92) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.41: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 + goveff (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.3.t.3) (4.9.3.t.3) (4.10.3.t.3) (4.11.3.t.3) (4.12.3.t.3) (4.13.3.t.3) (4.14.3.t.3) (4.8.3.a.3) (4.9.3.a.3) (4.10.3.a.3) (4.11.3.a.3) (4.12.3.a.3) (4.13.3.a.3) (4.14.3.a.3) 
constant 39.93*** 37.17*** 19.20*** 40.37*** 19.68*** 21.66*** 18.99*** 39.97*** 37.23*** 19.52*** 40.42*** 19.73*** 22.19*** 19.06*** 
 
(3.09) (3.39) (5.53) (3.14) (5.49) (6.08) (6.97) (3.08) (3.38) (5.56) (3.13) (5.51) (6.14) (6.99) 
tdisgdp5 0.11** 0.09** 0.01 0.09* 0.01 0.01 0.00        
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.21) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 
goveff 2.62 4.17 -11.87 5.59 -12.97* -7.88 -6.90 2.69 4.24 -11.62 5.77 -12.95** -7.38 -6.98 
 
(6.78) (7.20) (7.24) (7.78) (7.22) (8.29) (8.05) (6.77) (7.18) (7.22) (7.78) (7.22) (8.30) (8.03) 
inf5  15.83***    10.53** 9.81**  15.69***    10.51** 9.97** 
 




  (4.56) (4.68) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.24***   3.37*** 24.05   4.18***   3.27*** 23.67 
  




 (0.89) (21.28) 
gdpgr5    -0.37  0.00 0.67    -0.38  -0.01 0.67 





  (0.25)  (0.32) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.21***  -20.58     4.19***  -20.23 
        
  (0.78)   (21.07)   
  
    (0.78)   (21.06) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.42: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 + requal (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.8.3.t.4) (4.9.3.t.4) (4.10.3.t.4) (4.11.3.t.4) (4.12.3.t.4) (4.13.3.t.4) (4.14.3.t.4) (4.8.3.a.4) (4.9.3.a.4) (4.10.3.a.4) (4.11.3.a.4) (4.12.3.a.4) (4.13.3.a.4) (4.14.3.a.4) 
constant 22.66*** 24.36*** 14.97*** 24.28*** 15.68*** 19.30*** 12.94* 22.96*** 24.70*** 15.34*** 24.61*** 15.74*** 19.90*** 12.91* 
 
(4.49) (4.69) (5.70) (4.54) (5.73) (6.30) (6.84) (4.50) (4.71) (5.75) (4.55) (5.76) (6.37) (6.91) 
tdisgdp5 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.05        
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
     
 
 




   (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.27) 
requal 31.30*** 25.69*** 11.24 31.37*** 12.62 14.91* 22.62** 30.96*** 25.30*** 11.45 31.04*** 12.56 15.24* 22.55** 
 
(7.54) (8.07) (7.95) (7.89) (7.97) (8.75) (8.92) (7.58) (8.14) (7.97) (7.94) (8.00) (8.84) (9.01) 
inf5  12.56***    9.56* 7.04  12.42***    9.45* 7.12 
 




  (5.12) (5.42) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.07***   2.04** 41.44*   3.00***   1.93** 41.37* 
  




 (0.94) (21.92) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  -0.22 1.00    -0.35  -0.23 1.01 





  (0.21)  (0.31) (0.85) 
ln (agdppc5)     2.82***  -39.50*     2.81***  -39.44* 
        
  (0.89)   (21.89)   
  
    (0.89)   (21.98) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table A.43: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 + rule (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.8.3.t.5) (4.9.3.t.5) (4.10.3.t.5) (4.11.3.t.5) (4.12.3.t.5) (4.13.3.t.5) (4.14.3.t.5) (4.8.3.a.5) (4.9.3.a.5) (4.10.3.a.5) (4.11.3.a.5) (4.12.3.a.5) (4.13.3.a.5) (4.14.3.a.5) 
constant 40.10*** 38.18*** 17.44*** 41.27*** 17.79*** 20.96*** 18.63*** 40.09*** 38.18*** 17.75*** 41.27*** 17.85*** 21.51*** 18.71*** 
 
(2.29) (2.60) (5.06) (2.40) (5.15) (6.02) (6.95) (2.27) (2.58) (5.10) (2.37) (5.17) (6.10) (6.97) 
tdisgdp5 0.11** 0.09** 0.01 0.09* 0.01 0.01 0.00        
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
  




   (0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 
rule 2.48 1.90 -10.27** 3.51 -9.95* -6.65 -4.87 2.73 2.13 -9.96* 3.86 -9.95* -6.19 -4.95 
 
(5.40) (5.59) (5.67) (5.99) (5.64) (6.11) (5.75) (5.40) (5.59) (5.70) (6.03) (5.64) (6.19) (5.75) 
inf5  15.89***    10.18** 9.54**  15.76***    10.21** 9.71** 
 




  (4.60) (4.74) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.33***   3.38*** 22.89   4.27***   3.27*** 22.47 
  
 (0.79)   (0.92) (21.21) 
  
(0.79)   (0.93) (21.19) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  -0.01 0.61    -0.35  -0.02 0.60 





  (0.24)  (0.32) (0.85) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.23***  -19.48     4.21***  -19.09 
        
  (0.81)   (21.03)   
  
    (0.81)   (21.01) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.44: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5 + contcorr (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.8.3.t.6) (4.9.3.t.6) (4.10.3.t.6) (4.11.3.t.6) (4.12.3.t.6) (4.13.3.t.6) (4.14.3.t.6) (4.8.3.a.6) (4.9.3.a.6) (4.10.3.a.6) (4.11.3.a.6) (4.12.3.a.6) (4.13.3.a.6) (4.14.3.a.6) 
constant 38.58*** 37.74*** 16.67*** 40.10*** 17.31*** 20.49*** 18.09*** 38.65*** 37.81*** 17.06*** 40.19*** 17.36*** 21.10*** 18.15*** 
 
(1.98) (2.22) (5.01) (2.22) (5.15) (5.95) (6.96) (1.97) (2.21) (5.05) (2.20) (5.17) (6.03) (6.98) 
tdisgdp5 0.10** 0.09** 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.00        
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
 
 




   (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) 
contcorr 8.27 4.19 -7.09 8.83 -5.90 -6.20 -4.75 8.31 4.23 -6.83 8.90 -5.90 -5.85 -4.81 
 
(5.67) (5.99) (6.40) (6.22) (6.23) (6.69) (6.33) (5.67) (5.99) (6.40) (6.23) (6.23) (6.70) (6.33) 
inf5  15.60***    10.61** 9.76**  15.45***    10.59*** 9.93** 
 




  (4.63) (4.73) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.17***   3.36*** 24.25   4.11***   3.26*** 23.86 
  




 (0.93) (21.53) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  -0.06 0.62    -0.36  -0.06 0.61 





  (0.23)  (0.30) (0.86) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.00***  -20.82     3.98***  -20.47 
        
  (0.84)   (21.36)   
  
    (0.84)   (21.34) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.45: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5 + polins)   
Variables  
/Model (4.8.1.t.1) (4.9.1.t.1) (4.10.1.t.1) (4.11.1.t.1) (4.12.1.t.1) (4.8.1.a.1) (4.9.1.a.1) (4.10.1.a.1) (4.11.1.a.1) (4.12.1.a.1) 
constant 34.77*** 32.08*** 4.97 37.72*** 4.95 34.94*** 32.25*** 5.07 37.92*** 4.69 
 
(2.14) (2.36) (3.67) (2.43) (3.99) (2.13) (2.36) (3.70) (2.42) (3.98) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.04 0.03 0.13*** 0.00 0.14***      
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
     
aibrdidagdp5      0.22 0.15 0.65*** 0.01 0.70*** 
 
     (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) 
polins 14.53*** 16.27*** 2.64 16.30*** 2.69 14.32*** 16.10*** 2.53 16.13*** 2.43 
 
(3.51) (3.68) (3.51) (3.66) (3.46) (3.51) (3.67) (3.49) (3.66) (3.44) 
inf5  14.00***     13.79***    
 
 (3.86) 
   
 (3.87) 
   






  (0.58) 
  
gdpgr5    -0.75***     -0.76***  







ln (agdppc5)     5.08***     5.12*** 
     
(0.61) 
    
(0.61) 
tibrdidagdp5 
* TE 1.05* -3.10*** 1.42*** 1.67*** 1.33***      
 
(0.59) (0.04) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) 
  
   
aibrdidagdp5 
* TE      5.52* -15.51*** 7.10*** 8.36*** 6.66*** 
 
     (2.89) (0.22) (2.49) (2.34) (2.49) 
polins * TE -28.68*** -47.37*** -111.20*** -36.75*** -168.29*** -28.93*** -47.42*** -108.38*** -36.90*** -165.00*** 
 
(3.05) (1.92) (23.41) (3.45) (33.26) (3.01) (1.93) (22.83) (3.47) (32.44) 








* TE   7.42***     7.15***   








gdpgr5 * TE    0.15     0.19  







* TE     13.03***     12.72*** 
          
(2.98)   
  
    (2.90) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.14 0.22 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.21 0.40 0.19 0.39 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 159 136 158 158 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A.46: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummy (ibrdidagdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 1.10* 3.44 0.07 (4.8.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 5.73** 3.96 0.05 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -14.16*** 13.61 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 -14.61*** 14.85 0.00 
           
(4.9.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 -3.07*** 2.18e+19 0.00 (4.9.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 -15.36 na na 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -31.10*** 119.98 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 -31.32*** 121.21 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 na na  na  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 na na na 
           
(4.10.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 1.54*** 9.75 0.00 (4.10.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 7.74*** 9.76 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -108.56*** 22.17 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 -105.85*** 22.19 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 12.57*** 34.40 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 12.29*** 34.48 0.00 
           
(4.11.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 1.67*** 13.07 0.00 (4.11.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 8.37*** 12.91 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -20.45*** 27.58 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 -20.76*** 28.30 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 -0.60*** 6.50 0.01  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 -0.57** 6.01 0.02 
           
(4.12.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*TE=0 1.47*** 8.83 0.00 (4.12.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*TE=0 7.37*** 8.83 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -165.60*** 25.18 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 -162.57*** 25.53 0.00 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 18.11*** 33.04 0.00   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 17.84*** 33.68 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.           




Table A.47: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (disincimfgdp5 + polins)   
Variables 
/Model (4.8.2.t.1) (4.9.2.t.1) (4.10.2.t.1) (4.11.2.t.1) (4.12.2.t.1) (4.8.2.a.1) (4.9.2.a.1) (4.10.2.a.1) (4.11.2.a.1) (4.12.2.a.1) 
constant 34.62*** 31.97*** 11.30** 37.36*** 12.23*** 34.81*** 32.16*** 11.66** 37.55*** 12.24*** 
 
(2.08) (2.30) (4.51) (2.27) (4.65) (2.08) (2.30) (4.56) (2.26) (4.66) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00      
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
adisincimfgdp5      0.29 0.14 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 
 
     (0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
polins 14.10*** 16.28*** 5.52 16.24*** 5.74 13.92*** 16.14*** 5.55 16.08*** 5.72 
 
(3.58) (3.76) (3.81) (3.76) (3.79) (3.59) (3.76) (3.81) (3.77) (3.79) 
inf5  14.13***     13.92***    
 
 (3.84) 
   
 (3.85) 
   





   
 (0.77) 
  
gdpgr5    -0.70***     -0.71***  
    
(0.20) 
    
(0.20) 
 
ln (agdppc5)     4.14***     4.14*** 
     
(0.78) 
   
 (0.79) 
tdisincimfgdp5 
* TE -0.24 -1.33*** -2.09*** -3.25*** -1.99***      
 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.44) (0.69) (0.53) 
  
   
adisincimfgdp5 
* TE      -1.29 -6.64*** -10.45*** -15.73*** -10.03*** 
 
     (0.84) (0.17) (2.11) (3.13) (2.55) 
polins * TE -19.81*** 2.32 340.69*** 43.00*** 444.41*** -19.41*** 2.23 318.86*** 41.13*** 417.38*** 
 
(3.85) (2.15) (84.74) (15.62) (151.53) (4.20) (2.17) (76.40) (14.32) (135.64) 




  (3.85) 
 
  
ln (igdppc5) * 
TE   -31.53***     -29.37***   








gdpgr5 * TE    6.52***     5.97***  






ln (agdppc5) * 
TE     -41.71***     -39.01*** 
          
(13.48)   
  
    (11.99) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.15 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.32 0.15 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.32 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 161 138 158 161 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A.48: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummy (disincimfgdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.1.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -0.18 1.50 0.22 (4.1.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -1.00 1.53 0.22 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -5.71 1.49 0.22  polins + polins*TE=0 -5.49 1.21 0.27 
           
(4.2.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 na na na (4.2.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -6.49*** 1.21e+19 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 18.61*** 45.02 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 18.37*** 43.89 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 65.78 na na  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 65.78*** 1.22e+18 0.00 
           
(4.3.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -2.10*** 22.97 0.00 (4.3.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -10.50*** 25.01 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 346.21*** 16.72 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 324.41*** 18.08 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 -27.19*** 13.76 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 -25.08*** 14.59 0.00 
           
(4.4.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -3.24*** 22.42 0.00 (4.4.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -15.69*** 25.29 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 59.24*** 14.47 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 57.21*** 16.06 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 5.81*** 21.48 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 5.26*** 24.41 0.00 
           
(4.5.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -1.99*** 13.98 0.00 (4.5.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*TE=0 -10.04*** 15.63 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 450.15*** 8.83 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 423.11*** 9.74 0.00 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 -37.57*** 7.69 0.01   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 -34.88*** 8.35 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.      





Table A.49: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (disgdp5 + polins)   
Variables 
/Model (4.8.3.t.1) (4.9.3.t.1) (4.10.3.t.1) (4.11.3.t.1) (4.12.3.t.1) (4.8.3.a.1) (4.9.3.a.1) (4.10.3.a.1) (4.11.3.a.1) (4.12.3.a.1) 
constant 34.62*** 31.88*** 11.13** 37.23*** 12.10** 34.82*** 32.09*** 11.49** 37.42*** 12.11** 
 
(2.07) (2.30) (4.60) (2.25) (4.73) (2.07) (2.30) (4.65) (2.23) (4.75) 
tdisgdp5 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.02      
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
adisgdp5      0.34 0.20 -0.11 0.11 -0.06 
 
     (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
polins 13.99*** 16.10*** 5.61 15.97*** 5.84 13.81*** 15.96*** 5.64 15.80*** 5.82 
 
(3.59) (3.77) (3.80) (3.77) (3.78) (3.60) (3.78) (3.81) (3.77) (3.79) 
inf5  14.32***     14.12***    
 
 (3.89) 
   
 (3.90) 
   





   
 (0.78) 
  
gdpgr5    -0.69***     -0.70***  
    
(0.19) 
    
(0.19) 
 
ln (agdppc5)     4.18***     4.17*** 
     
(0.80) 
   
 (0.80) 
tdisgdp5 * 
TE -0.22 -1.18*** -1.86*** -2.65** -1.65**      
 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.67) (1.27) (0.72) 
  
   
adisgdp5 * 
TE      -1.15 -5.90*** -9.39*** -13.28** -8.41** 
 
     (0.76) (0.19) (3.31) (6.06) (3.56) 
polins * TE -20.47*** -5.32** 306.20** 26.47 365.06* -20.34*** -5.43** 295.97** 26.94 355.36* 
 
(3.26) (2.21) (140.76) (28.47) (220.15) (3.42) (2.22) (133.55) (27.34) (209.05) 








* TE   -28.90**     -27.85**   








gdpgr5 * TE    5.48**     5.31**  







* TE     -34.95*     -33.92* 
          
(19.71)   
  
    (18.66) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.15 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.32 0.15 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.32 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 161 138 158 161 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A.50: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummy (disgdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -0.15 1.25 0.27 (4.8.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -0.81 1.25 0.26 
 polins + polins*TE=0 -6.49 2.42 0.12  polins + polins*TE=0 -6.53 2.29 0.13 
           
(4.9.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -1.14*** 5.99e+18 0.00 (4.9.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -5.70*** 4.68e+18 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 10.78*** 15.09 0.00  polins + polins*TE=0 10.53*** 14.43 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 90.27*** 4.59e+18 0.00  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 na na na 
           
(4.10.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -1.88*** 7.91 0.01 (4.10.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -9.50*** 8.29 0.00 
 polins + polins*TE=0 311.81** 4.91 0.03  polins + polins*TE=0 301.61** 5.10 0.03 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 -24.52** 4.02 0.05  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 -23.52** 4.15 0.04 
           
(4.11.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -2.62** 4.28 0.04 (4.11.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -13.17** 4.73 0.03 
 polins + polins*TE=0 42.43 2.22 0.14  polins + polins*TE=0 42.74 2.44 0.12 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 4.80* 3.61 0.06  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 4.62** 3.98 0.05 
           
(4.12.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*TE=0 -1.66** 5.33 0.02 (4.12.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*TE=0 -8.47** 5.68 0.02 
 polins + polins*TE=0 370.90* 2.84 0.09  polins + polins*TE=0 361.19* 2.99 0.09 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 -30.77 2.42 0.12   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 -29.75 2.53 0.11 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.           





Table A.51: Regression Results with Latin American Countries (LA) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5 + polins)     
Variables/Model (4.8.1.t.1) (4.9.1.t.1) (4.10.1.t.1) (4.11.1.t.1) (4.12.1.t.1) (4.13.1.t.1) (4.14.1.t.1) (4.8.1.a.1) (4.9.1.a.1) (4.10.1.a.1) (4.11.1.a.1) (4.12.1.a.1) (4.13.1.a.1) (4.14.1.a.1) 
constant 37.57*** 35.11*** 13.90*** 38.41*** 14.41*** 18.54*** 15.83** 37.72*** 35.21*** 13.95*** 38.56*** 14.08*** 18.51*** 15.20** 
 
(1.99) (2.27) (5.22) (2.22) (5.35) (6.14) (6.61) (2.00) (2.27) (5.25) (2.22) (5.36) (6.27) (6.55) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.08* 0.07 0.14*** 0.07 0.14*** 0.13** 0.14***        
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
       
aibrdidagdp5        0.40* 0.36 0.70*** 0.34 0.74*** 0.65** 0.73*** 
 
       (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.20) (0.28) (0.26) 
polins 3.51 3.79 -1.61 4.49 -1.54 2.25 5.41 3.32 3.68 -1.71 4.36 -1.71 2.09 5.06 
 
(3.99) (4.60) (4.67) (4.41) (4.54) (5.74) (5.47) (3.99) (4.59) (4.64) (4.42) (4.51) (5.71) (5.43) 
inf5  16.45**    15.77** 16.03**  16.29**    15.77** 16.06** 
 
 (7.40) 




   
(6.55) (7.05) 











gdpgr5    -0.25  0.13 1.22    -0.26  0.13 1.25 








ln (agdppc5)     3.69***  -28.75     3.74***  -29.04 








tibrdidagdp5 * LA 0.07 0.17** 0.17* 0.09 0.17* 0.22*** 0.23***        
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
     
  
aibrdidagdp5 * LA        0.30 0.86** 0.85* 0.41 0.83* 1.11*** 1.16*** 
 
       (0.44) (0.41) (0.50) (0.44) (0.47) (0.43) (0.43) 
polins * LA 11.61*** 11.89*** -1.80 7.17 -1.97 -7.87 -11.31 11.67*** 11.68*** -1.97 7.09 -2.56 -7.98 -11.32 
 
(3.40) (4.12) (7.30) (5.24) (6.93) (7.54) (7.40) (3.45) (4.19) (7.33) (5.27) (7.01) (7.53) (7.39) 








  (8.88) (9.78) 
ln (igdppc5) * LA   0.55   1.35 -31.76   0.56   1.35* -33.24 
   
(0.60) 
 




 (0.80) (31.03) 
gdpgr5 * LA    0.71  0.24 -1.00    0.71  0.23 -1.07 







(0.45)  (0.54) (1.06) 
ln (agdppc5) * LA     0.66  33.88     0.69  35.36 
          
(0.57) 
  
(31.03)   
  
    (0.57)   (31.25) 
adjusted R-squared 
0.18 0.27 0.32 0.18 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.17 0.33 0.34 0.37 
# of cross secs  
62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel obss: 160 137 157 159 158 136 133 159 136 156 158 158 136 133 
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Table A.52: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results  with LA Dummy (ibrdidagdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.15** 3.90 0.05 (4.8.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.70*** 3.36 0.07 
 polins + polins*LA=0 15.12*** 15.71 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 14.99*** 14.90 0.00 
          
(4.9.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.24*** 14.34 0.00 (4.9.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.22*** 13.52 0.00 
 polins + polins*LA=0 15.68*** 14.63 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 15.36*** 13.73 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 6.39 2.64 0.11  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 6.51* 2.67 0.10 
          
(4.10.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.31*** 13.09 0.00 (4.10.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.55*** 12.72 0.00 
 polins + polins*LA=0 -3.40 0.38 0.54  polins + polins*LA=0 -3.67 0.43 0.51 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 4.41*** 31.05 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 4.41*** 30.73 0.00 
          
(4.11.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.15** 4.46 0.04 (4.11.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.75** 4.12 0.04 
 polins + polins*LA=0 11.66*** 7.06 0.01  polins + polins*LA=0 11.46*** 6.75 0.01 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.46 1.63 0.20  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.45 1.59 0.21 
          
(4.12.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.31*** 13.56 0.00 (4.12.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.56*** 13.70 0.00 
 polins + polins*LA=0 -3.51 0.46 0.50  polins + polins*LA=0 -4.27 0.66 0.42 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 4.35*** 30.84 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 4.43*** 31.54 0.00 
          
(4.13.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.35*** 25.83 0.00 (4.13.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.75*** 24.64 0.00 
 polins + polins*LA=0 -5.61 1.31 0.26  polins + polins*LA=0 -5.88 1.42 0.24 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.50 0.18 0.67  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.74 0.21 0.64 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.73*** 16.67 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.73*** 16.27 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.36 0.75 0.39  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.36 0.72 0.40 
          
(4.14.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*LA=0 0.37*** 24.28 0.00 (4.14.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*LA=0 1.88*** 23.83 0.00 
 polins + polins*LA=0 -5.90 1.40 0.24  polins + polins*LA=0 -6.27 1.57 0.21 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 0.22 0.10 0.75  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 3.54 0.28 0.60 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.14 0.22 0.64  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 -2.13 0.01 0.93 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 -1.02 0.00 0.97  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.18 0.07 0.80 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 5.12 0.04 0.84   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 6.32 0.06 0.80 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.53: Regression Results with Latin American Countries (LA) Dummy (disincimfgdp5 + polins)     
Variables 
/Model (4.8.2.t.1) (4.9.2.t.1) (4.10.2.t.1) (4.11.2.t.1) (4.12.2.t.1) (4.13.2.t.1) (4.14.2.t.1) (4.8.2.a.1) (4.9.2.a.1) (4.10.2.a.1) (4.11.2.a.1) (4.12.2.a.1) (4.13.2.a.1) (4.14.2.a.1) 
constant 37.81*** 35.49*** 23.82*** 38.67*** 24.76*** 32.78*** 30.91*** 37.89*** 35.61*** 24.19*** 38.77*** 24.79*** 33.36*** 30.84*** 
 
(2.06) (2.35) (6.24) (2.15) (6.25) (6.64) (7.17) (2.06) (2.36) (6.25) (2.16) (6.25) (6.68) (7.16) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.11** 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10        
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
       
adisincimfgdp5        0.54** 0.31 0.37 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.54 
 
       (0.24) (0.20) (0.32) (0.28) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) 
polins 2.52 3.52 1.32 3.67 1.32 9.27* 10.46* 2.40 3.45 1.37 3.57 1.31 9.42* 10.46* 
 
(4.10) (4.55) (4.96) (4.53) (4.97) (5.55) (5.65) (4.09) (4.54) (4.95) (4.53) (4.96) (5.53) (5.63) 
inf5  17.16**    19.41*** 19.79***  16.98**    19.37*** 20.01*** 
 
 (6.87) 




   
(7.07) (7.32) 











gdpgr5    -0.26  -0.13 0.51    -0.26  -0.14 0.52 








ln (agdppc5)     2.10*  -16.13     2.07*  -16.01 









* LA -0.18*** -0.14** -0.16* -0.17** -0.17** -0.15* -0.18        
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
     
  
adisincimfgdp5 
* LA        -0.91*** -0.73** -0.82** -0.86** -0.89** -0.78* -0.96** 
    
    (0.32) (0.31) (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.40) (0.43) 
polins * LA 17.88*** 19.90*** 5.20 14.02** 4.93 -4.93 -5.88** 18.07*** 20.04*** 5.38 14.16** 5.14 -4.78 -5.49 
 
(3.37) (4.32) (8.03) (5.78) (7.36) (8.43) (8.74) (3.36) (4.34) (8.04) (5.74) (7.38) (8.43) (8.78) 








  (9.55) (10.20) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
LA   0.76   2.04** -1.05**   0.78   2.07** 0.85 
   
(0.70) 
 




 (0.84) (34.77) 
gdpgr5 * LA    0.65  0.38 0.11    0.66  0.38 0.14 







(0.47)  (0.56) (1.24) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
LA     0.87  3.40     0.89  1.54 
          
(0.68) 
  
(35.12)   
  
    (0.68)   (35.15) 
Adj’ed R-sqed 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.28 0.29 
# of cross secs  62 57 61 62 61 56 57 62 57 61 62 61 56 57 




Table A.54: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummy (disincimfgdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.07 2.61 0.11 (4.8.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.38* 3.11 0.08 
 polins + polins*LA=0 20.40*** 25.34 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 20.46*** 25.33 0.00 
           
(4.9.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.08* 2.69 0.10 (4.9.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.41* 2.96 0.09 
 polins + polins*LA=0 23.42*** 23.62 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 23.48*** 23.49 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 4.62 1.69 0.20  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 4.32 1.49 0.23 
           
(4.10.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.09* 2.94 0.09 (4.10.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.44* 3.41 0.07 
 polins + polins*LA=0 6.52 1.07 0.30  polins + polins*LA=0 6.75 1.14 0.29 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.07*** 11.11 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.02*** 10.75 0.00 
           
(4.11.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.08 2.41 0.12 (4.11.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.43* 2.95 0.09 
 polins + polins*LA=0 17.69*** 10.58 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 17.73*** 10.84 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.39 0.97 0.33  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.39 1.04 0.31 
           
(4.12.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.09* 3.69 0.06 (4.12.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.44** 4.22 0.04 
 polins + polins*LA=0 6.25 1.33 0.25  polins + polins*LA=0 6.45 1.40 0.24 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 2.97*** 1.99 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 2.96*** 11.00 0.00 
           
(4.13.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.07 1.78 0.18 (4.13.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.38 2.35 0.13 
 polins + polins*LA=0 4.34 0.47 0.49  polins + polins*LA=0 4.64 0.54 0.47 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.06 0.03 0.87  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.38 0.05 0.83 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 1.97* 3.88 0.05  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 1.90* 3.62 0.06 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.25 0.31 0.58  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.25 0.30 0.58 
           
(4.14.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.08 1.73 0.19 (4.14.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*LA=0 -0.43 2.27 0.13 
 polins + polins*LA=0 4.58 0.48 0.49  polins + polins*LA=0 4.97 0.56 0.46 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.76 0.06 0.80  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -2.18 0.09 0.76 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 14.82 0.23 0.63  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 16.57 0.29 0.59 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.62 0.43 0.51  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.67 0.51 0.48 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -12.72 0.17 0.68   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -14.47 0.22 0.64 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.55: Regression Results with Latin American Countries (LA) Dummy (disgdp5 + polins)     
Variables  
/Model (4.8.3.t.1) (4.9.3.t.1) (4.10.3.t.1) (4.11.3.t.1) (4.12.3.t.1) (4.13.3.t.1) (4.14.3.t.1) (4.8.3.a.1) (4.9.3.a.1) (4.10.3.a.1) (4.11.3.a.1) (4.12.3.a.1) (4.13.3.a.1) (4.14.3.a.1) 
constant 37.85*** 35.45*** 23.81*** 38.76*** 24.83*** 33.25*** 31.71*** 37.93*** 35.57*** 24.21*** 38.85*** 24.91*** 33.83*** 31.73*** 
 
(2.08) (2.41) (6.36) (2.16) (6.38) (6.75) (7.28) (2.08) (2.42) (6.38) (2.16) (6.38) (6.78) (7.27) 
tdisgdp5 0.11** 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12        
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
       
adisgdp5        0.58** 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.68 
 
       (0.27) (0.23) (0.37) (0.32) (0.36) (0.40) (0.43) 
polins 2.56 3.52 1.37 3.73 1.41 9.63* 10.83* 2.43 3.44 1.42 3.62 1.41 9.79* 10.85* 
 
(4.09) (4.53) (5.00) (4.48) (5.01) (5.60) (5.70) (4.08) (4.52) (4.99) (4.48) (5.00) (5.57) (5.67) 
inf5  17.63**    20.33*** 20.99***  17.46**    20.34*** 21.36*** 
 
 (6.88) 




   
(7.53) (7.85) 











gdpgr5    -0.28  -0.13 0.45    -0.28  -0.14 0.46 








ln (agdppc5)     2.11*  -14.54     2.07*  -14.21 








tdisgdp5 * LA -0.18*** -0.15** -0.15* -0.17** -0.16** -0.17* -0.21**        
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
     
  
adisgdp5 * LA        -0.94*** -0.77** -0.79* -0.89** -0.88** -0.91* -1.13** 
 
       (0.34) (0.34) (0.44) (0.40) (0.41) (0.47) (0.51) 
polins * LA 17.55*** 19.90*** 4.93 13.53** 4.65 -5.32 -6.30 17.75*** 20.03*** 5.10 13.69** 4.84 -5.21 -5.98 
 
(3.30) (4.36) (8.05) (5.57) (7.40) (8.43) (8.73) (3.30) (4.38) (8.06) (5.53) (7.42) (8.43) (8.76) 








  (9.93) (10.58) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
LA   0.74   2.13** 0.41   0.75   2.16** 2.45 
   
(0.71) 
 




 (0.90) (34.49) 
gdpgr5 * LA    0.68  0.39 0.17    0.69  0.39 0.20 







(0.46)  (0.55) (1.22) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
LA     0.85  2.03     0.87  0.03 
          
(0.69) 
  
(34.85)   
  
    (0.69)   (34.87) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.29 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 




Table A.56: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummy (disgdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.07 2.40 0.12 (4.8.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.36* 2.91 0.09 
 polins + polins*LA=0 20.11*** 24.73 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 20.18*** 24.71 0.00 
          
(4.9.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.08 2.66 0.11 (4.9.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.42* 2.92 0.09 
 polins + polins*LA=0 23.42*** 23.26 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 23.47*** 23.10 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 4.57 1.64 0.20  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 4.26 1.43 0.23 
          
(4.10.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.09* 2.75 0.10 (4.10.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.44* 3.22 0.07 
 polins + polins*LA=0 6.29 1.00 0.32  polins + polins*LA=0 6.52 1.06 0.30 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.08*** 10.84 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.02*** 10.46 0.00 
          
(4.11.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.08 2.40 0.12 (4.11.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.42* 2.96 0.09 
 polins + polins*LA=0 17.26*** 10.53 0.00  polins + polins*LA=0 17.31*** 10.76 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.40 1.09 0.30  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.41 1.16 0.28 
          
(4.12.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.09* 3.48 0.06 (4.12.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.44** 4.01 0.05 
 polins + polins*LA=0 6.06 1.25 0.26  polins + polins*LA=0 6.26 1.32 0.25 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 2.96*** 10.61 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 2.95*** 10.58 0.00 
          
(4.13.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.08 1.97 0.16 (4.13.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.41 2.50 0.12 
 polins + polins*LA=0 4.32 0.48 0.49  polins + polins*LA=0 4.58 0.53 0.47 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.17 0.03 0.85  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.50 0.06 0.81 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 1.91* 3.61 0.06  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 1.85* 3.36 0.07 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.25 0.33 0.57  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.25 0.32 0.57 
          
(4.14.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*LA=0 -0.08 1.90 0.17 (4.14.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*LA=0 -0.45 2.40 0.12 
 polins + polins*LA=0 4.53 0.48 0.49  polins + polins*LA=0 4.87 0.55 0.46 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.89 0.07 0.79  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -2.31 0.11 0.75 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 14.51 0.23 0.63  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 16.17 0.28 0.60 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.62 0.44 0.51  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.66 0.51 0.48 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -12.51 0.17 0.68   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -14.18 0.22 0.64 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.57: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5 + polins)     
Variables 
/Model (4.8.1.t.1) (4.9.1.t.1) (4.10.1.t.1) (4.11.1.t.1) (4.12.1.t.1) (4.13.1.t.1) (4.14.1.t.1) (4.8.1.a.1) (4.9.1.a.1) (4.10.1.a.1) (4.11.1.a.1) (4.12.1.a.1) (4.13.1.a.1) (4.14.1.a.1) 
constant 36.10*** 34.03*** 8.27* 37.95*** 8.86** 10.63* 9.23 36.26*** 34.21*** 8.40* 38.14*** 8.62* 10.78* 8.75 
 
(2.20) (2.30) (4.28) (2.46) (4.46) (5.77) (5.86) (2.20) (2.30) (4.33) (2.45) (4.45) (5.98) (5.84) 
tibrdidagdp5 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.08        
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
       
aibrdidagdp5        0.06 0.19 0.14 -0.07 0.22 0.39 0.39 
 
       (0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32) (0.40) (0.35) 
polins 11.81*** 9.75** -2.50 12.55*** -2.11 0.01 1.29 11.65*** 9.65** -2.47 12.43** -2.20 0.04 1.17 
 
(4.29) (4.57) (4.54) (4.84) (4.52) (4.93) (4.57) (4.31) (4.58) (4.54) (4.85) (4.52) (4.96) (4.58) 
inf5  20.93***    16.01*** 14.25***  20.69***    16.00*** 14.30*** 
 
 (4.41) 




   
(5.58) (5.47) 











gdpgr5    -0.46  0.27 1.41    -0.47  0.26 1.43 








ln (agdppc5)     4.94***  -38.70     4.97***  -38.86 









* SSA 0.12 0.11 0.19** 0.14 0.21*** 0.15 0.23***        
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) 
     
  
aibrdidagdp5 
* SSA        0.62 0.54 0.97** 0.70 1.03** 0.75 1.15*** 
 
       (0.42) (0.48) (0.44) (0.45) (0.40) (0.54) (0.40) 
polins * 
SSA -7.08 0.26 5.11 -10.00 5.12 -0.91 1.91 -7.49 -0.20 4.42 -10.52 4.49 -1.65 1.30 
 
(5.67) (6.23) (9.86) (7.57) (9.45) (11.55) (11.39) (5.71) (6.27) (9.76) (7.61) (9.39) (11.53) (11.43) 








  (8.96) (8.91) 
ln (igdppc5) 
* SSA   -0.87   0.18 0.39   -0.85   0.21 1.52 
   
(0.87) 
 




 (1.12) (42.27) 
gdpgr5 * 
SSA    0.38  0.11 0.65    0.39  0.12 0.68 







(0.53)  (0.59) (1.50) 
ln (agdppc5) 
* SSA     -1.13  -1.45     -1.10  -2.57 
          
(0.72) 
  
(43.59)   
  
    (0.72)   (43.21) 
adjed R-sqed 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.28 0.25 0.28 
# of cross 
secs  62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel  
obs: 160 137 157 159 158 135 133 159 136 157 159 158 135 133 
 128 
 
Table A.58: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results  with SSA Dummies (ibrdidagdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.13** 4.81 0.03 (4.8.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.68** 5.08 0.03 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 4.73 0.67 0.42  polins + polins*SSA=0 4.16 0.51 0.47 
          
(4.9.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.14** 3.89 0.05 (4.9.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.73** 4.14 0.04 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 10.01 2.54 0.11  polins + polins*SSA=0 9.44 2.26 0.14 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -9.81 2.14 0.15  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -9.75 2.27 0.13 
          
(4.10.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.22*** 15.01 0.00 (4.10.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.11*** 15.79 0.00 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 2.61 0.09 0.76  polins + polins*SSA=0 1.95 0.05 0.82 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.23*** 14.01 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.24*** 14.01 0.00 
          
(4.11.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.12* 3.51 0.06 (4.11.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.63* 3.73 0.06 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 2.55 0.15 0.70  polins + polins*SSA=0 1.91 0.08 0.78 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.08 0.03 0.87  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.07 0.03 0.87 
          
(4.12.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.25*** 28.95 0.00 (4.12.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.25*** 30.26 0.00 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 3.01 0.13 0.71  polins + polins*SSA=0 2.28 0.08 0.78 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 3.81*** 15.07 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 3.87*** 15.76 0.00 
          
(4.13.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.22*** 9.21 0.00 (4.13.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.13*** 9.85 0.00 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 -0.90 0.01 0.93  polins + polins*SSA=0 -1.60 0.02 0.88 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -9.01 1.48 0.23  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -8.81 1.51 0.22 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.13*** 8.13 0.01  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.13*** 7.87 0.01 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.38 0.80 0.37  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.38 0.81 0.37 
          
(4.14.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5 + tibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 0.30*** 40.85 0.00 (4.14.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5 + aibrdidagdp5*SSA=0 1.53*** 42.87 0.00 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 3.20 0.09 0.76  polins + polins*SSA=0 2.47 0.05 0.82 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -12.37* 2.78 0.10  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -11.87* 2.76 0.10 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 42.81 1.37 0.24  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 44.15 1.49 0.23 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 2.06 2.49 0.12  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 2.11 2.64 0.11 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -40.16 1.16 0.28   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -41.43 1.26 0.26 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.59: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (disincimfgdp5 + polins)     
Variables 
 /Model (4.8.2.t.1) (4.9.2.t.1) (4.10.2.t.1) (4.11.2.t.1) (4.12.2.t.1) (4.13.2.t.1) (4.14.2.t.1) (4.8.2.a.1) (4.9.2.a.1) (4.10.2.a.1) (4.11.2.a.1) (4.12.2.a.1) (4.13.2.a.1) (4.14.2.a.1) 
constant 36.28*** 33.90*** 13.11** 37.84*** 12.93** 20.79*** 18.62*** 36.44*** 34.07*** 13.63** 38.02*** 13.04** 21.88*** 18.71*** 
 
(2.24) (2.39) (5.35) (2.46) (5.62) (6.76) (6.96) (2.24) (2.39) (5.40) (2.45) (5.62) (6.90) (6.94) 
tdisincimfgdp5 0.06 0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03        
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
       
adisincimfgdp5        0.28 0.13 -0.21 0.24 -0.22 -0.10 -0.12 
 
       (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) 
polins 10.18** 10.25** -1.86 10.95** -1.09 2.87 3.93 10.06** 10.10** -1.89 10.83** -1.18 3.01 3.81 
 
(4.28) (4.78) (4.52) (4.91) (4.46) (4.95) (4.71) (4.29) (4.81) (4.55) (4.92) (4.50) (5.01) (4.73) 
inf5  20.78***    14.16*** 12.93**  20.59***    14.17** 13.06** 
 
 (4.37) 




   
(5.61) (5.86) 











gdpgr5    -0.44  -0.09 0.92    -0.44  -0.11 0.92 








ln (agdppc5)     4.48***  -32.42     4.45***  -32.44 








tdisincimfgdp5 * SSA 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.20 0.19        
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.18) 
      
 
adisincimfgdp5 * SSA        0.26 0.49 0.72 0.27 0.80 1.04 0.99 
 
       (0.42) (0.44) (0.54) (0.48) (0.53) (0.80) (0.88) 
polins * SSA -1.82 2.69 15.73 -5.74 13.98 13.74 12.75 -2.10 2.45 15.83 -6.09 14.09 13.70 13.01 
 
(4.59) (5.38) (11.32) (7.04) (10.96) (12.42) (13.13) (4.58) (5.40) (11.27) (7.02) (10.94) (12.26) (13.10) 








  (9.33) (8.99) 
ln (igdppc5) * SSA   -1.21   -1.41 -31.48   -1.25   -1.52 -30.78 
   
(1.00) 
 




 (1.53) (51.87) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    0.54  0.44 -0.51    0.55  0.50 -0.46 







(0.54)  (0.70) (2.04) 
ln (agdppc5) * SSA     -1.10  30.50     -1.12  29.71 
          
(0.97) 
  
(53.40)   
  
    (0.96)   (53.37) 
Adj’ed R-squared 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.17 
# of cross secs  62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 




Table A.60: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummies (disincimfgdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.11 2.08 0.15 (4.8.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.54 2.19 0.14 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 8.36 2.51 0.12  polins + polins*SSA=0 7.95 2.28 0.13 
           
(4.9.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.12 2.55 0.11 (4.9.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.63 2.63 0.11 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 12.94** 5.54 0.02  polins + polins*SSA=0 12.55** 5.24 0.02 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -5.24 0.62 0.43  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -5.39 0.66 0.42 
           
(4.10.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.10 0.85 0.36 (4.10.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.52 1.01 0.32 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 13.87 1.82 0.18  polins + polins*SSA=0 13.95 1.86 0.17 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.33** 5.92 0.02  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.21** 5.47 0.02 
           
(4.11.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.10 1.27 0.26 (4.11.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.51 1.36 0.25 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 5.21 0.66 0.42  polins + polins*SSA=0 4.74 0.55 0.46 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.10 0.04 0.84  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.10 0.05 0.83 
           
(4.12.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.11 1.20 0.27 (4.12.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.58 1.35 0.25 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 12.88 1.67 0.20  polins + polins*SSA=0 12.91 1.69 0.20 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 3.38*** 6.20 0.01  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 3.34** 6.04 0.02 
           
(4.13.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.17 1.18 0.28 (4.13.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.94 1.46 0.23 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 16.61 2.11 0.15  polins + polins*SSA=0 16.71 2.21 0.14 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.05 0.00 0.99  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.42 0.00 0.95 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 1.35 0.48 0.49  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 1.08 0.30 0.58 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.35 0.39 0.53  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.40 0.49 0.48 
           
(4.14.2.t.1) tdisincimfgdp5 + tdisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.16 0.89 0.35 (4.14.2.a.1) adisincimfgdp5 + adisincimfgdp5*SSA=0 0.88 1.05 0.31 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 16.68 1.82 0.18  polins + polins*SSA=0 16.82 1.87 0.17 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 0.57 0.01 0.94  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 0.48 0.00 0.95 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.61 0.01 0.94  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.30 0.01 0.92 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.40 0.05 0.82  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.47 0.07 0.79 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -1.93 0.00 0.97   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -2.73 0.00 0.95 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.61: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (disgdp5 + polins)     
Variables 
 /Model (4.8.3.t.1) (4.9.3.t.1) (4.10.3.t.1) (4.11.3.t.1) (4.12.3.t.1) (4.13.3.t.1) (4.14.3.t.1) (4.8.3.a.1) (4.9.3.a.1) (4.10.3.a.1) (4.11.3.a.1) (4.12.3.a.1) (4.13.3.a.1) (4.14.3.a.1) 
constant 36.27*** 33.81*** 13.15** 12.93*** 12.93** 20.46*** 18.53*** 36.42*** 33.98*** 13.69** 38.09*** 13.06** 21.53*** 18.66*** 
 
(2.26) (2.44) (5.42) (5.67) (5.67) (6.77) (7.08) (2.26) (2.45) (5.47) (2.46) (5.67) (6.89) (7.04) 
tdisgdp5 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03        
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
       
adisgdp5        0.33 0.17 -0.19 0.30 -0.21 -0.09 -0.11 
 
       (0.23) (0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) 
polins 10.02** 10.22** -1.93 -1.14** -1.14 2.76 3.89 9.90** 10.08** -1.96 10.45** -1.24 2.89 3.77 
 
(4.32) (4.85) (4.53) (4.47) (4.47) (4.93) (4.68) (4.34) (4.88) (4.56) (4.93) (4.51) (4.99) (4.71) 
inf5  20.88***    14.21** 12.94**  20.69***    14.23** 13.08** 
 
 (4.40) 




   
(5.59) (5.85) 











gdpgr5    4.47  -0.08 0.93    -0.45*  -0.09 0.93 








ln (agdppc5)     4.47***  -32.63     4.44***  -32.55 








tdisgdp5 * SSA 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.22        
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.26) 
     
  
adisgdp5 * 
SSA        0.27 0.47 0.81 0.22 0.90 1.22 1.17 
 
       (0.50) (0.49) (0.72) (0.54) (0.70) (1.25) (1.29) 
polins * SSA -1.41 3.06 16.31 14.58 14.58 15.66 13.72 -1.70 2.80 16.48 -4.95 14.75 15.90 14.15 
 
(4.48) (5.40) (11.51) (11.06) (11.06) (13.79) (14.14) (4.47) (5.41) (11.44) (6.65) (11.03) (13.56) (14.03) 








  (11.40) (11.15) 
ln 
(igdppc5)*SSA   -1.25   -1.59 -40.57   -1.30   -1.75 -40.69 
   
(1.08) 
 




 (2.04) (51.44) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    -1.14  0.36 -0.89    0.49  0.42 -0.85 







(0.52)  (0.74) (1.92) 
ln 
(agdppc5)*SSA     -1.14  39.62     -1.17  39.63 
          
(1.03) 
  
(52.63)   
  
    (1.03)   (52.60) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.04 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.17 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel  obs: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.62: Wald Test Results for The Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummies (disgdp5 + polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.8.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.12 1.76 0.19 (4.8.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.60 1.84 0.18 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 8.61* 2.80 0.10  polins + polins*SSA=0 8.20 2.55 0.11 
          
(4.9.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.12 2.06 0.15 (4.9.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.64 2.13 0.15 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 13.28*** 6.14 0.01  polins + polins*SSA=0 12.89** 5.82 0.02 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -3.25 0.19 0.67  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -3.36 0.20 0.65 
          
(4.10.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.11 0.65 0.42 (4.10.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.62 0.78 0.38 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 14.38 1.90 0.17  polins + polins*SSA=0 14.51 1.96 0.16 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.28** 4.98 0.03  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.14** 4.57 0.03 
          
(4.11.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.10 1.03 0.31 (4.11.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.52 1.10 0.30 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 5.95 0.96 0.33  polins + polins*SSA=0 5.49 0.83 0.36 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.04 0.01 0.93  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.05 0.01 0.92 
          
(4.12.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.13 0.93 0.34 (4.12.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 0.70 1.04 0.31 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 13.44 1.79 0.18  polins + polins*SSA=0 13.52 1.83 0.18 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 3.33** 5.36 0.02  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 3.27** 5.19 0.02 
          
(4.13.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.20 0.64 0.42 (4.13.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 1.13 0.82 0.37 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 18.42 2.02 0.16  polins + polins*SSA=0 18.80 2.19 0.14 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 3.55 0.13 0.72  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 3.64 0.13 0.71 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 1.21 0.24 0.63  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 0.89 0.13 0.72 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.28 0.21 0.64  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.33 0.29 0.59 
          
(4.14.3.t.1) tdisgdp5 + tdisgdp5*SSA=0 0.19 0.55 0.46 (4.14.3.a.1) adisgdp5 + adisgdp5*SSA=0 1.05 0.68 0.41 
 polins + polins*SSA=0 17.62 1.71 0.19  polins + polins*SSA=0 17.92 1.81 0.18 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 4.38 0.21 0.65  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 4.69 0.24 0.63 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -5.26 0.01 0.91  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -5.49 0.01 0.90 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.04 0.00 0.98  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.08 0.00 0.96 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 6.99 0.02 0.88   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 7.07 0.02 0.88 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.63: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5 *polins (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.1.t.1) (4.16.1.t.1) (4.17.1.t.1) (4.18.1.t.1) (4.19.1.t.1) (4.20.1.t.1) (4.21.1.t.1) (4.15.1.a.1) (4.16.1.a.1) (4.17.1.a.1) (4.18.1.a.1) (4.19.1.a.1) (4.20.1.a.1) (4.21.1.a.1) 
constant 41.43*** 39.05*** 11.66*** 42.95*** 11.93*** 13.54*** 9.23* 41.47*** 39.11*** 11.83*** 43.03*** 11.75*** 13.72*** 8.93* 
 
(1.01) (1.24) (4.08) (1.70) (4.36) (5.17) (5.38) (1.02) (1.25) (4.11) (1.70) (4.35) (5.26) (5.33) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
polins 0.15** 0.15** 0.23*** 0.12* 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.26***        
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 








   (0.31) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) (0.39) (0.38) 
inf5  15.41***    11.59*** 11.26***  15.27***    11.66*** 11.44*** 
 




  (4.27) (4.30) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.30***   3.66*** 35.67*   4.27***   3.63*** 35.85* 
  




 (0.72) (20.25) 
gdpgr5    -0.32  0.11 1.25    -0.32  0.11 1.26 





  (0.24)  (0.29) (0.80) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.20***  -31.89     4.22***  -32.05 
        
  (0.66)   (20.39)   
  
    (0.66)   (20.31) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.24 0.26 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 137 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.64: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5*voaccount (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.15.1.t.2) (4.16.1.t.2) (4.17.1.t.2) (4.18.1.t.2) (4.19.1.t.2) (4.20.1.t.2) (4.21.1.t.2) (4.15.1.a.2) (4.16.1.a.2) (4.17.1.a.2) (4.18.1.a.2) (4.19.1.a.2) (4.20.1.a.2) (4.21.1.a.2) 
constant 41.36*** 39.10*** 12.76*** 42.87*** 13.27*** 15.32*** 10.23* 41.39*** 39.15*** 12.97*** 42.93*** 13.12*** 15.58*** 9.95* 
 
(1.01) (1.23) (4.19) (1.69) (4.45) (5.26) (5.54) (1.01) (1.24) (4.22) (1.69) (4.44) (5.33) (5.49) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
voaccount 0.17** 0.16** 0.23*** 0.14* 0.24*** 0.23** 0.27***        
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 








   (0.34) (0.37) (0.43) (0.37) (0.41) (0.48) (0.48) 
inf5  15.13***    11.00*** 10.50**  14.98***    11.04*** 10.66** 
 




  (4.24) (4.32) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.16***   3.48*** 39.76*   4.13***   3.44*** 40.07* 
  




 (0.75) (20.77) 
gdpgr5    -0.31  0.05 1.34*    -0.32  0.05 1.35* 





  (0.24)  (0.29) (0.82) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.03***  -36.12     4.04***  -36.41* 
        
  (0.68)   (20.90)   
  
    (0.67)   (20.81) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.22 0.24 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel  
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 135 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 






Table A.65: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5*goveff (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.1.t.3) (4.16.1.t.3) (4.17.1.t.3) (4.18.1.t.3) (4.19.1.t.3) (4.20.1.t.3) (4.21.1.t.3) (4.15.1.a.3) (4.16.1.a.3) (4.17.1.a.3) (4.18.1.a.3) (4.19.1.a.3) (4.20.1.a.3) (4.21.1.a.3) 
constant 41.61*** 39.23*** 11.86*** 43.36*** 12.20*** 14.27*** 10.62* 41.63*** 39.28*** 12.02*** 43.43*** 11.97*** 14.45*** 10.27* 
 
(1.16) (1.41) (4.06) (1.86) (4.34) (5.25) (5.59) (1.17) (1.42) (4.08) (1.87) (4.32) (5.32) (5.51) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
goveff 0.18 0.18 0.31** 0.13 0.33*** 0.32** 0.35**        
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) 










(0.55) (0.58) (0.62) (0.61) (0.58) (0.69) (0.68) 
inf5  15.36***    11.24** 10.99**  15.20***    11.29** 11.16** 
 




  (4.45) (4.50) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.26***   3.60*** 31.75   4.24***   3.57*** 31.86 
  




 (0.73) (20.46) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  0.04 1.04    -0.36  0.03 1.05 





  (0.24)  (0.30) (0.81) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.15***  -28.07     4.17***  -28.16 
        
  (0.66)   (20.60)   
  
    (0.66)   (20.50) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.07 0.24 0.02 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.07 0.24 0.02 0.23 0.21 0.23 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 159 137 157 159 158 137 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.66: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5*requal (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.1.t.4) (4.16.1.t.4) (4.17.1.t.4) (4.18.1.t.4) (4.19.1.t.4) (4.20.1.t.4) (4.21.1.t.4) (4.15.1.a.4) (4.16.1.a.4) (4.17.1.a.4) (4.18.1.a.4) (4.19.1.a.4) (4.20.1.a.4) (4.21.1.a.4) 
constant 41.44*** 39.25*** 11.35*** 43.02*** 11.55*** 13.29** 9.00 41.47*** 39.30*** 11.49*** 43.09*** 11.33*** 13.43** 8.63 
 
(1.07) (1.29) (4.07) (1.80) (4.36) (5.31) (5.62) (1.08) (1.30) (4.10) (1.80) (4.35) (5.41) (5.56) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
requal 0.14** 0.12* 0.22*** 0.11 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.24***        
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 








   (0.31) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.41) (0.41) 
inf5  14.99***    10.80** 10.41**  14.83***    10.85** 10.57** 
 




  (4.36) (4.44) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.32***   3.71*** 34.86*   4.30***   3.68*** 35.07* 
  




 (0.73) (20.33) 
gdpgr5    -0.32  0.10 1.21    -0.33  0.10 1.23 





  (0.24)  (0.30) (0.81) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.23***  -31.03     4.25***  -31.21 
        
  (0.66)   (20.47)   
  
    (0.66)   (20.37) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.02 0.08 0.25 0.03 0.25 0.23 0.24 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 137 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.67: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5*rule (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.13.1.t.5) (4.16.1.t.5) (4.17.1.t.5) (4.18.1.t.5) (4.19.1.t.5) (4.20.1.t.5) (4.21.1.t.5) (4.15.1.a.5) (4.16.1.a.5) (4.17.1.a.5) (4.18.1.a.5) (4.19.1.a.5) (4.20.1.a.5) (4.21.1.a.5) 
constant 41.63*** 39.26*** 13.02*** 43.36*** 13.58*** 15.41*** 11.23** 41.65*** 39.31*** 13.23*** 43.42*** 13.41*** 15.67*** 10.95** 
 
(1.11) (1.35) (4.16) (1.79) (4.41) (5.13) (5.43) (1.12) (1.36) (4.18) (1.80) (4.39) (5.18) (5.35) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
rule 0.19* 0.19* 0.29** 0.15 0.31*** 0.31** 0.35**        
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) 








   (0.55) (0.58) (0.65) (0.62) (0.58) (0.69) (0.68) 
inf5  15.29***    11.07** 10.73**  15.13***    11.10** 10.87** 
 




  (4.37) (4.42) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.14***   3.49*** 34.78*   4.11***   3.44*** 34.96* 
  




 (0.73) (20.61) 
gdpgr5    -0.36  0.01 1.12    -0.36  0.01 1.13 





  (0.24)  (0.29) (0.81) 
ln (agdppc5)     4.00***  -31.19     4.01***  -31.35 
        
  (0.67)   (20.77)   
  
    (0.67)   (20.66) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.21 0.22 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 137 133 159 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.68: Pooled OLS Results for ibrdidagdp5*contcorr (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.15.1.t.6) (4.16.1.t.6) (4.17.1.t.6) (4.18.1.t.6) (4.19.1.t.6) (4.20.1.t.6) (4.21.1.t.6) (4.15.1.a.6) (4.16.1.a.6) (4.17.1.a.6) (4.18.1.a.6) (4.19.1.a.6) (4.20.1.a.6) (4.21.1.a.6) 
constant 41.50*** 39.12*** 13.36*** 43.23*** 13.98*** 16.52*** 13.15** 41.53*** 39.16*** 13.57*** 43.29*** 13.83*** 16.79*** 12.87** 
 
(1.14) (1.42) (4.09) (1.85) (4.29) (5.13) (5.49) (1.13) (1.43) (4.10) (1.86) (4.27) (5.19) (5.42) 
tibrdidagdp5 
*contcorr 0.27* 0.26* 0.35** 0.20 0.39** 0.34* 0.39**        
 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) 








   (0.70) (0.78) (0.84) (0.82) (0.77) (0.94) (0.94) 
inf5  15.66***    11.54** 11.39**  15.52***    11.59** 11.57** 
 




  (4.51) (4.54) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.10***   3.35*** 30.65   4.07***   3.31*** 30.79 
  




 (0.74) (20.69) 
gdpgr5    -0.35  0.00 0.98    -0.35  0.00 0.99 





  (0.24)  (0.30) (0.82) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.94***  -27.25     3.95***  -27.38 
        
  (0.66)   (20.83)   
  
    (0.66)   (20.73) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.20 0.21 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 160 137 157 159 158 135 133 1659 136 156 158 158 134 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.69: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5*polins (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.15.2.t.1) (4.16.2.t.1) (4.17.2.t.1) (4.18.2.t.1) (4.19.2.t.1) (4.20.2.t.1) (4.21.2.t.1) (4.15.2.a.1) (4.16.2.a.1) (4.17.2.a.1) (4.18.2.a.1) (4.19.2.a.1) (4.20.2.a.1) (4.21.2.a.1) 
constant 41.04*** 38.81*** 17.20*** 42.35*** 18.02*** 21.88*** 19.07*** 41.13*** 38.90*** 17.63*** 42.47*** 18.10*** 22.55*** 19.22*** 
 
(0.99) (1.25) (5.24) (1.51) (5.38) (6.15) (6.91) (0.98) (1.25) (5.28) (1.49) (5.40) (6.23) (6.94) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
polins 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.17*** 0.02 0.03 0.03        
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 








   (0.28) (0.26) (0.33) (0.29) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34) 
inf5  15.50***    10.88** 10.21**  15.39***    10.86** 10.33** 
 




  (4.47) (4.59) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.77***   2.85*** 25.33   3.70***   2.76*** 25.08 
  




 (0.94) (21.93) 
gdpgr5    -0.30  -0.10 0.65    -0.31  -0.11 0.65 





  (0.22)  (0.28) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.62***  -22.36     3.60***  -22.14 
        
  (0.84)   (21.86)   
  
    (0.84)   (21.86) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 





Table A.70: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5*voaccount (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.15.2.t.2) (4.16.2.t.2) (4.17.2.t.2) (4.18.2.t.2) (4.19.2.t.2) (4.20.2.t.2) (4.21.2.t.2) (4.15.2.a.2) (4.16.2.a.2) (4.17.2.a.2) (4.18.2.a.2) (4.19.2.a.2) (4.20.2.a.2) (4.21.2.a.2) 
constant 40.77*** 38.97*** 17.31*** 41.95*** 18.19*** 21.62*** 18.90*** 40.88*** 39.07*** 17.78*** 42.11*** 18.30*** 22.33*** 19.02*** 
 
(0.95) (1.22) (5.33) (1.49) (5.48) (6.20) (6.93) (0.94) (1.22) (5.36) (1.48) (5.49) (6.28) (6.95) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
voaccount 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.02 0.21*** 0.03 0.01 0.02        
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 








   (0.30) (0.26) (0.34) (0.30) (0.34) (0.30) (0.31) 
inf5  15.11***    10.60** 9.97**  15.00***    10.57** 10.06** 
 
 (4.33)    (4.36) (4.48) 
 
(4.32)    (4.38) (4.49) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.75***   2.94*** 25.77   3.68***   2.84*** 25.72 
  




 (0.93) (21.90) 
gdpgr5    -0.27  -0.12 0.65    -0.28  -0.12 0.66 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.59***  -22.74     3.56***  -22.72 
        
  (0.85)   (21.88)   
  
    (0.85)   (21.85) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel  
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.71: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5*goveff (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.15.2.t.3) (4.16.2.t.3) (4.17.2.t.3) (4.18.2.t.3) (4.19.2.t.3) (4.20.2.t.3) (4.21.2.t.3) (4.15.2.a.3) (4.16.2.a.3) (4.17.2.a.3) (4.18.2.a.3) (4.19.2.a.3) (4.20.2.a.3) (4.21.2.a.3) 
constant 41.32*** 39.16*** 16.48*** 42.74*** 17.29*** 21.20*** 18.29*** 41.38*** 39.23*** 16.93*** 42.83*** 17.37*** 21.89*** 18.40*** 
 
(1.07) (1.35) (5.15) (1.55) (5.32) (6.10) (6.98) (1.06) (1.36) (5.20) (1.54) (5.33) (6.19) (7.00) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
goveff 0.20** 0.17** -0.06 0.18** -0.06 -0.04 -0.05        
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 










(0.42) (0.40) (0.46) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45) (0.48) 
inf5  15.48***    10.26** 9.44**  15.34***    10.22** 9.55** 
 




  (4.47) (4.60) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.96***   3.07*** 26.19   3.89***   2.97*** 26.10 
  




 (0.92) (22.30) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  -0.13 0.63    -0.34  -0.14 0.64 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.82***  -22.96     3.79***  -22.91 
        
  (0.82)   (22.17)   
  
    (0.82)   (22.18) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.72: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5*requal (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.15.2.t.4) (4.16.2.t.4) (4.17.2.t.4) (4.18.2.t.4) (4.19.2.t.4) (4.20.2.t.4) (4.21.2.t.4) (4.15.2.a.4) (4.16.2.a.4) (4.17.2.a.4) (4.18.2.a.4) (4.19.2.a.4) (4.20.2.a.4) (4.21.2.a.4) 
constant 40.88*** 38.96*** 17.19*** 42.16*** 18.01*** 21.59*** 18.75*** 40.97*** 39.05*** 17.62*** 42.29*** 18.09*** 22.24*** 18.85*** 
 
(1.04) (1.30) (5.20) (1.61) (5.34) (6.06) (6.83) (1.03) (1.30) (5.24) (1.59) (5.35) (6.14) (6.85) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
requal 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.02 0.01 0.01        
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 








   (0.27) (0.24) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28) (0.31) 
inf5  15.24***    10.63** 9.88**  15.13***    10.59** 10.00** 
 




  (4.49) (4.59) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.77***   2.94*** 25.56   3.70***   2.85*** 25.35 
  




 (0.92) (21.98) 
gdpgr5    -0.28  -0.11 0.64    -0.29  -0.12 0.64 





  (0.22)  (0.28) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.62***  -22.48     3.60***  -22.31 
        
  (0.83)   (21.94)   
  
    (0.84)   (21.91) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.73: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5*rule (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.13.2.t.5) (4.16.2.t.5) (4.17.2.t.5) (4.18.2.t.5) (4.19.2.t.5) (4.20.2.t.5) (4.21.2.t.5) (4.15.2.a.5) (4.16.2.a.5) (4.17.2.a.5) (4.18.2.a.5) (4.19.2.a.5) (4.20.2.a.5) (4.21.2.a.5) 
constant 41.41*** 39.25*** 16.19*** 42.84*** 17.00*** 21.10*** 18.32*** 41.48*** 39.33*** 16.67*** 42.94*** 17.11*** 21.82*** 18.44*** 
 
(1.02) (1.30) (5.23) (1.48) (5.40) (6.20) (7.06) (1.01) (1.31) (5.27) (1.46) (5.41) (6.28) (7.08) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
rule 0.20** 0.17** -0.07 0.19** -0.07 -0.04 -0.04        
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 








   (0.40) (0.38) (0.46) (0.41) (0.46) (0.43) (0.46) 
inf5  15.49***    10.25** 9.53**  15.34***    10.22** 9.63** 
 




  (4.45) (4.58) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.01***   3.09*** 25.81   3.94***   2.98*** 25.81 
  




 (0.93) (22.16) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  -0.13 0.63    -0.35  -0.13 0.63 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.87***  -22.60     3.84***  -22.65 
        
  (0.83)   (22.04)   
  
    (0.83)   (22.06) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.74: Pooled OLS Results for disincimfgdp5*contcorr (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.2.t.6) (4.16.2.t.6) (4.17.2.t.6) (4.18.2.t.6) (4.19.2.t.6) (4.20.2.t.6) (4.21.2.t.6) (4.15.2.a.6) (4.16.2.a.6) (4.17.2.a.6) (4.18.2.a.6) (4.19.2.a.6) (4.20.2.a.6) (4.21.2.a.6) 
constant 41.31*** 39.37*** 16.11*** 42.70*** 16.97*** 20.64*** 17.75*** 41.36*** 39.45*** 16.60*** 42.78*** 17.10*** 21.37*** 17.88** 
 
(1.00) (1.30) (5.26) (1.49) (5.44) (6.17) (7.10) (0.99) (1.30) (5.31) (1.49) (5.45) (6.25) (7.13) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
contcorr 0.26** 0.19* -0.09 0.24** -0.08 -0.09 -0.09        
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 








   (0.49) (0.47) (0.56) (0.51) (0.55) (0.53) (0.57) 
inf5  15.33***    10.01** 9.21**  15.18***    9.97** 9.29** 
 




  (4.45) (4.58) 
ln (igdppc5)   4.02***   3.20*** 26.41   3.95***   3.09*** 26.43 
  




 (0.93) (22.36) 
gdpgr5    -0.33  -0.14 0.63    -0.33  -0.14 0.63 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.87***  -23.07     3.84***  -23.13 
        
  (0.84)   (22.19)   
  
    (0.84)   (22.22) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.75: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5*polins (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.15.3.t.1) (4.16.3.t.1) (4.17.3.t.1) (4.18.3.t.1) (4.19.3.t.1) (4.20.3.t.1) (4.21.3.t.1) (4.15.3.a.1) (4.16.3.a.1) (4.17.3.a.1) (4.18.3.a.1) (4.19.3.a.1) (4.20.3.a.1) (4.21.3.a.1) 
constant 41.03*** 38.67*** 17.11*** 42.36*** 17.92*** 21.97*** 19.15*** 41.13*** 38.79*** 17.56*** 42.50*** 18.02*** 22.67*** 19.32*** 
 
(0.97) (1.26) (5.30) (1.46) (5.45) (6.26) (7.09) (0.96) (1.26) (5.34) (1.44) (5.46) (6.34) (7.12) 
tdisgdp5* 
polins 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.01 0.19*** 0.01 0.03 0.03        
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 








   (0.30) (0.28) (0.34) (0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) 
inf5  15.92***    10.95** 10.23**  15.81***    10.94** 10.37** 
 




  (4.51) (4.63) 
ln 
(igdppc5)   3.79***   2.84*** 25.12   3.73***   2.74*** 24.80 
  




 (0.96) (22.13) 
gdpgr5    -0.31  -0.10 0.64    -0.32  -0.11 0.63 





  (0.22)  (0.28) (0.87) 
ln 
(agdppc5)     3.65***  -22.14     3.62***  -21.86 
        
  (0.85)   (22.00)   
  
    (0.85)   (22.02) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
secs 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel obs 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.76: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5*voaccount (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.3.t.2) (4.16.3.t.2) (4.17.3.t.2) (4.18.3.t.2) (4.19.3.t.2) (4.20.3.t.2) (4.21.3.t.2) (4.15.3.a.2) (4.16.3.a.2) (4.17.3.a.2) (4.18.3.a.2) (4.19.3.a.2) (4.20.3.a.2) (4.21.3.a.2) 
constant 40.72*** 38.85*** 17.21*** 41.94*** 18.08*** 21.58*** 18.85*** 40.85*** 38.97*** 17.70*** 42.12*** 18.22*** 22.33*** 19.01*** 
 
(0.94) (1.22) (5.41) (1.45) (5.56) (6.30) (7.09) (0.93) (1.22) (5.43) (1.43) (5.56) (6.38) (7.12) 
tdisgdp5* 
voaccount 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.02 0.00 0.01        
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 








   (0.33) (0.28) (0.36) (0.33) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) 
inf5  15.47***    10.58** 9.92**  15.35***    10.57** 10.03** 
 




  (4.39) (4.51) 
ln (igdppc5)   3.77***   2.95*** 25.63   3.70***   2.84*** 25.53 
  




 (0.95) (22.00) 
gdpgr5    -0.28  -0.12 0.64    -0.30  -0.12 0.64 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln (agdppc5)     3.62***  -22.57     3.59***  -22.51 
        
  (0.86)   (21.91)   
  
    (0.86)   (21.92) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.77: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5*goveff (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.15.3.t.3) (4.16.3.t.3) (4.17.3.t.3) (4.18.3.t.3) (4.19.3.t.3) (4.20.3.t.3) (4.21.3.t.3) (4.15.3.a.3) (4.16..3.a.3) (4.17.3.a.3) (4.18.3.a.3) (4.19.3.a.3) (4.20.3.a.3) (4.21.3.a.3) 
constant 41.33*** 39.08*** 16.28*** 42.76*** 17.06*** 21.08*** 18.04** 41.39*** 39.16*** 16.75*** 42.85*** 17.17*** 21.80*** 18.20*** 
 
(1.04) (1.35) (5.19) (1.49) (5.36) (6.17) (7.10) (1.03) (1.35) (5.24) (1.48) (5.38) (6.25) (7.13) 
tdisgdp5* 
goveff 0.21** 0.19** -0.07 0.21** -0.07 -0.05 -0.06        
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 








   (0.43) (0.42) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.47) (0.51) 
inf5  15.76***    10.17** 9.28**  15.62***    10.16** 9.42** 
 




  (4.49) (4.61) 
ln 
(igdppc5)   4.00***   3.10*** 26.59   3.93***   2.99*** 26.43 
  




 (0.93) (22.47) 
gdpgr5    -0.35  -0.13 0.65    -0.36  -0.13 0.65 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln 
(agdppc5)     3.87***  -23.33     3.84***  -23.20 
        
  (0.83)   (22.30)   
  
    (0.83)   (22.33) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
secs  62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel obs 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.78: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5*requal (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables  
/Model (4.15.3.t.4) (4.16.3.t.4) (4.17.3.t.4) (4.18.3.t.4) (4.19.3.t.4) (4.20.3.t.4) (4.21.3.t.4) (4.15.3.a.4) (4.16.3.a.4) (4.17.3.a.4) (4.18.3.a.4) (4.19.3.a.4) (4.20.3.a.4) (4.21.3.a.4) 
constant 40.87*** 38.83*** 17.03*** 42.17*** 17.86*** 21.55*** 18.62*** 40.97*** 38.94*** 17.49*** 42.32*** 17.97*** 22.23*** 18.77*** 
 
(1.02) (1.31) (5.27) (1.54) (5.41) (6.15) (6.98) (1.01) (1.31) (5.31) (1.52) (5.42) (6.23) (7.00) 
tdisgdp5* 
requal 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.00 0.18*** 0.01 0.00 -0.01        
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 










(0.29) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) 
inf5  15.63***    10.58** 9.74**  15.51***    10.56** 9.89** 
 




  (4.53) (4.63) 
ln 
(igdppc5)   3.81***   2.96*** 25.80   3.74***   2.86*** 25.51 
  




 (0.94) (22.19) 
gdpgr5    -0.30  -0.12 0.64    -0.31  -0.12 0.63 





  (0.22)  (0.28) (0.87) 
ln 
(agdppc5)     3.66***  -22.68     3.64***  -22.43 
        
  (0.84)   (22.10)   
  
    (0.85)   (22.09) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
secs 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel obs 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.79: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5*rule (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.3.t.5) (4.16.3.t.5) (4.17.3.t.5) (4.18.3.t.5) (4.19.3.t.5) (4.20.3.t.5) (4.21.3.t.5) (4.15.3.a.5) (4.16.3.a.5) (4.17.3.a.5) (4.18.3.a.5) (4.19.3.a.5) (4.20.3.a.5) (4.21.3.a.5) 
constant 41.44*** 39.19*** 15.87*** 42.88*** 16.64*** 20.90*** 18.01** 41.52*** 39.28*** 16.39*** 42.98*** 16.80*** 21.67*** 18.19** 
 
(0.99) (1.30) (5.26) (1.42) (5.44) (6.29) (7.22) (1.03) (1.30) (5.30) (1.41) (5.45) (6.37) (7.24) 
tdisgdp5* 
rule 0.21** 0.19** -0.10 0.21** -0.10 -0.05 -0.05        
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 








   (0.42) (0.40) (0.47) (0.42) (0.46) (0.46) (0.48) 
inf5  15.76***    10.12** 9.33**  15.62***    10.12** 9.46** 
 




  (4.46) (4.60) 
ln 
(igdppc5)   4.08***   3.12*** 26.18   3.99***   3.01*** 26.13 
  




 (0.95) (22.33) 
gdpgr5    -0.36*  -0.13 0.64    -0.36*  -0.13 0.64 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln 
(agdppc5)     3.94***  -22.91     3.91***  -22.91 
        
  (0.84)   (22.16)   
  
    (0.84)   (22.20) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
secs 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel obs 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 




Table A.80: Pooled OLS Results for disgdp5*contcorr (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance): 
Variables 
/Model (4.15.3.t.6) (4.16.3.t.6) (4.17.3.t.6) (4.18.3.t.6) (4.19.3.t.6) (4.20.3.t.6) (4.21.3.t.6) (4.15.3.a.6) (4.16.3.a.6) (4.17.3.a.6) (4.18.3.a.6) (4.19.3.a.6) (4.20.3.a.6) (4.21.3.a.6) 
constant 41.30*** 39.32*** 15.99*** 42.70*** 16.82*** 20.52*** 17.52** 41.36*** 39.39*** 16.50*** 42.79*** 16.97*** 21.30*** 17.69** 
 
(0.97) (1.29) (5.31) (1.45) (5.49) (6.23) (7.21) (0.97) (1.29) (5.35) (1.44) (5.50) (6.32) (7.25) 
tdisgdp5* 
contcorr 0.28*** 0.21** -0.10 0.27** -0.09 -0.09 -0.10        
 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 










(0.51) (0.49) (0.59) (0.53) (0.58) (0.56) (0.60) 
inf5  15.51***    9.95** 9.10**  15.37***    9.93** 9.21** 
 




  (4.46) (4.58) 
ln 
(igdppc5)   4.04***   3.21*** 26.76   3.96***   3.10*** 26.73 
  




 (0.94) (22.48) 
gdpgr5    -0.34  -0.14 0.64    -0.35  -0.14 0.65 





  (0.22)  (0.27) (0.87) 
ln 
(agdppc5)     3.89***  -23.39     3.86***  -23.40 
        
  (0.85)   (22.27)   
  
    (0.85)   (22.32) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
secs 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel obs 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
* ** reject null at 1 per cent significance level. 
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent. 
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table A.81: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5*polins)   
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.1.t.1) (4.16.1.t.1) (4.17.1.t.1) (4.18.1.t.1) (4.19.1.t.1) (4.15.1.a.1) (4.16.1.a.1) (4.17.1.a.1) (4.18.1.a.1) (4.19.1.a.1) 
constant 41.78*** 39.68*** 7.54** 44.36*** 7.86** 41.82*** 39.75*** 7.71** 44.45*** 7.70** 
 
(1.00) (1.23) (3.61) (1.59) (3.89) (1.01) (1.24) (3.64) (1.59) (3.88) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins 0.14** 0.13** 0.21*** 0.09 0.22***      
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
     
aibrdidagdp5*polins      0.70** 0.68** 1.04*** 0.47 1.11*** 
 
     (0.31) (0.33) (0.39) (0.35) (0.36) 
inf5  14.53***     14.37***    
 
 (4.45) 
   
 (4.45) 
   





    
(0.55) 
  
gdpgr5    -0.51**     -0.52**  
    
(0.22) 
    
(0.22) 
 
ln (agdppc5)     4.91***     4.92*** 
     
(0.57) 
    
(0.57) 
tibrdidagdp5 * polins * TE -3.67*** 7.44*** 0.37 -4.57*** 0.30      
 
(1.38) (1.98) (1.04) (1.66) (1.10) 
     
aibrdidagdp5 * polins * TE      -18.54*** 37.31*** 2.06 -22.95*** 1.69 
 
     (6.98) (9.90) (5.17) (8.31) (5.50) 









ln (igdppc5) * TE   -2.82***     -2.83***   








gdpgr5 * TE    1.90*     1.85*  






ln (agdppc5) * TE     -2.74***     -2.75*** 
          
(0.45)   
  
    (0.46) 
adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.40 0.08 0.38 0.06 0.14 0.40 0.08 0.38 
# of cross sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel observations: 160 137 157 159 158 159 136 156 158 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
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Table A.82: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummies (ibrdidagdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5*polins + tibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 -3.53** 6.47 0.01 (4.15.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5*polins + aibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 -17.85** 6.48 0.01 
           
(4.16.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5*polins + tibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 7.57*** 14.84 0.00 (4.16.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5*polins + aibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 37.99*** 14.86 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 -402.18*** 68.59 0.00  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 -403.77*** 68.60 0.00 
           
(4.17.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5*polins + tibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 0.57 0.31 0.58 (4.17.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5*polins + aibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 3.10 0.36 0.55 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.20*** 13.03 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.16*** 12.43 0.00 
           
(4.18.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5*polins + tibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 -4.47** 7.14 0.01 (4.18.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5*polins + aibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 -22.48** 7.23 0.01 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.39 2.04 0.16  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.34 1.91 0.17 
           
(4.19.1.t.1) tibrdidagdp5*polins + tibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 0.52 0.22 0.64 (4.19.1.a.1) aibrdidagdp5*polins + aibrdidagdp5*polins*TE=0 2.80 0.26 0.61 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 2.17*** 10.84 0.00   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 2.18*** 10.85 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      












Table A.83: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (disincimfgdp5*polins)   
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.2.t.1) (4.16.2.t.1) (4.17.2.t.1) (4.18.2.t.1) (4.19.2.t.1) (4.15.2.a.1) (4.16.2.a.1) (4.17.2.a.1) (4.18.2.a.1) (4.19.2.a.1) 
constant 41.07*** 38.98*** 12.15** 43.62*** 43.62*** 41.20*** 39.11*** 12.53*** 43.77*** 13.08*** 
 
(0.99) (1.26) (4.80) (1.39) (1.39) (0.98) (1.26) (4.84) (1.37) (4.96) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
polins 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.01 0.18*** 0.18***      
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
     
adisincimfgdp5* 
polins      1.03***     
 
     (0.28)     
inf5  14.51***     0.97*** 0.06 0.85*** 0.10 
 
 (4.34) 
   
 (0.25) (0.32) (0.28) (0.32) 







   
gdpgr5    -0.52***    4.55***   
    
(0.20) 
   
(0.75) 
  
ln (agdppc5)     -0.52***    -0.53***  
     
(0.20) 




* polins * TE -1.10*** -1.39*** -0.40*** -1.32*** -1.32***     4.43*** 
 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) 
    
(0.76) 
adisincimfgdp5 
* polins * TE      -5.52*** -6.91*** -2.08*** -6.58*** -2.37*** 
 
     (0.49) (0.28) (0.73) (0.60) (0.75) 








ln (igdppc5) * 
TE   -2.15***     -2.10***   





 (0.28)   
gdpgr5 * TE    2.38***     2.31***  
    
(0.37) 
   
 (0.36)  
ln (agdppc5) * 
TE     2.38***     -1.96*** 
          
(0.37)   
      
(0.28) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.10 0.16 0.33 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.33 0.14 0.13 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 162 139 159 161 161 161 138 158 160 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors   
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Table A.84: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummies (disincimfgdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -0.89*** 72.53 0.00 (4.15.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -4.49*** 73.36 0.00 
           
(4.16.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -1.18*** 325.38 0.00 (4.16.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -5.95*** 330.49 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 86.21*** 290.57 0.00  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 85.90*** 293.86 0.00 
           
(4.17.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -0.39*** 8.23 0.00 (4.17.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -2.02*** 8.24 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.46*** 13.10 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.45*** 12.54 0.00 
           
(4.18.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -1.14*** 69.40 0.00 (4.18.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -5.73*** 73.01 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.86*** 78.66 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.79*** 80.31 0.00 
           
(4.19.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -1.14*** 69.40 0.00 (4.19.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*TE=0 -2.27*** 9.45 0.00 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 1.86*** 78.66 0.00   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 2.47*** 11.34 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      











Table A.85: Regression Results with Transition Economies (TE) Dummy (disgdp5*polins)   
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.3.t.1) (4.16.3.t.1) (4.17.3.t.1) (4.18.3.t.1) (4.19.3.t.1) (4.15.3.a.1) (4.16.3.a.1) (4.17.3.a.1) (4.18.3.a.1) (4.19.3.a.1) 
constant 41.03*** 38.81*** 12.08*** 43.57*** 12.95*** 41.17*** 38.97*** 12.46** 43.75*** 13.00* 
 
(0.98) (1.27) (4.88) (1.35) (5.03) (0.97) (1.27) (4.91) (1.33) (5.03) 
tdisgdp5* 
polins 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.00 0.21*** 0.01      
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
     
adisgdp5* 
polins      1.14*** 1.10*** 0.03 0.98*** 0.07 
      
(0.30) (0.27) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32) 
inf5  15.02***     14.90***    
 
 (4.37) 
   
 (4.37) 
   
ln (igdppc5)   4.63***     4.57***   







gdpgr5    -0.53***     -0.54***  
    
(0.20) 
    
(0.20) 
 
ln (agdppc5)     4.46***     4.45*** 
     
(0.77) 
    
(0.77) 
tdisgdp5 * 
polins * TE -1.16*** -1.51*** -0.37*** -1.41*** -0.42***      
 
(0.11) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
     
adisgdp5 * 
polins * TE      -5.78*** -7.52*** -1.92*** -7.01*** -2.19*** 
 
 
    
(0.53) (0.25) (0.71) (0.68) (0.72) 
inf5 * TE  79.64***     79.42***    
  






* TE   -2.22***     -2.19***   
  





gdpgr5 * TE    2.50***     2.47***  
   
 (0.38)  




* TE     -2.10***     -2.06*** 
  
    
  
  (0.24) 
        
(0.24) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.11 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.31 0.11 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.31 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 62 57 61 62 61 
∑ panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations: 161 138 158 160 158 162 136 157 159 158 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.  
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.  
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   





Table A.86: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with TE Dummies (disgdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -0.92*** 65.93 0.00 (4.15.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -4.64*** 67.59 0.00 
           
(4.16.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -1.27*** 410.71 0.00 (4.16.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -6.41*** 417.92 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*TE=0 94.65*** 973.48 0.00  inf5 + inf5*TE=0 94.32*** 992.42 0.00 
           
(4.17.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -0.37** 7.61 0.01 (4.17.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -1.89** 7.59 0.01 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.40*** 12.68 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*TE=0 2.38*** 12.11 0.00 
           
(4.18.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -1.20*** 63.66 0.00 (4.18.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -6.03*** 66.63 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.97*** 80.19 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*TE=0 1.92*** 82.87 0.00 
           
(4.19.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -0.41*** 8.76 0.00 (4.19.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*TE=0 -2.13*** 8.87 0.00 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 2.37*** 10.88 0.00   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*TE=0 2.39*** 10.90 0.00 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      















Table A.87: Regression Results with Latin American Economies (LA) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5*polins)     
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.1.t.1) (4.16.1.t.1) (4.17.1.t.1) (4.18.1.t.1) (4.19.1.t.1) (4.20.1.t.1) (4.21.1.t.1) (4.15.1.a.1) (4.16.1.a.1) (4.17.1.a.1) (4.18.1.a.1) (4.19.1.a.1) (4.20.1.a.1) (4.21.1.a.1) 
constant 40.66*** 38.13*** 16.73*** 41.84*** 17.76*** 21.84*** 19.11*** 40.74*** 38.12*** 16.91*** 41.92*** 17.66*** 22.06*** 18.77*** 
 
(1.05) (1.29) (5.30) (1.72) (5.42) (6.02) (6.42) (1.05) (1.30) (5.32) (1.73) (5.41) (6.11) (6.38) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
polins 0.10 0.12 0.21*** 0.10 0.22*** 0.21** 0.25***        
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
       
aibrdidagdp5* 
polins        0.50 0.61 1.08*** 0.53 1.12*** 1.08** 1.28*** 
 
       (0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.35) (0.42) (0.39) 
inf5  13.21*    16.33** 16.31**  13.24*    16.36** 16.45** 
 
 (7.51) 




   
(6.44) (6.85) 











gdpgr5    -0.38  0.07 1.09    -0.39*  0.06 1.11 








ln (agdppc5)     3.14***  -26.02     3.15***  -26.42 









polins * LA 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.21 0.30** 0.18 0.23 0.22        
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
     
  
aibrdidagdp5 * 
polins * LA        2.73*** 3.19*** 1.01 1.47** 0.78 1.11 1.05 
 
     
  
(0.48) (0.50) (0.76) (0.63) (0.67) (0.72) (0.73) 








  (8.61) (9.55) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
LA   0.49   0.92 -23.60   0.49   0.92 -24.68 
   
(0.33) 
 




 (0.59) (31.54) 
gdpgr5 * LA    1.31***  0.15 -0.84    1.29***  0.15 -0.89 







(0.32)  (0.54) (1.05) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
LA     0.59*  24.97     0.61*  26.06 
          
(0.31) 
  
(31.49)   
  
    (0.31)   (31.73) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.12 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.12 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.32 0.34 0.37 
# of cross secs  
62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 




Table A.88: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummies (ibrdidagdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.68*** 43.21 0.00 (4.15.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 3.23*** 37.21 0.00 
           
(4.16.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.76*** 64.01 0.00 (4.16.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 3.79*** 63.95 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 16.30*** 9.48 0.00  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 16.20*** 9.45 0.00 
           
(4.17.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.42*** 11.62 0.00 (4.17.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 2.09*** 11.05 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.86*** 32.44 0.00  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*LA=0 3.83*** 31.75 0.00 
           
(4.18.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.40*** 9.42 0.00 (4.18.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 1.99*** 8.97 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.92** 7.00 0.01  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.90** 6.59 0.01 
           
(4.19.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.40*** 12.38 0.00 (4.19.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 1.90*** 11.79 0.00 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.74*** 29.52 0.00  
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*LA=0 3.76*** 29.90 0.00 
           
(4.20.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.44*** 14.12 0.00 (4.20.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 2.19*** 13.10 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.49 0.20 0.66  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.63 0.21 0.64 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.04*** 14.77 0.00  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*LA=0 3.01*** 14.19 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.22 0.26 0.61  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.21 0.24 0.62 
           
(4.21.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 0.46*** 13.16 0.00 (4.21.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*LA=0 2.33*** 12.43 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 2.74 0.17 0.68  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 3.00 0.20 0.65 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 4.41 0.03 0.87  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*LA=0 3.75 0.02 0.89 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.25 0.13 0.72  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.22 0.10 0.76 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -1.05 0.00 0.97   
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*LA=0 -0.35 0.00 0.99 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      





Table A.89: Regression Results with Latin American Economies (LA) Dummy (disincimfgdp5*polins)     
Variables / 
Model (4.15.2.t.1) (4.16.2.t.1) (4.17.2.t.1) (4.18.2.t.1) (4.19.2.t.1) (4.20.2.t.1) (4.21.2.t.1) (4.15.2.a.1) (4.16.2.a.1) (4.17.2.a.1) (4.18.2.a.1) (4.19.2.a.1) (4.20.2.a.1) (4.21.2.a.1) 
constant 41.50*** 39.66*** 24.38*** 42.49*** 25.62*** 33.45*** 32.47*** 41.65*** 39.81*** 24.88*** 42.64*** 25.79*** 34.10*** 32.60*** 
 
(1.02) (1.36) (6.60) (1.55) (6.64) (7.01) (7.63) (1.02) (1.37) (6.63) (1.54) (6.65) (7.05) (7.61) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
polins 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.21*        
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
       
adisincimfgdp5* 
polins        0.20 0.15 0.51 0.46 0.64 0.86 1.14* 
 
       (0.39) (0.41) (0.56) (0.41) (0.55) (0.53) (0.59) 
inf5  11.33    18.70*** 19.26***  11.04    18.73*** 19.53*** 
 
 (7.22) 




   
(7.09) (7.36) 











gdpgr5    -0.47**  -0.13 0.40    -0.48**  -0.13 0.42 








ln (agdppc5)     2.13*  -12.63     2.08*  -12.80 









* polins * LA 0.29*** 0.26** -0.16** 0.02 -0.19 -0.23* -0.28**        
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
     
  
adisincimfgdp5 
* polins * LA        1.32*** 1.14** -0.86 0.01 -1.03* -1.23** -1.54** 
 
       (0.44) (0.48) (0.62) (0.46) (0.60) (0.60) (0.66) 








  (9.75) (10.27) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
LA   1.01***   1.56** -1.10   1.03***   1.60*** -0.30 
   
(0.35) 
 




 (0.61) (34.84) 
gdpgr5 * LA    1.66***  0.49 0.25    1.68***  0.49 0.26 







(0.29)  (0.53) (1.27) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
LA     1.12***  2.91     1.15***  2.16 
          
(0.34) 
  
(35.19)   
  
    (0.34)   (35.24) 
Adjed R-sq 0.06 0.13 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.28 
# of cross secs 
62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 




Table A.90: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummies (disincimfgdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.34*** 15.37 0.00 (4.15.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 1.52*** 14.30 0.00 
           
(4.16.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.29*** 13.48 0.00 (4.16.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 1.29*** 13.59 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 16.51*** 9.89 0.00  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 16.83*** 10.35 0.00 
           
(4.17.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.07 1.18 0.28 (4.17.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.35 1.66 0.20 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.39*** 14.37 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.33*** 13.81 0.00 
           
(4.18.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.12 2.46 0.12 (4.18.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.47 2.04 0.15 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.19*** 13.05 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.20*** 13.11 0.00 
           
(4.19.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.07 1.52 0.22 (4.19.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.38 2.04 0.16 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.24*** 12.95 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.23*** 12.82 0.00 
           
(4.20.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.07 1.14 0.29 (4.20.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.37 1.61 0.21 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -0.86 0.02 0.90  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.08 0.03 0.87 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.10** 4.41 0.04  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.03* 4.09 0.05 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.36 0.69 0.41  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.36 0.71 0.40 
           
(4.21.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.07 1.12 0.29 (4.21.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.40 1.57 0.21 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.41 0.04 0.84  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.67 0.05 0.82 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 11.87 0.15 0.70  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 12.78 0.17 0.68 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.65 0.44 0.51  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.68 0.48 0.49 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -9.72 0.10 0.75   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -10.64 0.12 0.73 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      







Table A.91: Regression Results with Latin American Economies (LA) Dummy (disgdp5*polins)     
Variables  
/Model (4.15.3.t.1) (4.16.3.t.1) (4.17.3.t.1) (4.18.3.t.1) (4.19.3.t.1) (4.20.3.t.1) (4.21.3.t.1) (4.15.3.a.1) (4.16.3.a.1) (4.17.3.a.1) (4.18.3.a.1) (4.19.3.a.1) (4.20.3.a.1) (4.21.3.a.1) 
constant 41.59*** 39.72*** 24.27*** 42.54*** 25.57*** 34.20*** 33.63*** 41.73*** 39.87*** 24.81*** 42.68*** 25.79*** 34.90*** 33.87*** 
 
(1.01) (1.41) (6.72) (1.50) (6.77) (7.26) (7.93) (1.01) (1.42) (6.75) (1.50) (6.79) (7.29) (7.92) 
tdisgdp5*  
polins 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.27*        
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
       
adisgdp5* 
polins        0.18 0.13 0.49 0.54 0.63 1.11 1.45* 
 
     
  
(0.44) (0.49) (0.65) (0.47) (0.63) (0.71) (0.78) 
inf5  11.38    19.78*** 20.68***  11.07    19.89*** 21.10*** 
 





   
(7.52) (7.88) 











gdpgr5    -0.48**  -0.13 0.34    -0.50**  -0.14 0.36 








ln (agdppc5)     2.16*  -11.22     2.10*  -11.24 








tdisgdp5 * polins * 
LA 0.30*** 0.26** -0.15 0.01 -0.19 -0.28* -0.35**        
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) 
     
  
adisgdp5 * polins 
* LA        1.36*** 1.17** -0.85 -0.09 -1.03 -1.51** -1.88** 
 
     
  
(0.48) (0.53) (0.69) (0.53) (0.67) (0.76) (0.82) 








  (10.09) (10.61) 
ln (igdppc5) * LA   0.98***   1.64** -0.27   1.01***   1.68*** 0.60 
   
(0.35) 
 




 (0.63) (34.56) 
gdpgr5 * LA    1.68***  0.49 0.28    1.71***  0.50 0.30 







(0.29)  (0.52) (1.25) 
ln (agdppc5) * LA     1.09***  2.16     1.13***  1.35 
          
(0.34) 
  
(34.94)   
  
    (0.34)   (34.97) 
Adj’ed R-squared 0.06 0.13 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.06 0.12 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.29 
# of cross sec used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel  obs: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.    
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.    
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.       
 
 162 
Table A.92: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with LA Dummies (disgdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.34*** 14.75 0.00 (4.15.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 1.54*** 13.81 0.00 
           
(4.16.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.29*** 13.24 0.00 (4.16.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 1.30*** 13.37 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 16.74*** 9.90 0.00  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 17.03*** 10.31 0.00 
           
(4.17.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.07 1.22 0.27 (4.17.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.36 1.72 0.19 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 3.40*** 13.98 0.00  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*LA=0 3.34*** 13.38 0.00 
           
(4.18.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.11 2.28 0.13 (4.18.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 0.45 1.88 0.17 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.20*** 13.26 0.00  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 1.21*** 13.39 0.00 
           
(4.19.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.08 1.59 0.21 (4.19.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.39 2.13 0.15 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 3.25*** 12.51 0.00  
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*LA=0 3.23*** 12.31 0.00 
           
(4.20.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.08 1.36 0.25 (4.20.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.40 1.86 0.18 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -0.97 0.02 0.88  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.20 0.03 0.86 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 2.01* 3.83 0.05  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*LA=0 1.93* 3.52 0.06 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.36 0.71 0.40  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.36 0.73 0.40 
           
(4.21.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.08 1.32 0.25 (4.21.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*LA=0 -0.43 1.78 0.18 
 inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.52 0.05 0.83  inf5 + inf5*LA=0 -1.78 0.06 0.80 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*LA=0 11.07 0.13 0.72  
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*LA=0 11.88 0.15 0.70 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.63 0.42 0.52  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*LA=0 0.65 0.46 0.50 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*LA=0 -9.06 0.09 0.76   
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*LA=0 -9.89 0.11 0.74 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      






Table A.93: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (ibrdidagdp5*polins)     
Variables  
/Model (4.15.1.t.1) (4.16.1.t.1) (4.17.1.t.1) (4.18.1.t.1) (4.19.1.t.1) (4.20.1.t.1) (4.21.1.t.1) (4.15.1.a.1) (4.16.1.a.1) (4.17.1.a.1) (4.18.1.a.1) (4.19.1.a.1) (4.20.1.a.1) (4.21.1.a.1) 
constant 41.40*** 38.65*** 9.38** 42.92*** 10.33** 12.71** 11.18* 41.43*** 38.71*** 9.57** 42.98*** 10.20** 13.00** 10.82 
 
(1.04) (1.28) (4.34) (1.73) (4.63) (5.91) (5.69) (1.05) (1.30) (4.40) (1.74) (4.62) (6.08) (5.66) 
tibrdidagdp5* 
polins 0.16* 0.16* 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.14        
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) 
       
aibrdidagdp5* 
polins        0.81* 0.82* 0.20 0.62 0.36 0.67 0.73 
 
       (0.42) (0.47) (0.47) (0.44) (0.47) (0.59) (0.54) 
inf5  21.34***    16.31*** 14.56**  21.22***    16.29*** 14.63 
 
 (4.42) 




   
(5.71) (5.50) 











gdpgr5    -0.30  0.24 1.36    -0.30  0.24 1.38 








ln (agdppc5)     4.57***  -37.74     4.58***  -37.88 









polins * SSA -0.01 0.12 0.32** 0.01 0.31*** 0.20 0.31**        
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) 
     
  
aibrdidagdp5 * 
polins * SSA        -0.08 0.55 1.58** 0.04 1.53*** 0.98 1.51 
 
       (0.42) (0.51) (0.64) (0.47) (0.59) (0.75) (0.64) 








  (8.56) (8.53) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
SSA   -0.29   0.32 1.49   -0.31   0.29 3.06 
   
(0.39) 
 




 (0.73) (45.18) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    -0.10  -0.04 0.47    -0.12  -0.04 0.51 







(0.41)  (0.58) (1.64) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
SSA     -0.46  -2.04     -0.46  -3.64 
          
(0.32) 
  
(46.39)   
  
    (0.32)   (46.02) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.02 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.02 0.27 0.25 0.28 
# of cross sect.s 
used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 




Table A.94: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummies (ibrdidagdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.15** 4.52 0.04 (4.15.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.74** 4.68 0.03 
           
(4.16.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.28*** 14.67 0.00 (4.16.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.37*** 15.35 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -8.70 2.16 0.14  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -8.66 2.24 0.14 
           
(4.17.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.35*** 19.05 0.00 (4.17.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.78*** 20.21 0.00 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.47*** 29.42 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.43*** 28.28 0.00 
           
(4.18.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.13 2.57 0.11 (4.18.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.67* 2.69 0.10 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.40 0.96 0.33  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.42 1.04 0.31 
           
(4.19.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.38*** 31.09 0.00 (4.19.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.90*** 33.13 0.00 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.12*** 26.63 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.12*** 26.81 0.00 
           
(4.20.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.33*** 12.61 0.00 (4.20.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.66*** 13.58 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -4.79 0.52 0.47  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -4.42 0.47 0.49 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.98*** 13.17 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 3.92*** 12.29 0.00 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.20 0.25 0.62  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.19 0.22 0.64 
           
(4.21.1.t.1) 
tibrdidagdp5*polins + 
tibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.45*** 34.57 0.00 (4.21.1.a.1) 
aibrdidagdp5*polins + 
aibrdidagdp5*polins*SSA=0 2.24*** 36.93 0.00 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -7.31 1.12 0.29  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -6.70 1.01 0.32 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 42.77 1.17 0.28  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 44.52 1.29 0.26 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 1.84 1.60 0.21  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 1.89 1.71 0.19 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -39.78 0.98 0.32   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 -41.53 1.09 0.30 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      







Table A.95: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (disincimfgdp5*polins)     
Variables 
 /Model (4.15.2.t.1) (4.16.2.t.1) (4.17.2.t.1) (4.18.2.t.1) (4.19.2.t.1) (4.20.2.t.1) (4.21.2.t.1) (4.15.2.a.1) (4.16.2.a.1) (4.17.2.a.1) (4.18.2.a.1) (4.19.2.a.1) (4.20.2.a.1) (4.21.2.a.1) 
constant 41.03*** 38.58*** 12.65** 42.43*** 12.69** 21.09*** 19.20** 41.12*** 38.65*** 13.25** 42.56*** 12.87** 22.29*** 19.46*** 
 
(1.00) (1.27) (5.15) (1.59) (5.52) (7.14) (7.51) (0.99) (1.28) (5.22) (1.59) (5.52) (7.31) (7.49) 
tdisincimfgdp5* 
polins 0.18*** 0.14** -0.07 0.18*** -0.07 0.00 0.01        
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
       
adisincimfgdp5* 
polins        0.86*** 0.66** -0.28 0.86** -0.27 0.06 0.09 
 
       (0.29) (0.27) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) 
inf5  21.00***    14.38*** 13.40**  20.95***    14.44*** 13.56** 
 
 (4.33) 




   
(5.54) (5.75) 











gdpgr5    -0.35  -0.07 0.87    -0.36  -0.09 0.87 








ln (agdppc5)     4.40***  -29.96     4.36***  -29.76 









* polins * SSA 0.01 0.27* 0.22 -0.06 0.25 0.32 0.26        
 
(0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.30) (0.34) 
     
  
adisincimfgdp5 
* polins * SSA        0.07 1.38 1.16 -0.28 1.27 1.78 1.47 
 
       (0.52) (0.74) (0.98) (0.59) (0.96) (1.48) (1.68) 








  (9.24) (8.78) 
ln (igdppc5) * 
SSA   0.18   -0.12 -41.23   0.14   -0.25 -38.78 
   
(0.42) 
 




 (0.93) (51.87) 
gdpgr5 * SSA    0.22  0.48 -0.91    0.21  0.54 -0.78 







(0.37)  (0.65) (2.01) 
ln (agdppc5) * 
SSA     0.17  41.76     0.14  39.18 





  (0.42)  (53.11) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.17 
# of cross sect.s 
used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel  
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 158 160 158 136 133 
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Table A.96: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummies (disincimfgdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.19* 3.03 0.08 (4.15.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.93* 2.96 0.09 
           
(4.16.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.41** 7.63 0.01 (4.16.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 2.04** 7.62 0.01 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -6.01 1.11 0.29  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -6.29 1.22 0.27 
           
(4.17.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.15 0.61 0.43 (4.17.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.88 0.82 0.37 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.62*** 21.53 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.48*** 19.95 0.00 
           
(4.18.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.12 0.94 0.33 (4.18.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.58 0.91 0.34 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.13 0.11 0.74  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.15 0.15 0.70 
           
(4.19.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.18 0.89 0.35 (4.19.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.99 1.11 0.29 
 ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.57*** 18.99 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.50*** 18.47 0.00 
           
(4.20.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.32 1.15 0.29 (4.20.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.84 1.52 0.22 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -2.23 0.09 0.76  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -2.53 0.12 0.73 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 2.73* 3.19 0.08  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 2.44 2.49 0.12 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.41 0.69 0.41  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.45 0.82 0.37 
           
(4.21.2.t.1) 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins + 
tdisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.27 0.65 0.42 (4.21.2.a.1) 
adisincimfgdp5*polins + 
adisincimfgdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.56 0.85 0.36 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.76 0.01 0.91  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -0.96 0.02 0.89 
 ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -8.47 0.03 0.85  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -6.26 0.02 0.89 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.04 0.00 0.98  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.08 0.00 0.96 
  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 11.80 0.06 0.80   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 9.42 0.04 0.84 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      







Table A.97: Regression Results with Sub-Saharan Africa Economies (SSA) Dummy (disgdp5*polins)     
Variables  
/Model (4.15.3.t.1) (4.16.3.t.1) (4.17.3.t.1) (4.18.3.t.1) (4.19.3.t.1) (4.20.3.t.1) (4.21.3.t.1) (4.15.3.a.1) (4.16.3.a.1) (4.17.3.a.1) (4.18.3.a.1) (4.19.3.a.1) (4.20.3.a.1) (4.21.3.a.1) 
constant 41.00*** 38.39*** 12.76** 42.44*** 12.77** 20.90** 19.30** 41.09*** 38.46*** 13.38** 42.56*** 12.99** 22.13*** 19.63** 
 
(0.99) (1.33) (5.21) (1.57) (5.56) (7.26) (7.76) (0.99) (1.33) (5.27) (1.56) (5.57) (7.40) (7.70) 
tdisgdp5* 
polins 0.20*** 0.15** -0.06 0.20*** -0.06 0.01 0.01        
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
adisgdp5* 
polins        0.94*** 0.75*** -0.25 0.94*** -0.25 0.09 0.11 
 
       (0.30) (0.28) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) 
inf5  21.38***    14.46*** 13.47**  21.34***    14.52*** 13.64** 
 
 (4.44) 




   
(5.52) (5.74) 











gdpgr5    -0.36  -0.06 0.87    -0.37  -0.08 0.86 








ln (agdppc5)     4.38***  -29.88     4.33***  -29.59 









polins * SSA 0.03 0.32 0.25 -0.06 0.28 0.38 0.31        
 
(0.13) (0.19) (0.27) (0.15) (0.26) (0.52) (0.53) 
     
  
adisgdp5 * 
polins * SSA        0.18 1.63** 1.33 -0.25 1.47 2.23 1.82 
 
       (0.66) (0.94) (1.36) (0.75) (1.32) (2.60) (2.66) 








  (11.33) (10.85) 
ln (igdppc5) 
* SSA   0.19   -0.15 -49.89   0.13   -0.33 -48.39 
   
(0.45) 
 




 (1.25) (49.96) 
gdpgr5 * 
SSA    0.22  0.41 -1.26    0.21  0.48 -1.16 







(0.38)  (0.69) (1.88) 
ln (agdppc5) 
* SSA     0.17  50.53     0.14  48.88 
          
(0.45) 
  
(51.01)   
  
    (0.45)   (51.00) 
adjusted R-
squared 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.16 
# of cross 
sections used 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 62 57 61 62 61 56 55 
∑ panel 
observations: 162 139 159 161 158 137 133 161 138 159 161 158 137 133 
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Table A.98: Wald Test Results for the Significance of The Coefficients in Regression Results with SSA Dummies (disgdp5*polins) 
Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob Model Null Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Sums F-Statistic Prob 
(4.15.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.23 2.65 0.11 (4.15.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.12 2.59 0.11 
           
(4.16.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.47** 5.89 0.02 (4.16.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 2.37** 5.89 0.02 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -3.03 0.22 0.64  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 -3.30 0.26 0.61 
           
(4.17.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.18 0.46 0.50 (4.17.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.08 0.63 0.43 
 
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.60** 19.62 0.00  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 4.45*** 18.04 0.00 
           
(4.18.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.14 0.84 0.36 (4.18.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.69 0.81 0.37 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.14 0.13 0.72  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.16 0.17 0.68 
           
(4.19.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.22 0.68 0.41 (4.19.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.21 0.84 0.36 
 
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.55** 17.50 0.00  ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 4.47*** 16.91 0.00 
           
(4.20.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.39 0.55 0.46 (4.20.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 2.32 0.78 0.38 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 1.11 0.01 0.91  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 1.42 0.02 0.89 
 
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*SSA=0 2.71 2.15 0.15  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 2.37 1.62 0.21 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.35 0.43 0.51  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 0.40 0.55 0.46 
           
(4.21.3.t.1) 
tdisgdp5*polins + 
tdisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 0.32 0.36 0.55 (4.21.3.a.1) 
adisgdp5*polins + 
adisgdp5*polins*SSA=0 1.93 0.51 0.47 
 inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 2.52 0.07 0.79  inf5 + inf5*SSA=0 2.92 0.10 0.76 
 
ln (igdppc5) + ln 
(igdppc5)*SSA=0 -17.22 0.16 0.69  ln (igdppc5) + ln (igdppc5)*SSA=0 -16.08 0.14 0.71 
 gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.39 0.06 0.81  gdpgr5 + gdpgr5*SSA=0 -0.30 0.04 0.85 
  
ln (agdppc5) + ln 
(agdppc5)*SSA=0 20.65 0.22 0.64   ln (agdppc5) + ln (agdppc5)*SSA=0 19.30 0.19 0.66 
*** reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
** reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.      
* reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.           
 
 
 
